

THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY



EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VOL. XXI

OCTOBER, 1958

No. 4

SENSE CONSCIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS



A concept of consciousness would seem to be an integral part of a theory of knowledge as well as a crucial element in any theory of human nature. Our capacity to know ourselves is necessarily bound up inextricably with the question of our capacity to know in general, and in turn underlies many such problems as those of self-realization and the validity of self-criticism, the nature of psychological personality, the foundation of ethics and morality, and other related points.

Traditionally accepted as an evident object of psychological study, both by philosophers and early empirical psychologists, the notion of consciousness began to suffer a certain diminution in the latter half of the nineteenth century, until in some schools of thought its reality came to be wholly denied. At the same time, through the influence of psychoanalysis, the

important role of the unconscious mind was made strikingly manifest, and the question of the respective influence of conscious and unconscious motivation became a central issue in psychology and ethics. At the present time, with the reality of consciousness generally accepted again, and some of the early over-statements of the force of the unconscious somewhat modified, the time seems ripe for an extensive investigation of the relationships obtaining between the conscious and unconscious spheres of men's minds. In this context, it seems useful to state more fully the ideas on consciousness held by St. Thomas, not only because his insights are bound to be of value in discussing current problems, but also because such doctrine should be explicitly understood if many of the implications of Thomistic psychology and moral theology are to be fully appreciated. Certainly many aspects of the doctrine of consciousness have been treated in one form or another, but, so far as I know, there is no complete and exhaustive statement. In working towards such a statement, it seems useful to sketch first, as in general outline, a broader conspectus of the points which will have to be raised and solved before an integral statement can be offered. For the sake of analysis, the matter may be divided under three main headings; the questions of strictly sense consciousness, the questions of purely intellectual consciousness, and the questions of intellectual reflection on the senses. Our immediate purpose here is to raise and discuss some of the problems involved in sense consciousness.

By way of preliminary notes, some of the ambiguity which attaches itself to the notion of consciousness should be removed. In common usage, consciousness often means nothing more than knowledge, for instance, when we ask someone whether or not he was conscious of some noise or sight. For St. Thomas, however, consciousness always had a note of cognitive complexity about it; it was knowledge as applied to something.¹

¹ "Nomen enim conscientiae significat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid; unde conscire dicitur quasi simul scire." *De Verit.*, q. 17, a. 1; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 13; *II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

In the moral order, it was knowledge applied to deliberate actions as they measured up to or failed to measure up to rules of reason and Faith; what is today called conscience. This moral consciousness was necessarily founded on psychological consciousness, which, in its strictest sense, was knowledge of knowledge, or the awareness of an act of knowledge. It thus involved two elements—an apprehension of some knowable object and a separate cognitive realization that that object was apprehended. By extension, however, the word “consciousness” could be used to signify the things of which one has consciousness, that is, the things known which are known to be known.² By extension, again, in another direction, consciousness may signify the act of being aware of other psychological states or operations besides those which are cognitive, that is, the actual awareness of emotions, feelings, performances and the like. Under this aspect, the object of consciousness goes on to include, and indeed as a most important and central and in a sense essential element, the awareness of the knowing self, for consciousness reaches its perfection when the knower is revealed to himself in his act of knowledge and in his other vital actions.³

Consciousness, for St. Thomas, always indicates an operation, never a habit or power. States of consciousness are more or less continuous series of acts of consciousness, and may vary in duration, intensity, clarity, extension, distinctness and in other qualities, ranging from total unconsciousness as in comas, through various grades of partial consciousness, to alert attention. For consciousness is by no means a homogeneous state of activity opposed simply to unconsciousness; men seem rather to live in a state of more or less fluid balance between conscious and unconscious motivations, thoughts, drives, emotions, judgments, moods and persuasions. A valid description, therefore,

² “Quandoque enim conscientia sumitur pro ipsa re conscita . . . Illud quidem secundum usum loquentium esse videtur ut conscientia quandoque pro re conscita accipiatur, ut cum dicitur: Dicam tibi conscientiam meam; id est quod est in conscientia mea.” *De Verit.*, q. 17, a. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 9.

of man's mind cannot confine itself exclusively to the conscious nor to the unconscious. The problems of the mind must be set in the context of degrees, limits and qualifications, and mutual influences. In this light, the analysis of consciousness ought to be prosecuted, beginning, as seems convenient, with the lower senses in which, although the factor of actual consciousness is slight, the raw materials of all knowledge and of eventual full consciousness are prepared.

ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY AT THE SENSE LEVEL

A. *Consciousness of the objects and activities of the senses*

1. *How the external senses are involved in consciousness*

Since all human knowledge begins in the senses, a reflexive examination of the functioning of human consciousness may be reasonably initiated with the analysis of the role of the external senses. External sense knowledge is not, of itself, conscious knowledge, for it does not extend beyond a simple apprehension of the sensible qualities in the environment (or within the sensing subject considered as environment with respect to the sense activity in question). Thus it is purely awareness of other things, outward looking and saying nothing of self-awareness, simple, without depth, without organization and, in fact, not even perfectly possessed of objectivity. It is, therefore, an act of cognition but not of consciousness, entering into the order of consciousness, when it enters at all, purely as an object. For sense consciousness on the part of the external senses would involve man in knowing, by means of these senses, that he senses and what he senses—the fact and the nature of the fact. And such is not the activity of the external senses, for their own activity presents none of the factors which they themselves are ordered to apprehend. Seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., are not themselves colored or sounding or hard or soft objects; they are thus hidden to the external senses.⁴ If man,

⁴ "Sensus non sentiunt sine exterioribus sensibilibus." *II de Anima*, lect. 10, § 354. Cf. lect. 12, § 375.

therefore, had only his external senses, he could apprehend well enough, but he could not know that he was apprehending.⁵

2. *The role of the common sense*

We enter for the first time into the area of consciousness when we look to the function and activity of the common sense, for here is a faculty which can know knowledge, which can be aware of psychological activity.⁶ This is evident from the words of St. Thomas concerning the functions of the common sense. "For the common sense is a certain power in which terminate the transformations of all the senses."⁷ It is the power which is the root from which flow all the external senses as from an energizing source.⁸ Standing thus as the common point of reference for the external senses, it knows the objects they apprehend, and knows that they apprehend them—that they are acting, and how. Therefore, it is the sense by which man senses that he senses, giving him his first awareness of his own sensitive activity, uniting and binding the various activities of the senses by consciousness in the one sentient subject.⁹

⁵ "... a (sensu communi) percipiuntur intentiones sensuum; sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.

⁶ Since this is not the place for an "ex professo" treatment of St. Thomas' psychology, we will not enter into the arguments for the number and nature and functions of the various senses, unless it seems necessary for our purpose. The evidence and justification of his basic psychological conceptions belong to a more general treatise in psychology. Our purpose is satisfied when we outline the nature of consciousness as it follows from the concept of the structure of the soul as St. Thomas proposed it.

⁷ *II de Anima*, lect. 13, § 390.

⁸ "Attribuitur autem ista discretio tactui non secundum quod tactus est sensus proprius, sed secundum quod est fundamentum omnium sensuum, et propinquius se habens ad fontalem radicem omnium sensuum, qui est sensus communis." *III de Anima*, lect. 3, § 602. Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 1.

⁹ "Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium ad quem referantur; sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiuntur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre . . . a sensu communi, qui visionem percipit." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2. "Sicut in ipso homine patet quod sensus communis, qui est superior quam sensus

Moreover, because it is the focal point of all the external senses, it is able to discriminate among them and their objects, discerning not only black from white, as the eye can do, or sweet from bitter, as the tongue can do, but also sweet from white and black from bitter, which neither tongue nor eye can do, and any sensible quality whatsoever from any other.¹⁰

Thus St. Thomas posits two functions in the common sense: to perceive all the sensible qualities already separately apprehended by the several external senses, and to perceive them in a certain unity, for it is itself one single power, and also—presupposing the first—to discriminate among the many sensible qualities, comparing and judging them among themselves. We have, therefore, in the activity of the common sense, a truly conscious process.¹¹

Besides these functions of the common sense, by which it formally enters into the process of consciousness, insofar as it senses the operations of the external senses, there are two other contributions it makes to consciousness, not by being an act of consciousness, but by providing an element in the cognitive structure which is essential to consciousness in one way or another. Merely to provide material for other acts of knowledge, that is, to enter into the content of consciousness, is by no means peculiar to the common sense. What is special about its contribution in this order derives from its particular role in regard to the external senses.

In the first place, the common sense is the only internal power which is in direct and immediate contact with the external senses. It is, therefore, the one power which can provide

proprius, licet sit unica potentia, omnia cognoscit quae quinque sensibus exterioribus cognoscuntur. . . . Ibid., I, q. 57, a. 2.—Cf. *III de Anima*, lect. 3, § 612.

¹⁰ "Quia discernimus aliqua virtute, non solum album a nigro, vel dulce ab amaro, sed etiam album a dulci, et unumquodque sensibile discernimus ab unoquoque et sentimus quod hoc sit per sensum." *III de Anima*, lect. 3, § 601.

¹¹ It is true consciousness, but not proper consciousness. According to St. Thomas, consciousness is reflective activity, which is the knowing of knowledge, and this can be twofold, proper or improper. It is proper if one power know itself or its own act, improper if one power know the act or object of another power. Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.

man with data which forms the basis for distinguishing external sensations of reality from internal imaginings. This specialty of function will be investigated later in more detail,¹² and is only mentioned here to highlight its importance. For without the common sense, man might be conscious, but his consciousness would be distorted, unable to mark off clearly what comes to him from external reality and what rises from within himself subjectively.

Again, the common sense refers external sensations to the sensing subject. We do not mean that the common sense is perfectly and formally aware of these acts as acts of the sensing subject. What we mean is that, by uniting the several acts of sensation arising in different organs in its own single perception, it provides an effective evidence that they are related to each other as the several facets of the activity of one sensing subject. This evidence points to the subject underlying the several sensations, if there is another sense with the power to perceive it.¹³ It is probably because of this role which the common sense plays in regard to revealing the unity of the sensing subject that St. Thomas will say of its activity not merely that we know we see or hear through the common sense, but also that through its activity we know that we live, indicating not simply the effects of living but the interior fact itself.¹⁴

Briefly, then, to summarize what has been said of the common sense: this power in man is one which sees, hears, feels, etc., all the sights, sounds, touches, etc., which are first sensed by the external senses. It is, as it were, an internal eye and ear and tongue and finger, possessing the sensitivity of all the other senses. Being a single receptive center for all their separate activities, it collects their several impressions into one common matrix of sense activity, in which it can discern them one from another and refer them all to the one sensing subject. Being thus oriented towards the outside reality apprehended

¹² See p. 441.

¹³ See p. 484.

¹⁴ "Sensu enim communi percipimus nos vivere." *II de Anima*, lect. 13, § 390.

by the external senses, it provides grounds for distinguishing reality from imaginations.

3. *The functions of the other internal senses*

There is, however, more to sense life than this. We know of images in our imagination, perceptions of the memory and of instinct. How do these pertain to consciousness?

Primarily these powers give knowledge of the things we know through the external senses, but under an elaboration and an aspect proper to themselves. The imagination knows sensible objects as reproduced within the sensing subject, removed from the context of time and place, freed from the context in which they were first apprehended.

Memory perceives sense objects as things belonging to a part of the past, definite or indefinite, but always as past. Its proper object is the intention of pastness, referring sensed objects to the context of things already experienced.¹⁵

The cogitative power or particular reason, which corresponds to the power of instinct or estimation in brute animals, also apprehends an intention, the intention of singularity by which a mass of sensible data is designated as a singular quiddity or thing.¹⁶

All of these activities belong to the content of consciousness, perceptible to anyone who engages in introspection even superficially. The question which must be raised now, however, is whether or not there is an element of subjective or active consciousness in the operations of these powers. Do they know knowledge? Before trying to answer this question it will be useful to investigate more fully the function of the internal senses.

a. *Imagination*

When man's senses apprehend some object in his environ-

¹⁵ For a discussion of St. Thomas' conception and use of "intentions," see H. D. Simonin, O.P., "La Notion d' 'intentio' dans l'oeuvre de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Rev. de Sc. Phil. et Theol.*, XIX (1930).

¹⁶ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4.

ment and are impressed with its sensible qualities, these qualities impress not only the particular senses in question but also, and with a certain elaboration¹⁷ the internal power of imagination,¹⁸ and in fact this may occur whether or not he is conscious of the act of sensing.¹⁹ Once impressed in the imagination, the image is conserved as in a treasury, and can be evoked or reproduced henceforward. Thus the imagination differs from the external senses and the common sense, since these can act only in the presence of the sensible quality, and cease to act with its removal, while the imagination, once impressed with the quality sensed, can recall it even when the object originally possessing it has disappeared, thereby giving all sensible objects a kind of second life, or capacity to live and re-live for the benefit of the sensing subject.²⁰ Moreover, in the imagination, the objects sensed are freed from the context in which they were originally apprehended and are capable of being elaborated or of being combined among themselves in an almost unlimited variety of new formations,²¹ which might exist in a reality never seen, or in no reality at all, or in a reality proposed for future accomplishment.²² This is the functioning of the

¹⁷ " . . . una vis imaginationis se extendit ad omnia quae quinque vires sensuum cognoscunt et ad plura." *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 65, in the middle.

¹⁸ Imagination is a certain movement produced beyond the order of the external senses by their own activity. It is a "movement made by the senses in act." *IV Metaphys.*, lect. 14, § 692; *III de Anima*, lect. 6, § 655-659.

¹⁹ For an excellent description of the elements which may enter the imaginative content without having been first consciously perceived, see *Le Subconscient*, Ière Serie, Ière cours: *Nature et Action du Subconscient*, P. Reginald Omez, O. P., 1949. (Unpublished).

²⁰ "Vis enim imaginativa est apprehensiva similitudinum corporalium, etiam rebus absentibus quarum sunt similitudines." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 15, a. 1.

²¹ "Sicut etiam in speculativis aliqui sunt bene inquirentes, propter hoc quod ratio eorum prompta est ad discurrendum per diversa, quod videtur provenire ex dispositione imaginativae virtutis, quae de facili potest formare diversa phantasmata." *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 51, a. 3.

²² "Vis imaginativa potest formare diversorum sensibilium formas; quod praecipue apparet dum imaginamur ea quae numquam sensu percepimus." *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 6, ad 5. "In imaginatione autem non solum sunt formae rerum sensibilium secundum quod accipiuntur a sensu, sed transmutatur diversimode, vel propter aliquam transmutationem corporalem, sicut accidit in dormientibus et furiosis;

creative imagination, which belongs to the sense power in question insofar as it operates under the direction of reason, and it has extensive influence in all human activity.²³ For by this disposition of images under the direction of reason, the great creative works of fine and practical art are patterned and executed, while in everyday life, speech, gesture and most ordinary activity is formed imaginatively before being acted out.

b. Sense Memory

The role of memory is to perceive the past.²⁴ Among the wealth of images in the imagination, dissociated from time and place, and seeming to live in an independent and freely evolving existence, there is need to keep record of the order of images as they were perceived, if experience is to be a useful part of man's psychological equipment. To fashion experience into a useful tool man must have such order in the elements of sense knowledge that he can recall what come before and what come after, what is associated with another in spatial association, what image is of a thing seen before in a certain context of time and place, and what is new.²⁵ It is memory which fashions

vel etiam secundum imperium rationis disponuntur phantasmata in ordine ad id quod est intelligendum." *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 173, a. 2.

²³ "Apprehensio autem imaginationis, cum sit particularis, regulatur ab apprehensione rationis, sicut virtus activa particularis a virtute activa universali." *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 17, a. 7.

²⁴ "Vis autem memorativa retinet, cuius est memorari rem non absolute, sed prout est in praeterito apprehensa a sensu vel intellectu." *De Memoria*, lect. 2, § 321.

²⁵ Although the sense memory is generally treated after the discussion of the imagination in psychological textbooks, and is so treated here, it would probably be erroneous to think of its function as following upon that of imagination, as if it functions only after the imagination has functioned. Actually, the sense memory seems to be closer to the external senses than the imagination, since it recalls perceptions in the order and context in which they originate, while imagination takes the images without this order and context. From the point of view of object, then, memory seems more closely allied to the external senses than imagination. This observation seems confirmed from the point of view of psychological structure, for St. Thomas seems to make the memory pertain to the common sense in some way. "Unde concludit quod memoria sit intellectivae partis animae, sed per accidens; per se autem primi sensitivi, scilicet sensus communis." Probably

this order of images, for the function of memory is to recognize, among the things we apprehend, those which we perceived before, and to evoke the record of things apprehended as they were apprehended before.²⁶

Thus there seems to be a certain complexity of act in the memory's perception of the past. There seems to be a difference, for instance, between recollection, by which an incident recalled from the past is cited by memory as being in a certain context of time gone by, and recognition, by which an object presently known is known as having been previously perceived. In the first case, the excitation to act is internal, often from a voluntary intention, and the reference of the act is as of an act simply looking back to time past. In the second case, the excitation is external, and the reference is of the thing presently perceived to the same thing as perceived in the past. In the first case, then, the term of the knowledge seems to be primarily the perceptions themselves—this perception is this perception as it was had in the past. In the second case, the term of the knowledge seems to be primarily the things known—this thing, presently perceived, is the one perceived in the past. Here the note of "being perceived" seems to be secondary, in the intentional order, to the thing perceived.

And yet it cannot be denied that in either case, the crucial factors are the perceptions. The past perception is crucial because the past, with which the present is connected and to which it is referred in an act of memory, is a past which manifestly depends on having been perceived. There is no other way in which a sensible object could become an object of memory if it were not perceived at least once before.²⁷ The

the original sense impressions move both imagination and memory immediately, in order of time and nature, and with the images so supplied, each goes on its separate way. These problems, however, will come to the fore in the discussions on the interplay of the senses below.

²⁶ Cf. *de Memoria*, lect. 5, §§ 368-369.

²⁷ Non enim memoramur ea in quantum in praesenti eorum scientiam habemus, sed per se memorari non contingit ante factum tempus, scilicet antequam inter-

present perception is crucial because there is no way by which the past perception can be presently observed except through a present perception, for the act of memory exists in the present, spanning past and present by making the past reappear in a present act. This is done, of course, by an image, which is conserved from the past and reformed in the present, when the external sensible or perception of it is no longer present. Whence St. Thomas remarks that memory depends on phantasms.²⁸ Therefore, in its act of recollection, memory involves a present perception (of some object) referred to the past as having a real identity with a perception of the past, and differing only in time. Its act could be expressed in the sentence: This, the present perception, is a perception already had in the past. In its act of recognition, memory involves a perception of a thing present, referred to the same thing perceived in the past, and this could be expressed: This, the thing perceived, was perceived in the past. Thus the power of memory falls on perceptions and on things perceived.²⁹

The object of memory is an image, similar to that of the imagination³⁰ but endowed with its peculiar intention, which is a relation to the past as has been described above, of the thing perceived now, or of the present perception, to its perception in the past, or to the thing perceived in the past, as of before and after in time, near or far from each other in place,

veniat tempus medium inter notitiam prius existentem et ipsam memoriam." *Ibid.*, lect. 4, § 354.

²⁸ "(Memoria) non autem est sine phantasmate. Sensibilia enim postquam praetereunt, a sensu non percipiuntur, nisi sicut in phantasmate. . . . Unde per se memoria pertinet ad apparitionem phantasmatum." *Ibid.*, lect. 2, § 320.

²⁹ "Praeteritio potest ad duo referri: scilicet ad obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili; unde simul animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse quoddam praeteritum sensibile." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 6, ad 2.

³⁰ The imagination, memory and cogitative powers receive and retain the same or similar images, but under different formalities. "Si autem dicatur quod hic homo non sortitur speciem ab ipsis phantasmatibus, sed a virtutibus in quibus sunt phantasmata, scilicet, imaginativa, memorativa et cogitativa. . . ." *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 73, just before the middle.

familiar, therefore, or new, etc. Memory is formed on the basis of these intentions among the images of sensible reality, conserving them in an interconnected matrix of experience, or in a connecting web of things and perceptions inextricably bound up with one another.

Moreover, in virtue of these interconnections, memory serves man in the act of deliberate recollection or reminiscence, in which a man begins with some part of his remembered experience as an initial point for inquiry of other parts of experience which have been temporarily lost to evocation, but which he plans to regain along the paths of association, as directed by reason.³¹

c. Cogitative power

The cogitative power, which is also called the particular reason, and which corresponds to the estimative power in brute animals, is a sense power which perceives and collects individual intentions, that is, it perceives not simply the sensible quality as apprehended by the external senses, but also the concrete individual so qualified.³² The sensible species or image formed in the cogitative is made, like that in the imagination and memory, of the sensible qualities as apprehended by the external senses, but over and above its sensible content, it contains a reference or relationship to the individual possessing the qualities sensed, and to that individual as such. It is the peculiar function of the cogitative to grasp or perceive this relationship, which is called a singular or individual or particular intention, and is not apprehended by any other sense.³³

³¹ Cf. *de Memoria*, c. 2.

³² "Si vero apprehendatur (aliquid) in singulari, utputa cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium." *II de Anima*, lect. 13, § 396. "Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4.

³³ "Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4. "Licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae

Hence the intention is called an unsensed intention. The object, therefore, of the cogitative is the "thing"—this or that individual thing, which first impressed the sensing subject with its sensible qualities through the external senses and is subsequently perceived by the cogitative, through and under the sensible qualities, as their concrete possessor. Naturally, the thing as known by the cogitative does not have the force and precision of "thing" as known by the intellect, for the cogitative is not an abstracting power. Nevertheless, there is a quasi-abstraction in the function of the cogitative, for it is precisely the individual intention on which its power falls and for this reason its object can be defined as the quiddity of a particular thing—the quiddity of the particular thing as particular.³⁴

The significance of what this grasping of individual intentions entails has no small importance in regard to an understanding of the workings of sentient life. All animals act for two purposes: to stay alive and to reproduce. So all their knowledge is ordered to finding food to eat and water to drink, to avoiding dangers and enemies and to securing mates and protecting offspring. But the knowledge which is limited to sensible qualities is entirely insufficient to accomplish these purposes; sensible qualities themselves do not feed or hurt or help in reproducing. It is the thing which has these qualities which helps or hinders the animal. Hence the animal must have some cognitive power which enables him to discern the thing under the qualities, and this is the estimative power. So the estimative in animals is ordered to perceiving those things which are terms or principles of action and passion in it according to

sensus percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori modo." *Idem*, ad 4.

³⁴ "Sensus autem exteriores ipsa sensibilia accidentia, communia scilicet et propria, habent pro suis per se obiectis. Quidditas autem rei particularis in particulari non spectat ut per se obiectum ad illos sensus exteriores, cum quidditas ipsa substantia sit et non accidens; nec ad intellectum pertinet ut per se obiectum eius propter suam materialitatem. Ideo quidditas rei materialis in ipsa sua particularitate est obiectum rationis particularis, cuius est conferre de intentionibus particularibus." *De Princ. Individuationis*.

its species, and so also the estimative is the cognitive principle of its appetites.³⁵ Hence, for the brute animals, the individual intentions of the estimative always involve aspects of concrete utility or harm, or of gratification or repugnance, amicability or hostility, in reference to the species and organic conditions of the sensing subject, for on such factors depend such utilities and hostilities, etc.³⁶

But man's life has its animal purposes and more. His sensing powers are ordained not only to self-preservation and the preservation of the race, but also to apprehending and preparing the materials on which his intellect and reason can work. So the cogitative in man is not limited to perceiving the useful or harmful individuals in his environment, but any and all individual things.³⁷

More light is thrown on the nature of these individual intentions from the remarks St. Thomas makes about the power of the cogitative to perceive the sensible "*per accidens*."³⁸ He says that when we see a colored thing, and perceive it as a singular object, the perception of the singular is *per accidens*

³⁵ "Aestimativa autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum, secundum quod est sub natura communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis vel passionis; sicut ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum est hic agnus, sed inquantum est ab ea lactabilis; et hanc herbam, inquantum est eius cibus. . . . Naturalis enim aestimativa datur animalibus, ut per eam ordinentur in actiones proprias vel passiones, prosequendas, vel fugiendas." *II de Anima*, lect. 13, § 398.

³⁶ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4.

³⁷ It is interesting, in this light, to recall that brute animals apparently cannot discern an individual as such in their environment unless it moves. This is a fact which bullfighters and hunters stalking animals take into account. Man, however, can discern things whether moving or at rest.

³⁸ St. Thomas distinguishes the *per se* proper sensible of a sense, which is apprehended only by one particular sense, such as color by sight, and the *per se* common sensible, which is apprehended by more than one sense, such as motion by sight and touch, and the *per accidens* sensible, which is not apprehended at all by the sense to which it is *per accidens*, but is apprehended by some other power at the time when the sense in question apprehends its *per se* sensible, as when we see a man moving and say that we see a living man. The powers which concur with one sense in cases of *per accidens* sensation are another sense or the cogitative or the estimative or the intellect. Cf. *II de Anima*, lect. 13, §§ 384-386, 395.

to the seeing, and the power concurring with sight in this perception is the cogitative power.³⁹ The cogitative, therefore, falls directly upon the singularity or thingness of an object that is seen or heard or otherwise perceived in its sensible qualities by the external senses, i. e., on the particular quiddity as such.

To continue, however, in the development of the nature and function of the cogitative, we find that it not only apprehends individual intentions, but it also composes and divides them, making a kind of collation, that is, a collection of intentions assorted according to their kinds.⁴⁰ In other words, the cogitative is a power capable of making judgments, not indeed in the full and formal sense in which the intellect makes judgments, but in a virtual sense and within the limits of concrete and sensible data. That is to say, the cogitative actually composes two or more individuals into a kind of unity based on their similarity, and adds subsequent similar individuals to the aggregation, so that the cogitative eventually grasps not only this singular individual, but also this kind of individual, in the

³⁹ "Viso igitur quomodo dicantur per se sensibilia, et communia et propria, restat videndum, qua ratione dicatur aliquid sensibile per accidens. . . . Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili, potest dici sensibile per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur intellectu. . . . Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, utputa cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam." *Ibid.*, §§ 395-396.

⁴⁰ "Et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam sensitivae partis componens et dividens intentiones individuales quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa. . . ." *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 5. (This text, as given, is an emendation of the Marietti edition, according to text presently approved by the Leonine Commission, Santa Sabina, Rome. Cf. footnote, p. 92, "Experimentum and some related problems according to St. Thomas," Fergol O'Connor, O.P. Angelicum Dissertations, Rome, 1956). "Quia cum virtus cogitativa habeat operationes solum circa particularia, quorum intentiones dividit et componit. . . ." *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 73. "Sensus autem iudicium de quibusdam est naturale, sicut de propriis sensibilibus; de quibusdam autem quasi per quamdam collationem, quam facit in homine vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae partis, loco cuius in aliis animalibus est existimatio naturalis; et sic iudicat vis sensitiva de sensibilibus communibus et de sensibilibus per accidens." *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 11.

sense of a general group attained under one sensible species. And, consequently, it attains also to the distinctions among individual types, since it separates individuals into their different groups, and knows them as different. The result is experience—knowledge caused by many apprehensions of one thing on the part of the cogitative, retained in the storehouse of the cogitative, which is memory.⁴¹

This power of collation belongs to the cogitative insofar as it serves under the power of universal reason: in brute animals the judgment of singulars is accomplished by natural instinct. In man, indeed, there is something of this natural estimation too, but for the most part, the cogitative seems to lack the determination of the estimative, and consequently its limitation, and to be universalized, by participation of universal reason, and at the same time, dependent on such reason for the full acquisition of value determinations.⁴² So a sheep knows that grass is its food by a natural estimation; man learns what is food for himself partly by natural estimation and partly by experience informed by reason. In other words, man is not sufficiently equipped on the sense level to make an adequate judgment of what is good or bad for him by natural instinct. He has certain more or less vague perceptions which need to be perfected and completed by a collation of incidents leading to experience, and especially by intellectual knowledge generated from this experience.⁴³ Hence man's cogitative power

⁴¹ "Supra memoriam autem in hominibus . . . est experimentum, quod quaedam animalia non participant nisi parum. Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria receptorum. Huiusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur: quae est collativa intentionum individualium. . . . Modus autem causandi (experimentum) est iste: quia ex multis memoriis unius rei accipit homo experimentum de aliquo, quo experimento potens est ad facile et recte operandum." *I Metaphys.*, lect. 1, §§ 15 and 17. "Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa.—Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4.

⁴² "Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas (scil. singulares) differentia est; nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo etiam per quandam collationem." *Summa Theol.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴³ This is not to say that brute animals do not also acquire some perfection

can be said to lack a perfection which the estimative has, but it is more than compensated for this lack by being free to participate in the perfections of a higher order.

The final points to be made about the cogitative also concern its relationship with this higher order of reason. Since man's mind is not endowed with innate ideas, but depends on what he knows from the senses, the functioning of sense knowledge in man must be considered as ordered principally to providing the matter for intellectual knowledge, and not simply to providing the cognitive elements of his animal life, for whenever a lower order is ordained to the service of a higher order, its service to the higher order is more important, in the order of finality, than the accomplishment of its proper role. So the summit of the sensitive order is the point at which it immediately serves the intellectual order, and this point in man is the function of the cogitative, preparing phantasms to be instruments of the active intelligence.⁴⁴ These phantasms present to the intellect an adequate picture of the external, sensible world, containing all that the several external senses have perceived, bound together in the proper objects, in the context of space and time, and with the complexity and variety of detail which numerous similar perceptions conserved in memory can provide, in other words, the complete, sensitive synthesis implied in the word "experience." From this matter, the intellect draws its ideas.⁴⁵ But, since the intellect depends on

of knowledge by experience. However, their capacity for such added perfections is slight, and always limited within the bounds of the end set for instinct. "Et, quia ex multis sensibus et memoria animalia ad aliquid consuescunt prosequendum vel vitandum, inde est quod aliquid experimenti, licet parum, participare videntur. Homines autem supra experimentum, quod pertinent ad rationem particularem, habent rationem universalem, per quam vivunt, sicut per id quod est principale in eis." *I Metaphys.*, lect. 1, § 15.

⁴⁴ "Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit homo, nisi per suum actum quo praeeparantur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentem fiant intelligibilia actu, et perficientia intellectum possibilem." *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 73.

⁴⁵ Nam sicut ex multis memoriis fit una experimentalis scientia, ita ex multis experimentis apprehensis fit universalis acceptio de omnibus similibus. Unde plus

phantasms not only in the acquisition of ideas but also in any subsequent use, the cogitative enters necessarily into all intellectual considerations, and hence must be subject to direction from the intellect, so that its own activity will be conformed to the purposes of the higher power, and not vice versa. Hence St. Thomas says that the cogitative by its very nature is moved and directed by universal reason.⁴⁶ And, beyond this, if the cogitative is a *sine qua non* of any intellectual operation, it is essentially necessary in any intellectual operation which is carried through to a singular conclusion, for the intellect by itself knows the universal, and by itself is out of contact with the world of concrete things and actions. Hence, whenever science is to be applied to particular facts, and whenever the practical reason operates in either a prudential judgment or a work of art, the function of the cogitative must enter in, to join the universal order to the singular.⁴⁷ This can all be summed up in the phrase "knowing the individual as existing under the common nature." For the cogitative which perceives the singular subject of sensible qualities as its proper object, also moves the power of reason, whose proper object is the universal, to grasp the universal concept entailed in the singular subject. In turn, the cogitative is moved by the power of reason when reason refers its concept back to the singular subject through the image in the cogitative. In this sense the cogitative knows, for example, "this man" or "these men" as the concrete realities represented in the universal concept "man"—the individuals under the common nature.⁴⁸

habet hoc ars quam experimentum: quia experimentum tantum circa singularia versatur, ars autem ratio universalis." *I Metaphys.*, lect. 1, § 18.

⁴⁶ "Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi in homine secundum rationem universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 81, a. 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* "Universalem vero sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singulare, ut sic fiat quidam syllogismus, cuius major sit universalis, quae est sententia mentis; minor autem singularis, quae est apprehensio particularis rationis; conclusio vero electio singularis operis." *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 5.

⁴⁸ "Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum, ut existens sub natura communi;

And finally, it can be noted that in syllogisms composed entirely of singulars, the whole formality of the act belongs to the cogitative, although virtually the intellect is acting, for the terms are all singulars, which are known only to the cogitative but the activity of formally composing and dividing must be derived from the higher power. So it is, in any temerarious judgment, such as: John likes Mary, Tom likes Mary, John likes Tom. And if it seems remarkable that any such act can belong to the sensitive power, the reason must be sought in the functional unity it attains with the intellect, by which it participates something of intellectual power, and rises markedly above the limitations of strict sensitive activity.⁴⁹

Hence the role of the cogitative, or particular reason, is of critical importance in understanding human knowledge and human consciousness, both because it is the peak of sense activity and because it forms the nexus between the orders of sense and intellect. Man's dual nature, and its functioning, must remain a mystery unless we understand the pivotal functions in which the higher and spiritual part enters into intimate and dynamic union with the activities of the lower and animal part. These pivotal functions are precisely those of the cogitative.

4. *The dynamism of the internal senses*

The functioning of the internal senses cannot be rightly understood by the static and disconnected analysis given above, until the interactions and interplay of the several faculties are considered. The fact of the matter is that the four internal senses act together in so close a harmony that it is more difficult, in a sense, to see their distinctions than it is to see them

quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum." *II de Anima*, lect. 13, § 398.

⁴⁹ "Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte sensitiva; quia vis sensitiva in sui supremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in quo sensus intellectui coniungitur." *Ibid.*, § 397.

as a kind of unity.⁵⁰ Nor is it strange that there is a high degree of complexity and subtlety when we remember that these senses do not accomplish their purpose until they complete the picture of external reality in all its ramifications and in all its unities, whether, as in the case of brute animals, to serve as the sum total of cognitive activity by which their whole life is directed,⁵¹ or, as in man's case, to serve as apt material for inspection and meaningful interpretation by intellect and reason.⁵² And yet the faculties which accomplish this complete picture are limited to contributing each one only a particular element to the final composite. Therefore, the totality of their action must entail a highly elaborated interplay of function, with mutual assistance one to the other, and a kind of mutual intercourse of sensible knowledge; all as smooth and natural as if it were the simple action of a simple power. Of all this interplay, man has a kind of general awareness at the level of internal sensation and perception, and for all this an accounting should be given.

a. *The process of elaboration in regard to the external object*

The account of the interfunctioning of the internal sense faculties can be viewed from several different aspects, and should be so viewed, for the matter is so complicated that it demands some kind of division. Several different principles might be used as the basis for division; the one that seems

⁵⁰ "Posset aut alicui videri quod ex his quae dicuntur, quod phantasia et memoria non sunt potentiae distinctae a sensu communi, sed sint quaedam passionibus ipsius. Sed Avicenna rationabiliter ostendit esse diversas potentias." *De Memoria*, lect. 2, § 321.

⁵¹ Vita animalium regitur imaginatione et memoria: imaginatione quidem, quantum ad animalia imperfecta; memoria vero quantum ad animalia perfecta. . . . Accipitur autem vivere pro actione vitae, sicut et conversationem hominum vitam dicere solemus. In hoc vero, quod cognitionem animalium determinat per comparisonem ad regimen vitae, datur intelligi quod cognitio inest ipsis animalibus non propter ipsum cognoscere, sed propter necessitatem actionis." *I Metaphys.*, lect. 1, § 14.

⁵² "Vires apprehensivae interius praeparant intellectui possibili proprium obiectum." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 50, a. 4, ad 3. Cf. *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 73.

most useful is the one based on the division of consciousness into three degrees, according to the manner in which it approaches the limit of simple cognition on one hand and the limit of perfect self-consciousness on the other. Closest to the lower limit of simple apprehension of an object are the activities of the internal senses which bear directly on an object known, in such a way as to complete the direct knowledge of the object in all the dimensions possible to the sense order. The second and middle degree of consciousness is that in which the object is known in the context of other internal sense knowledge. If the first degree can be called, with all due reservations, purely objective consciousness, the second can be called objective-subjective consciousness. The third and highest degree of sense consciousness, which may be called purely subjective, is that in which the content is wholly a matter of internal sensations. In this third degree, the intention of the sentient subject is turned directly to his internal sense operations, without explicit reference to the object; in the first degree it is turned to the object, without explicit reference to the operations, in the middle degree, it is turned to the object in the context of internal operations.

Approaching the problem of the interfunctioning of the internal senses from the first point of view, we can take a simple object of knowledge and see how the total sensible character of it is placed together and gradually given depth by the combined operations of the senses. This procedure should throw into relief several psychological dynamisms. In the first place, there is the "direct" line of development of the knowledge we have of the object, wherein each sense faculty performs its proper operations in regard to the object, and in so doing, shows its dependence on the acts of the other faculties. In such a line of development, the act of one presupposes and rises from the act of another, and, consequently, reflects on the act of the other.

When we say that it reflects on the act of another, we mean that it knows, under its own proper light, the object which

was first known by the other, and knows it in the perfection in which it was known by the other. But, since the sense in act is the sensible in act, it can be said to know the act of the other. In another sense, of course, it does not know the act of the other, that is, it does not know the act of the other as an immanent movement proceeding from within a power by which it has the form of another as of the other—such a subtlety could not be grasped by a sense power. We are limited, therefore, at this stage of the analysis, to saying that the one power knows the act of the other just insofar as its object in act is its act.

From what is implied in this direct line of development we should be able to see one of the lines of sense consciousness, and consequently the primary parts of the content of sense consciousness and the powers which are actively responsible for them.

As has been seen above, the sense knowledge which has been apprehended by the five external senses as so many fragments of sensation is received in the common sense, where it attains to a certain objective and subjective unity, that is, the several qualities apprehended by different senses are referred to each other as associated in one originating source, so that, for instance, we know that the red apple is smooth and sweet, while the seeing, touching, tasting, etc., are associated as of one subject. For the knowledge that the sweet apple is red implies the fact that the seer tastes. Moreover, since these qualities do not exist as simple, vague and indefinite, but are rather defined and limited as the qualities of bodies of a certain size and shape, size and shape are known along with them, and also the other common sensibles, motion and rest and number, for when we know a thing precisely, we know it in its limits, and hence know its limiting factors. We also know the immediate consequences of these factors, and thus time is known from motion,⁵³ and also space, place and position from sizes and shapes.⁵⁴ Then all these elements, of which we are

⁵³ Cf. *De Memoria*, lect. 2, § 319.

⁵⁴ We do not wish to digress into an analysis of the development of perception,

aware at the level of common sense, reverberate into the imagination, in a manner less vivid but more permanent, whence they are subject to recall again and again.⁵⁵ However, simultaneous in time with the operation of the common sense described above is the perception of the cogitative, bearing upon the individual as such involved in the complex of quality apprehensions, for the cogitative perceives as a recognizable whole the individual thing hitherto apprehended in a more or less compact association of qualities. And, with the operation of the cogitative, the object, now grasped in its essential sensible completeness although not in total completeness, and in its context of time and place becomes memorable, for the memory stores the intentions perceived by the cogitative at the time the cogitative acts, and recalls them for its proper act of memory at some later time.

To sum up, therefore, the line of consciousness involved in this particular psychological dynamism: there is the common sense conscious of the objects and acts of the external senses, the cogitative moved to its act by and in the act of the common sense, the imagination similarly moved by the common sense, and the memory moved by the act of the cogitative. Nevertheless, the import of this dynamism from the point of view of consciousness formally taken, or self-consciousness, is not great, for in all the operations mentioned, the focus or intention of the act is on the object precisely as object, and

since it pertains more to the knowledge of the content of consciousness than to the precise factor of the activity of consciousness. Our purpose is served by a general summary of the principal elements of which we are sensibly conscious, in reference to the sense power which makes this possible. Questions of third dimensional perception, of motion and rest, of the localization of the object, of causality, etc., are interesting but somewhat aside from the point. Even more interesting although further from the point would be an analysis of the respective claims of the associationists and the Gestaltists. It would seem, for instance, highly rewarding to inquire whether or not the truth that lies in the associationist position is that which the scholastics present as the apprehensions of the exterior senses and the common sense, while the truth of the Gestalt analysis is embraced in the scholastic doctrine on the perceptions of the cogitative. But this, as we say, would lead us far afield.

⁵⁵ Cf. p. 422 above.

not on the acts, even when one act depends on the other. It is, indeed, necessary to see this dynamism as it is, for it is the primary element in human knowledge, and the direct sensitive operation which must be posited as a preamble to reflex sensitive knowledge, and indeed it contains, as has been seen, the germ of reflexive knowledge, but to find this reflexive character more fully developed, we must look further.

b. *The concatenation of present apprehensions and internal perceptions*

The nature of sense knowledge is not such that man takes up an object and inspects it until he has exhausted its sensible content and then lays it aside and takes up another. Along with the work of inspecting the object, which was described immediately above, there is a concomitant play of internal sensation, provided by past experience, in which cogitative and memory have the major part, and general appreciation, which is the work of imagination. If the process of inspecting the object can be said to answer the question: What is this object, these secondary processes can be taken as answering the question: What does this object mean to me in the light of what I already know? Manifestly, this is a more subjective question, and for this reason, the secondary process under investigation here has been designated as subjective-objective.

Under this heading the relation of the internal senses to the external senses must be reconsidered, and seen, not simply as the internal senses are moved by the object as externally apprehended and then operate to perfect the perception of the object, but also as they enlarge and enrich the direct perception on the basis of the past accumulation of sense knowledge, and how, indeed, they might color or distort its perception. Then, after considering how present perceptions are linked with the accumulated perceptions from the past, the question arises as to how these elements can be kept distinct and unconfused, that is to say, how man is conscious of the distinction between present external reality and present internal imaginings. In

investigating this question, we are manifestly in the midst of the problem of self-consciousness in the sense order.

To work with an example, a man can, for instance, walk into the ruins of an historic place, and, if he is sufficiently instructed, can begin to reconstruct it in his imagination, restoring it to an earlier splendor, peopling it with characters from the past, seeing and hearing the flow of imaginary action. Seeing especially well preserved details in the present ruin would reinforce the strength of the imaginary scene and give new impetus to the imagined reconstruction, but discordant notes could destroy the whole illusion. Such imaginary processes provoked and sustained by present apprehensions, or again, disturbed and distracted, are not uncommon.

In such a situation, it is clear that the present apprehension moving the imagination starts it off on a series of images according to its own laws of association, and that subsequent apprehensions can reinforce or distract this flow of imagery. It should be noted, however, that in his more complete accounts of imagination-external sense interplay, St. Thomas includes the intermediate operations of the common sense, for nothing reaches the internal senses unless it has passed through the common sense. So, it is more strictly correct to say that the imagination is moved by the complex of external sense-common sense activity, from which the imagination receives its impulse to move as from one single power.⁵⁶ For this reason also the imagination is called a "passion" of the common sense, and common sense is called its "root." Whenever, then, we speak of the internal senses as being moved by either the external senses or by the common sense, we mean that, in either case, they are moved by both together.⁵⁷ Hence the activity involved

⁵⁶ We say "as from one single power" because the activities of external sense and common sense are not simply coordinated but are subordinated, the former to the latter.

⁵⁷ "Phantasia autem, secundum quod apparet per huius immutationem secundariam, est passio sensus communis: sequitur enim totam immutationem sensus, quae incipit a sensibilibus propriis, et terminatur ad sensum communem." *De Memoria*, lect. 2, § 319. "Similiter autem sensus communis est radix phantasiae

is this: the external sensible quality actuates and is received in and apprehended by the external sense. When the external sense acts, becoming the form sensed, it activates the common sense, which receives and perceives the quality and the fact of external sense activity. Finally, the act of the common sense activates the imagination, which in turn receives and perceives the quality sensed, and holds it subsequently as in a treasury from which it can be reproduced. The normal course of activity, then, is from sensible to external sense to common sense to imagination; one single sensible form existing in all these powers according to their different modes, having been passed from one to the other without losing its original character, but rather gaining new modes of existence in the different cognitive faculties.⁵⁸

Given this as normal sense activity, two questions arise: how are species in these different powers distinguished one from the other, so that man knows what is real and what is imaginary? And, is this process of reverberation of sense image reversible?

Man normally has no difficulty in distinguishing what belongs to external reality and what belongs to his internal sense activity, especially imagination; in maintaining his connection with reality and so avoiding illusions or hallucinations. He does not suffer alienation from his senses except in sleep or when violence is done, for example, in the development of mental disorders.⁵⁹ For St. Thomas, the key to this power of distinguishing reality from subjective imagination is in the opera-

et memoriae quae praesupponunt actum sensus communis." *Ibid.*, § 322. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 3.

⁵⁸ Species quae est in imaginatione, est eiusdem generis cum specie quae est in sensu, quia utraque est individualis et materialis. . . . Et ideo . . . species sensibilis imprimit speciem imaginariam." *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 10, ad 17. ". . . una potentia ab alia movetur, sicut imaginatio a sensu. Et hoc quidem possibilis est, quia formae imaginationis et sensus sunt eiusdem generis; utraque enim sunt individuales. Et ideo formae quae sunt in sensu, possunt imprimere formas quae sunt in imaginationem, quasi sibi similes." *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 4, ad 1.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 173, a. 3.

tion of the common sense.⁶⁰ Thus in analysing the different states of consciousness occurring in sleep, he states that it is the imagination which functions when we dream in sleep, and it functions more or less vividly and coherently depending on the depth of the sleep. But the depth of sleep is measured according to the degree to which the common sense is bound, since the binding of the common sense is the cause of sleep. However, in the lightest phases of sleep, the common sense partly returns to operation, so that man can make some kind of a judgment distinguishing realities which he senses from his dream images, although not perfectly. It follows then that the full operation of common sense allows man to distinguish clearly and adequately between dream states and reality.⁶¹ It is not necessary to conclude that the common sense itself performs this act of distinguishing, but only that its operation is vital to the right performance of the action.⁶² The act of discerning belongs rather to a higher sense power, which is conscious of the workings of the common sense and of the imagination, and distinguishes them one from the other, as long as both are working. There are certainly many clues given to distinguish the two: the sensations of externals are more vivid, more coherent, they fill the scope of vision more completely, are not so much subject to flux and, finally, are susceptible to proof through touch, which seems to be the sense hardest to deceive. And that is why people pinch them-

⁶⁰ See p. 421 above; where this point is first mentioned.

⁶¹ "Si autem (in somno) motus vaporum fuerit modicus, non solum imaginatio remanet libera, sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte solvitur; ita quod homo iudicat interdum in dormiendo ea quae videt somnia esse, quasi diiudicans inter res et rerum similitudines. Sed tamen ex aliqua parte remanet sensus communis ligatus; et ideo licet aliquas similitudines discernat a rebus, tamen semper in aliquibus decipitur." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2.

⁶² In the text cited above, one could make "*sensus communis*" the subject of the verbs "*discernat*" and "*decipitur*," and interpret the words to mean that this sense is the judging power. On the other hand, "*homo*" could be the subject of these verbs, as he is of the verb "*iudicat*," so that it is "*homo*" who discerns and in some things is deceived, and this seems a preferable interpretation, since in no place is the common sense assigned awareness of the content of imagination, which it must have if it is to distinguish imaginings from sense realities.

selves when something amazing is happening, to prove that they are not dreaming. This higher sense is probably the cogitative.⁶³

The second question asked above, namely, whether or not the process of reverberation is reversible, so that the images produced in the imagination normally excite the common sense, and so reproduce themselves in the power through which they originally reached the imagination, has already been answered implicitly. Normally this would not happen, for it is contrary both to the nature and to the purpose of sensation. It is contrary to the nature of sensation because the senses have their own proper active principle, which is the external object outside the psychic order towards which their passivity is naturally ordered,⁶⁴ and as the external senses are made to be moved by external objects, so the common sense is made to be moved by the external senses, and not by the imagination. It is against the purpose of sensation for, unless the common sense normally operates directly and immediately and without interference upon the evidences of the external senses, the orientation towards reality, which is the whole purpose of knowledge, is necessarily distorted.

Normally, then, the imagination does not reverberate back into the common sense. Whether, when violence has been done to the sentient being, the sensitive organs can be so disturbed as to allow a reversion of the normal development of sense knowledge, remains a question. Amputees, for instance, report feelings of pain from missing limbs. This may be interpreted as meaning that something in the imagination is being reported as if it were perceived by the common sense at a time when it

⁶³ Cf. p. 456 below.

⁶⁴ "Sed iste modus receptionis non facit vere sentire. Quia omnis potentia passiva secundum suae speciei rationem determinatur ad aliquid activum speciale: quia potentia, inquantum huiusmodi habet ordinem ad illud respectu cuius dicitur. Unde, cum proprium activum in sensu exteriori sit res existens extra animam, et non intentio eius existens in imaginatione vel ratione; si organum sentiendi non moveatur a rebus extra, sed ex imaginatione vel aliis superioribus viribus, non erit vere sentiendi." *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 82, a. 3.

could not originate in external sensation, and when the common sense is itself in all other respects operating normally, that is, is not bound by sleep, drugs, etc. On the other hand, the source of the deception could be in the severed nerve which normally reported sensations from the external sense to the common sense, and, in this light, the deception would not be proceeding from an interference on the part of the imagination. This second explanation seems to accord better with the ideas of St. Thomas. In discussing the manner in which imaginary visions are caused by physical disturbances, he sees the cognitive processes initiated by physical commotions in the external sense organs, even though they are not apprehending their proper objects, insofar as traces left in the external senses from previous sense activity are excited by these commotions and passed on to the internal organs where sensible images are aroused, as if the common sense were moved as it is ordinarily moved by a normal external sense apprehension. Some dreams are caused in this way, and some hallucinations.⁶⁵

Again, the violence may be seated immediately in the internal sensing organs, as in cases of mental disorders, and here again hallucinations are produced. Such a hallucination might come from an intrusion of imaginary species into the common sense, where they pass themselves off as realities after the mode of apprehension proper to the common sense, or they may come from an impeding of the operation of the common sense coupled with a vehement and intense motion of the imagination, in such a way that the cogitative power is deceived into taking fantasy

⁶⁵ "Manifestum est autem quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum. Unde Aristoteles, in libro De Somno, assignans causam apparitionis somniorum, dicit quod, 'cum animal dormit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus' idest impressiones relictæ ex sensibilibus motionibus, quæ in spiritibus sensualibus conservantur, et 'movent principium sensitivum,' ita quod fit quaedam apparitio, ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest esse commotio spirituum et humorum, quod huiusmodi apparitiones etiam vigilantibus fiunt: sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis huiusmodi." *Ibid.*, I, q. 111, a. 3.

for fact. St. Thomas observes the fact that men can take imaginations for realities and does not think it impossible that this can come about through an actual invasion of the external sense organs by phantasms.⁶⁶

It seems, therefore, that the normal process of sensation develops in one direction only, from the external senses up to the imagination. In abnormal cases, however, the process may be reversed because of violence done to the sense organs.

So much then, for the present, for the concatenation of present sensations and internal imagery—how the one affects the other and how man keeps them distinguished. We must also consider a similar concatenation of the other internal senses with external apprehensions. For if we change slightly the example given above of a man walking into a scene concerning which he has strong imaginative connections, and have him instead walking into a scene from some earlier time in his own life, for example, revisiting the place where his youth was spent, we find an interaction of apprehension and memory similar to that which obtains between apprehension and imagination. For some details will provoke and incite strong currents of memory; others might distract him from the memorative process. The question then which must be raised is this: how does the memory interact with external sensations.

It was stated above that when the cogitative power has apprehended an individual from and in the sensible data associated by the common sense, the individual becomes memorable, that is, having been once apprehended, it can be recalled by the memory as having been apprehended in the past. This is in line with the statements which have been made about the memory as the storehouse of the intentions apprehended by

⁶⁶ "Deceptio autem in nobis proprie fit secundum phantasiam, per quam interdum similitudinibus rerum inhaeremus sicut rebus ipsis, ut patet in dormientibus et amentibus." *Ibid.*, I, q. 54, a. 5, in contr. ". . . si organum sentiendi non moveatur a rebus extra, sed ex imaginatione vel aliis superioribus viribus, non erit vere sentire. Unde non dicimus quod phrenetici et alii mente capti, in quibus propter victoriam imaginativae virtutis fit huiusmodi defluxus specierum ad organa sentiendi, vere sentiant, sed quia videtur eis quod sentiant." *Ibid.*, Suppl., q. 82, a. 3.

the cogitative.⁶⁷ When, therefore, St. Thomas says that the memory is rooted in the common sense,⁶⁸ it seems that this should be understood as the remote root of the memorative act, while the proximate root is the act of the cogitative. Thus the succession of apprehensions which is the basis for the apprehension of time is remotely the succession of common sense apprehensions and proximately the succession of cogitative perceptions. Therefore we do not say "I tasted sweet after I tasted acid and before I tasted bitter," but "I ate my cereal after I drank my grapefruit juice and before my coffee."

When, therefore, as in the example given above, a man walks into places where he has been in the past, and his memory is stirred by the things he presently apprehends, the psychological dynamism at work is a movement from the external senses and common sense through the cogitative to the memory. And the difference between this activity and the activity which is provoked when a man walks into unfamiliar surroundings is that, while unfamiliar things striking the memory become memorable, familiar things striking it are recognized, that is, they provoke an intentioned image, and the intention of the image is as of an image already seen in the past. Again, comparing the relation of memory to the external senses with the relation of imagination to external senses, in the latter case the sensible image apprehended externally itself actuates or moves the imagination, while in the former case, the intention perceived by the cogitative in the external sensations moves and informs the memory.

The basic difference between these two effects of the externally apprehended sensations, namely, that they move the imagination to produce a simple sensible image while they move the memory to an intentioned image lies in the two ways in which an image can be taken. For example, an animal painted on a canvas is both a painted animal and an image of a real animal;

⁶⁷ Cf. p. 449.

⁶⁸ "Similiter autem sensus communis est radix phantasiae et memoriae quae praesupponunt actum sensus communis. *De Memoria*, § 322.

one thing, that is, which can be viewed from two aspects. So an image in the senses can be taken simply in itself or as the image of some real thing. In the first way, the image is a product of the imagination, in the second way, it is considered as something we have previously seen or heard or learned, and this is the way in which it informs the memory.⁶⁹

The question, therefore, which was raised concerning the imagination and the external senses, namely, how man distinguishes the operations of the one from those of the other, is not so acute in the case of the memory and the external sensations, for in the first case the objects were essentially the same, namely, simple sensible images, but in the second case there is a fundamental difference in the objects, that is, the difference between simple images and intentioned images.

This explanation, however, does not so much finally settle the problems of the relation of the memory with the other faculties as open the doors to new problems. For instance, as St. Thomas points out, a man can forget something which in fact happened to him, or can consider something that never happened as if it happened to him, if he looks at images that should refer him to the past as if they were simple images, or on simple images as if they were affected by the intention of pastness.⁷⁰ The investigation of this problem, however, must wait, for, at this point, it is only the structure of consciousness itself which is under question; the question of the nature of its defects follows later. Another question which will be taken up later in its proper place is the question of the direct interaction between memory and imagination, when a man remembers that he imagined.⁷¹ A third problem, however, which might be raised can be investigated at this point, and that is the question of whether or not the memory depends in its proper act on the proper act of the imagination. In the analysis above, the operation of the imagination was not considered necessary

⁶⁹ See *de Memoria*, lect. 3, §§ 340-341.

⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, §§ 344-347.

⁷¹ See p. 449.

for the formation of a memorable apprehension, nor for its recollection. However, St. Thomas, in discussing the various levels of animal sensitivity, says that the memory follows the imagination, so that animals which have no imagination cannot have memory either.⁷² The solution of this problem seems to lie in the distinction which must be placed on the word "imagination." St. Thomas uses this word in two senses; in one sense it means the power of imagination itself, as it is a separate internal sense power, while in another sense it means the power to form images, and so considered, is a power pertaining to the three internal sense powers—imagination, memory and cogitative. This distinction can be seen in places where St. Thomas compares the memory with the imagination, when he speaks of the soul remembering after the mode of images, but not of simple images which are apprehended by the imaginative power, but of images as of another thing previously known, which is the object of memory,⁷³ and is more explicitly evident in places where he distinguishes the several internal senses.⁷⁴

In summary, then, it seems that the principal element in the working of sense consciousness which has been isolated in this investigation of subjective-objective consciousness is the role of the cogitative in distinguishing the operations of external sense and imagination; the other inter-sense dynamisms mentioned do not seem to contribute much to self-consciousness although they are important to know for a complete understanding of sense operations.

c. *The interplay of the internal senses*

The third and final point of view to be taken in this consideration of sense consciousness is that of the interplay of the three higher sense powers among themselves. This, as has been said, can be called the subjective consideration, for in these

⁷² "Memoria enim sequitur phantasiam, quae est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. . . . In quibusdam animalibus ex sensu non fit phantasia et sic in eis non potest esse memoria." *I Metaphys.*, lect. 2, § 10.

⁷³ Cf. *de Memoria*, lect. 3, § 341.

⁷⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, lect. 2, § 321.

interactions the relation of the internal senses to the common sense, through which they reach to external reality, is not being considered, but rather their relations among themselves, and especially as these relations contribute to self-consciousness in the sense order. It is here also that we can approach the question of total sense consciousness, that is, the question of the power or powers to which can be attributed the knowing of all sense activity in a unity.

Here, then, are questions not so much of the objects of sense activity as of the acts themselves, that is, of the acts taken as objects. For the memory stores not only the intentions perceived and combined by the cogitative power in regard to external objects, but also the fact of the cogitative's activity; since we can remember how often and when we perceived such and such an individual. In the same way, we can remember that we imagined, and so the operation of imagination is an object for the memory, and finally, and most curious of all, when we consider the limitations of a sense power, we can remember that we remembered.

Likewise the cogitative can operate upon the acts of the memory and of the imagination, for it is a part of our experiential knowledge, upon which we rely in practical actions, that we imagine and remember, and, indeed, that we cogitate. Going back and forth, therefore, among the activities of the internal senses, we find them immensely ramified among themselves and reflecting on the activity of one another, and while we must admit that all this is a matter of consciousness, it is not so easy to determine how much each of the different powers contributes to the totality of the general sense awareness of sensitive activity.

To take up these several points, one by one, beginning with the interrelationship of the imagination and the memory, it is evident that we can remember that we have imagined as well as we can remember that we have seen or heard this or that external object. We must therefore admit that a connection exists between the memory and the imagination similar

to that between the memory and the common sense, so that the operations of the former are as much subject to recollection and assignation to time past as those of the latter. Thus the activity of the imagination must be subject to being perceived by the cogitative as an individual activity, and, once so perceived, the memory can store and recall the imaginative operation. Hence there is a manifestly self-conscious activity on the part of the cogitative and the memory upon the acts of the imagination.

Besides this connection of consciousness, there seems to be also a connection between imagination and cogitative and memory similar to that between common sense and themselves, namely, that an act in one is capable of provoking an act in another. This does not involve consciousness, strictly speaking, for the act of the one need not be known as such by the other—nothing more seems to be involved than simple excitation of one power to act by the act of another power. Such an interaction indicates a certain affinity between the three higher internal powers, which, on consideration, seems to follow from that one characteristic they have in common, which is the use of the expressed species or image as terms of their acts. While the external senses cannot act except in the presence of their object, and the common sense cannot act except upon the actual sensations of the external senses, the three higher internal senses necessarily act without contact with the external object, terminating their cognitive operation in an image which they themselves produce. This image, of course, is the expressed species, in which and through which the object is grasped. These internal senses, therefore, are freed from one of the limitations imposed upon the external senses and the common sense, and, in virtue of their freedom, can be actuated it seems, not only from external sensible reality but also by internal and subjective stimulations from each other.

Thus a series of day-dreaming imagery can be aroused from a recollection, and an item in a day-dream can lead to a recollection, or cogitations can be the cause or effect of imaginings,

The three internal powers seem able to pass an image around once it is evoked in one of them, with each of them performing its proper function in regard to it.⁷⁵

Thus the cogitative and the memory are related to the imagination, both as being conscious of its acts and as being influenced by its acts. They are, however, even more closely related to each other. As St. Thomas says: "But in men that which comes close upon memory, as will be said below, is experience. . . . Experience is from the collection of many singulars received in memory. This kind of collection, however, is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative power, which is called particular reason; which is collative of individual intentions as universal reason is of universal intentions."⁷⁶ The dynamism involved here is the one which has been mentioned several times before, namely, that the cogitative supplies the memory with the material for its operations, for the memory is like a storehouse of individual intentions. But, besides this contribution of the cogitative to the memory, there must be involved a reverse contribution of the memory to the cogitative, for there could be no collecting of individual intentions and no experience if earlier intentions conserved in the memory were not turned back to the cogitative to be aggregated with the

⁷⁵ Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 13, a. 3, ad 4. Here St. Thomas, speaking about the manner in which purely spiritual visions can be remembered in the sense memory, explains that the intelligible species in which the vision is formed can assume to themselves sensible species, that is, particular forms and intentions, either in the memory or in the imagination, and by their instrumentality, be conserved in the sensible memory. There is involved, then, a simple interdependence of memory and imagination, apart from their mutual dependence on the external senses. In another context, he states even more explicitly that an image can proceed from the memory to the imagination: "Visio vero corporalis non procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a sensu videntis; et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute imaginativa." Here the species conserved in the memory has the same effect in causing a sensation that the appearance of an external body has on the external senses. "Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum praedictam speciem." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 93, a. 6, ad 4.

⁷⁶ *I Metaphys.*, lect. 1, § 15.

new perceptions. For the building up of experience is not a simple accretion of perceptions, but an operation on the part of the cogitative by which it perceives a kind of unity among many instances, and for such an act, the whole of the past must be joined with the experiences of the present, in a present operation.

Similarly, the process of reminiscence depends on the mutual interaction of the cogitative and memory,⁷⁷ for reminiscence is an operation which begins with something remembered and proceeds by way of inquiry from this as a principle to some other point which was temporarily forgotten. So reminiscence arises from memory and terminates in memory, and, proceeding by particular reasoning, can pinpoint its path by intermediate memories. Hence in reminiscence there is a continual interplay of the memory and the cogitative.⁷⁸

Hence the functioning of the memory as the storehouse for the cogitative differs from the functioning of the imagination as the storehouse for common sense, for in the former case the objects stored are returned to the faculty storing them, but in the latter case this is not so. And in this difference, it would seem, we can find the solution to the problem of how these sense powers know their own acts.

The precise problem at issue is to explain how a sense power knows its own act, since, in the psychology of St. Thomas, a sense power cannot reflect on its own act. Taking up the case of how man can remember that he remembers, we could first offer the solution that a remembrance of remembering is accomplished in the intellect, which, as will be seen, reflects upon all the activities of the senses. And this is indeed true, for a part of what anyone might mean when he says that he remembers that he remembers would generally stem from an intellectual awareness of sense activity. But if this were all

⁷⁷ "Anima in corpore non potest . . . reminisci nisi per virtutem cogitativam et memorativam, per quam phantasma praeapantur." *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 81, a little after the middle.

⁷⁸ Cf. *de Memoria*, lect. 4, §§ 356-357, 360-362, 364.

that were meant, the act of remembering would not be taken in its strict and proper sense, for such a sense pertains to the act of the sensitive memory.⁷⁹ And this does not seem to be exactly what is meant when a man says that he remembers that he remembered, for those words seem to signify an act which is strictly in the sense order. If you are asked: Did you remember to speak to X, the affirmative answer would seem to refer to a sensible action of recollection. Further evidence of the fact that this act of recollection is formally in the sense order seems offered from animal behavior, for in learning a process involving a series of choices, an animal must reject and select alternatives which it learned previously to reject and select. This seems to involve remembering that it remembered before.

To place the problem now more accurately: how can we explain that the memory remembers its own act, since it cannot be stimulated by its own act of remembering when it has the act. The solution seems to lie in the peculiar relationship mentioned above existing between the memory and the cogitative power, whereby the acts of one another are referred back and forth. In this mutual reflection, the memory first receives and stores the intentions perceived by the cogitative, and later delivers them up, as part of experience, to a new cogitative act, in which the items remembered are combined with new present perceptions. Now when this new act of combination is completed and relegated to the memory, the object remembered would be a complex of past perceptions and newly completed perceptions, all in a unity, but with the note that the past perceptions were delivered up to the cogitative to be combined with the newer ones. That is to say, in the complex now referred to memory, some of the elements are known as having been recently perceived, some as more remotely perceived. For it is evident that we can discern in any area of experience, the different times at which the different elements were apprehended. But thus the memory is perceiving certain perceptions

⁷⁹ Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 10, a. 2: "Whether there is memory in the mind."

as having been of the past, and, since its own act is to know a past apprehension as past, it is perceiving its own act, or remembering that it remembered. In a similar way, the cogitative power can perceive its own acts of perceiving individual intentions, not by means of the acts themselves, but insofar as its previous acts stored in the memory are proffered as such, namely, as so many acts of perceiving singular intentions. So it seems that the senses can attain, by mutual cooperation, to a somewhat complete consciousness in their own order, similar, *salvatis salvandis*, to the consciousness the intellect can accomplish by itself.

d. *Conclusion*

Thus the psychology of St. Thomas concludes to a kind of reverberation of sensible images from the external senses to the sense memory and cogitative power, and a somewhat complex interaction of the same images among the powers.


i. *Summary of sense interplay*

Briefly summing up the several kinds of interactions, we find:


The external senses move the common sense by simple reverberation⁸⁰ and in consequence of this, the common sense knows the acts and objects of the external senses, since its whole cognitive value is focused upon them. So we say that the common sense has cognitive reflection on the external senses. At the same time, the common sense, as moved to act by the external senses, in turn moves the imagination, by a reverberation which is described as a storing of images. The imagination, then, reflects on the external senses by what may be called an operative reflection, that is, the imagination depends for its act on the act of the external senses, and knows

⁸⁰ We do not wish to leave this term entirely vague, so that it is more obscuring than clarifying. As used here, it means the causality exercised by a sensible image in one power in regard to exciting another power to act. The act of the other power is similar to the act of the first power, following the principle that every agent works for its own similitude, but differs from it in accordance with the principle that whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.

the objects that they know, but does not know them precisely as they are objects of the external senses, nor does it know the act of the external senses. Finally, there normally is no reverberation of image from imagination to common sense. This could be expressed in graphic form thus.⁸¹




At the same time the external-common sense combination reverberates to the cogitative, and so the cogitative has an operatively reflexive act on these senses, and the imagination also reverberates to the cogitative, so that we have another operative reflection from cogitative to imagination. Then, since the reverberations from imagination differ in mode from those from the common sense combine, the cogitative can distinguish the objects and acts of the one from those of the other, that is to say, it has cognitive reflection in their regard, thus:



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- indicates reverberation;
- indicates cognitive reflection;
- - - - -→ indicates operative reflection.

Finally, the cogitative reverberates into the memory, where its perceptions are stored, and gives rise to operative reflection of memory on cogitative. Since, however, the memory returns its contents to the cogitative, there is a reverse process of reverberation and operative reflection. On the strength, moreover, of this reciprocity, the cogitative is enabled to know the memory's acts as such, because they come to it under their own peculiar modality, and the memory the operations of the cogitative, so that there is mutual cognitive reflection. Finally, as a consequence of this cognitive reflection, these two sense powers achieve an indirect cognitive reflection upon their own acts and objects, as was explained above. Thus:



The fact which emerges prominently from this conclusion is the pre-eminence of the cogitative in man's sensitive life in general, and in his sensitive consciousness in particular. It is the only sense power which has cognitive reflection on all of the other powers directly, and on its own act indirectly; the only power, then, which can effectively serve as the center and source of the general awareness of sensation in all its manifestations, and provide, at the same time, the unitive factor which evidently obtains in sense life. When we consider, then, the operations of the cogitative, along the several somewhat complicated lines detailed above, we can begin to see how the total and all-embracing awareness of sensation is built up, even though the several elements that enter into the total are apprehended or perceived initially by distinct sense powers, each operating in its own separate organ and focused on its own proper object. External reality, our own apprehensions thereof, perceptions of the past, experiential appreciations, concomitant imaginings are all coordinated and integrated into a complete

representation of the sense world as it is and as it is sensibly known under the master influence of the cogitative.⁸² It remains now to consider the mode of this consciousness.

ii. *The mode of causality in the interplay of the senses*

Given, then, the fact of a general sense awareness of sensitive activity among the internal senses, the question arises as to the nature of the causality which underlies these interactions. There seem to be two possibilities. The first is that in which the activity and the object of one sense should serve as the object of another sense, just as the sensible qualities of external reality serve as the objects of the external senses. The other is that the activity of one power provokes or stimulates the activity of the other power, after the manner in which any agent educes an effect in a patient. A third explanation, namely, that a sense power could be aware of its own activity has been excluded by St. Thomas, when he says that "it is impossible that any power using a corporeal organ should reflect on its own act, because it is necessary that the instrument by which it knows itself should fall as medium between the power itself and the instrument by which it knew properly."⁸³ That is to say, if a power is to know its own act, it cannot be informed by its own act after the manner in which matter is informed by a form, for there is no medium in such a union. To know its own act, a power must be informed by the act, and united to the act, in such a way that its own act informs it immaterially, as an object of cognition, and such an information is only possible if the power is entitatively immaterial.

⁸² There are, of course, other elements in sense activity to account for, and principally the awareness of the self or the sensing subject, and the awareness of affective activity. Of these, something will be said later.

⁸³ *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3. Again, as he points out in regard to the impossibility of a proper sense knowing its own act, "it is not possible that any material thing should transmute itself; but one is transmuted by another." "Non est autem possibile quod aliquid materiale immutet seipsum; sed unum immutatur ab alio." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. 3, ad 3.

Neither does St. Thomas hold that the internal sense powers know the activity of the external senses, and their own activities, as external objective realities proffered for their inspection. He reserves this type of cognition for the activities of the external senses on their objects and of the intellect on the object presented by the internal senses—wherever, that is, there is a bridge over distinct orders, namely, the orders of external reality and sensation and the orders of sensation and intellection, between which there is need of a “light,” either physical light or the light of the active intellect, to immaterialize the object up to the grade of immateriality of the cognitive power. But within the order of sensation itself, he does not hold for this type of contact.⁸⁴ What he holds for is rather a kind of interaction in which one power, by virtue of its own activity, stimulates or moves another power to its proper activity, and so, by a series of reverberations, the objects sensed by the external senses are grasped in all their complexity by the mutually interacting play of all the internal senses. Thus he says: “One power using a corporeal organ can know the act of another power insofar as the impression of the lower power redounds into the higher, as we know that sight sees by the common sense.”⁸⁵ So, as a match can light a piece of wood and the wood can light a piece of paper, and each one burning burns in accordance with its own nature, so the initial sense impression stimulates a succession of impressions in the

⁸⁴ “Intellectus autem possibilis recipit species alterius generis quam sint in imaginatione; cum intellectus possibilis recipiat species universales, et imaginatio non contineat nisi particulares. Et ideo in intelligibilibus indigemus intellectu agente, non autem in sensibilibus alia potentia activa.” Q.D. *de Anima*, a. 4, ad 5. Whenever St. Thomas speaks positively of this kind of cognitive reflection, he mentions only those two cases. “Nulla potentia potest, aliquid cognoscere non convertendo se ad obiectum suum ut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo se ad colorem. Unde, cum phantasma se habeant hoc modo ad intellectum possibilem, sicut sensibilia ad sensum . . . numquam (intellectus) actu aliquid considerat . . . nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.” *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7. Cf. *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 67: “Phantasmata movent intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia sensum.” Also in *Boet. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 2.

⁸⁵ *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.

different organs of the internal senses, and each knows the object according to its own manner, although the cogitative, as holding the last and highest position, knows the object in all the formalities of the other senses as well.

This activity of stimulation of sense power by sense act is not evident to introspection. All that we know from introspection is the effect of the activity, for example, that we do remember what we have seen or heard, and can imagine on the bases of what was sensed externally, and so on. If we seek any deeper understanding of the facts, in the order of finality, we can see plainly enough that the perfection of sense knowledge demands the intercooperation of many different powers, given the limitations of each single power, and that, with the intention of an adequate sense apparatus in mind, nature and nature's Author so constructed the sentient being that its various powers harmoniously contribute to the total activity. The evidence of this construction can be observed in an animal body, wherein the radication of all the sense powers in the one soul informing the body and giving it its nature is reflected in the corporeal order by an organic continuity. All the sense organs, even those in extreme parts of the body, are interconnected with a network of nerves which permits not only cooperation of the parts one with the other but unified subordination of all to some one principle.

The nature of the stimulation among sense organs is still not fully known, beyond the fact that it involves chemical or physical or electrical changes, or a combination of them, in the physiological (nervous) order. Whatever is its precise nature, it certainly involves a material change, but a material change which arises on the occasion of a psychic activity and leads to another psychic activity. Beyond this, it seems necessary to say also that there is a different kind of stimulation for each of the different interconnections. The fact that the memory in recognition is comparing a present sensation to a past sensation, but in recollection is comparing a present image with a past sensation, and that we can distinguish these two activi-

ties of recognition and recollection, indicates that the memory is aware of the distinction of what comes from imagination and what comes from sensation, and this can only be true if there are differences in the stimulations which come from imagination and sensation. And so in general, a diversity of kinds of stimulation must be posited to account for the recognition on the part of one sensing power of the differences in its objects as they come from one or another of the other powers whose activity it knows, for a different effect is proportioned to a difference in act and agent.

B. *Consciousness of sensible affective activity*

Before investigating the nature of sensitive consciousness of the sensing subject, it seems useful to examine the nature of the consciousness of affective activity, for such activity, being a matter of subjective states, contributes something to the consciousness of the sensing subject.

1. *The nature of the appetites*

Appetite, according to St. Thomas, is an "inclination of a thing, and an order to some thing suitable to itself."⁸⁶ It is found at three levels: natural appetite which is the intrinsic inclination of anything to be what it is; elicited sensitive appetite which is the inclination towards a sensible good as it is perceived; elicited intellectual appetite, or will, which is the inclination towards a good perceived by reason.⁸⁷ Everything that is has an appetite following it, whether it exists in the real order or the intentional order, insofar as it is good, for an appetite is the response to the good.⁸⁸ The question being raised here involves the elicited sense appetites, or the appetites aroused by the perception of a sensible good, which appetite is also called passion, in the strictest sense of that word,⁸⁹ and also sensuality,⁹⁰ although often the name of

⁸⁶ *De Verit.*, q. 25, a. 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 80, a. 1.

⁸⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1.

⁸⁹ "Sensualitas nihil aliud esse videtur quam vis appetitiva sensitivae partis." *De Verit.*, q. 25, a. 1.

sensuality is reserved for the sense appetite insofar as it is unresponsive to rational control, while the responsive activity of the sense appetite is said to belong to the concupiscible and irascible parts.⁹¹ This distinction of concupiscible and irascible is the first distinction St. Thomas places in the sense appetites. The concupiscible is the power by which the soul inclines simply and directly towards what is suitable and away from what is harmful, according to the apprehension of the senses. The irascible is the power by which the soul inclines towards what is both suitable and dangerous or difficult, and away from what is both harmful and difficult.⁹² These two sets of powers work together, for the irascible rises from and terminates in the concupiscible, and operates to defend the sensing subject in its seeking for what is suitable and avoiding what is harmful.⁹³ The root passion of all the passions is love, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, a simple complacency in a suitable object, regardless of whether it is present or not, or a proneness of the soul to seek and hold such an object when the chance arises, like a stored up mass of psychic energy in favor of the object. So man can be said to love food, for he has a consistent complacency in food as something good for him. Desire arises from love when the object loved is presented as here and now attainable. Pleasure or joy follow when the object desired is attained. So these three passions act together as the principle of movement, the movement itself and the term of movement in respect to an object apprehended simply as good. Their contraries are hate, aversion and sorrow. Hate falls on the things which are opposed to those which are loved. Aversion is aroused from hate, when the object hated is presented as here and now imminent. Sorrow follows when that to which man is averse actually happens to him.⁹⁴ In every case, the passion, or appetitive movement, is aroused by knowledge and is a natural

⁹¹ Cf. *ibid.*, a. 4.

⁹² *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 81, a. 2.

⁹³ *Ibid.*; also *de Verit.*, q. 25, a. 2.

⁹⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 21, a. 2.

prelude to action, like a tension in a spring which is caused by pressure and causes and is released by the action of uncoiling.⁹⁵

The irascible appetites are aroused by the apprehension of some good which is difficult to obtain, or some evil which is difficult to avoid, for, as can be observed, difficulty in the path of appetite does not quiet it, but rather provokes a new activity, and, indeed, activity of a different and higher order. A good that is hard to obtain is seen as a kind of challenge; the passion of hope responds to the challenge. An evil that is hard to avoid induces fear even before it is inflicted. A good that is impossible to obtain is not relinquished simply with sorrow, but with the added pain of despair; an evil which is impossible to avoid may be met with audacity; an evil presently inflicted may cause, not sorrow but anger. So the irascible appetites act, not as simple reactions to sensible good and evil, but as complex reactions that overturn the course of sensible reaction that might ordinarily be expected.⁹⁶ These eleven kinds of sense appetite (which are eleven generic classes of appetite, each divided into several species) complete St. Thomas' appraisal of affective sense activity. The question here to be raised and answered is: are we aware of these, as part of the content of consciousness, and, if so, how.

2. *How man is aware of affective movements*

The fact that man has passions is a fact which "anyone can experience in himself"⁹⁷ by arousing or soothing his feelings at will. The many treatises written on the subject of passion, emotion, feeling, etc., are evidence enough that they are common matters of experience, and would seem to afford a basis for believing that the manner in which we are conscious of them is equally evident. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Evident they are, but how they are evident is not so clear. It

⁹⁵ Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 26, a. 3.

⁹⁶ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 23, a. 1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, q. 81, a. 3.

would seem, for instance, that the passions which are aroused by perceptions on the part of the internal senses should themselves be perceived somehow by the internal senses, but there is nothing in the writings of St. Thomas to lead one to believe that he held this opinion.

a. *The generation of the appetites*

i. *The cogitative is the crux of the cognitive preamble to appetite*

To investigate the problem from the beginning, it is necessary to turn aside for a moment to a consideration of the mode of generation of the passions or appetites. The general teaching of St. Thomas is that the elicited appetites cannot act except upon an object which is first apprehended or perceived by some cognitive power. The critical cognitive power in the case of the sense appetites is the cogitative or estimative power, for without its intervention, no sense appetite moves. He says:

Sensible apprehension causes no movement at all unless it is apprehended under the aspect of suitable or unsuitable. . . . Moreover, the power apprehending such aspects of suitable and unsuitable seems to be the estimative power, through which the lamb flees the wolf and follows its mother; which (power) has the same relation to the appetite of the sensible part as has the practical intellect to the appetite of will; whence properly speaking sensuality begins at the confines of the estimative and the appetite following it, so that sensuality has thus the same relation to the sensitive part as the will and free judgment to the intellective part. This suitable thing which moves the sensuality, or the aspect of its suitability, is either apprehended by sense as are the delightful things for each of the senses, which animals pursue, or is not apprehended by the senses, as the sheep perceives the hostility of the wolf neither by sight nor by hearing, but only by an estimation. And therefore the movement of sensuality tends towards two things: towards those things which are delightful for the external senses, and this is expressed by saying that the movement which bears upon the senses of body is from sensuality, or towards those

⁸⁸ *II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1.

things which are known as harmful or suitable to the body only by estimation, and thus the appetite for things pertaining to the body is said to be from sensuality.⁹⁸

It is evident that, in writing this, St. Thomas would not allow for an appetite to be motivated as a simple and spontaneous response to a simple apprehension, but demanded in all cases a quasi-judgment of the sort which could be proffered, on the sense level, only by the estimative or cogitative powers. For the act of the estimative is to produce quasi-conclusions such as: this thing is good, this thing is bad.⁹⁹ This quasi-judgment is the proper act of knowledge which precedes an appetitive movement, and reasonably so, for the goodness or badness of an object is not part of the object of simple apprehension, but rather like a predicate to be attached by the knowing power to the thing apprehended. So St. Thomas adds, in the same context, to clarify the inter-relationship of the several cognitive powers whose activity precedes appetitive movement, that the simple imagination and the preceding powers, that is, the external senses, have more remote roles in the cognitive preamble to appetition, similar to the role of the speculative intellect in moving the will, while the estimative power is a proximate mover, like practical reason in regard to free judgment.¹⁰⁰

Therefore every appetitive movement in the internal sensitive order waits for the act of the cogitative to give it its proper and proximate object. Nevertheless, this object is sometimes proffered as originating in the act of the estimative itself and sometimes as originating in the external senses, that is to say, sometimes an object is estimated to be good or bad on the basis of evidence not perceived by the external senses, and sometimes on the precise basis of external sense evidence. Now

⁹⁹ These are called quasi-conclusions since they are not effected by a rational process but by a sensitive act. They lack therefore the strict sense of a conclusion drawn from principles, but are similar to conclusions in that they involve, in a sense, a composition or division of subject and predicate.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

this external sense evidence is nothing other than pleasure and pain, which are the primary responses of a sentient being to the suitability or unsuitability of an external object. To analyze, then, more deeply the generation of appetites, we must first investigate St. Thomas' notion of pain and pleasure, what they are in themselves and how they cooperate in the genesis of appetitive movements.

ii. *The nature of pleasure and pain, and their apprehension by touch*

Pain involves two things: an injury and an experimental sense of the injury.¹⁰¹ By analogy, pleasure involves two things: a sensible well-being and an experimental perception of that well-being.¹⁰² The injury or well-being is principally in the body, but the experimental perception pertains only to the sense of touch.¹⁰³ Therefore pain and pleasure are listed among the objects of the sense of touch, along with hardness and softness, heat and cold, etc. Yet there is a radical difference which should not be overlooked between pain and pleasure on the one hand and the other objects mentioned on the other, in that pain and pleasure are affects of the sensing subject itself while the other objects are qualities of other bodies. For knowledge is the having of the form of another as of the other—it is an apprehension of the qualities of an object. Thus when we feel hardness or heat, it is the hardness and heat as the qualities of something external to ourselves, or objective to the knowing power. But pain and pleasure are not qualities of an object, but rather states of a subject in reaction to the sensible good

¹⁰¹ "Sunt enim duo in dolore: scilicet laesio et laesionis experimentalis perceptio." *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 9. Note also that St. Thomas uses the expression "experimental perception" to indicate knowledge of an object which is had more by immediate contact with the object than by contact through an image. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 54, a. 5, in cont; *de Malo*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 2. Pain is something with which we have immediate contact.

¹⁰² *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 35, a. 1.

¹⁰³ "Laesio quidem principaliter est in corpore. . . . Experimentalis autem perceptio laesionis ad solum sensus tactus pertinet." *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 9; also 3.

or bad. When we feel pain, it is our own pain we feel. And if it should be objected that we can, for example, feel the heat of our own bodies, it can be answered that we feel it as an objective quality of our body, while, when we feel pain, we do not gain knowledge of an objective quality but of a subjective condition or state. Anyone else, for instance, can feel the heat of our body, but no one else can feel our pain. So when man feels pain and pleasure, he learns about his own affective reactions to objects, and indirectly he learns something of the objects themselves.

Pain and pleasure, then, are apprehended by touch, but they also follow upon touch.¹⁰⁴ At first glance, it would seem that pain and pleasure are therefore elicited affects, following upon the knowledge of touch apprehensions. This, however, does not seem to be St. Thomas' mind, for elsewhere he says explicitly that pleasure arises upon contact with the sensible good, in the sense of real contact of thing on thing, without the intervention of a cognitive act.¹⁰⁵ It would seem to follow, then, that pain and pleasure follow upon touch in the sense that, by contact with the pleasurable or painful thing, it is also apprehended in its tangible qualities, but not in the sense that the touch apprehension is a cognitive prerequisite for the generation of pain or pleasure. The pain and pleasure arise from the contact insofar as the object has a mixture of qualities agreeably proportioned to the sensing subject or not; any excessive degree of a quality causing injury and hence pain.¹⁰⁶

So pain and pleasure, in the ordinary acceptance of the

¹⁰⁴ "Laetitia enim et tristitia magis videntur sequi apprehensionem interiorem. Sed delectatio et dolor consequuntur apprehensionem sensus, et praecipue sensus tactus." *II de Anima*, lect. 5, § 289.

¹⁰⁵ ". . . nam delectatio sensibilis habet ex parte corporis coniunctionem convenientis, ex parte vero animae sensum illius convenientiae . . . et sic delectatio utrobique incipit a coniunctione reali, et perficitur in eius apprehensione. Gaudium vero incipit in apprehensione et terminatur in affectu; . . ." *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 4, ad 5.

¹⁰⁶ "Et ideo excellentiae sensibilium, et maxime tangibilium, dolorem sensibilem inferunt; contemperationes autem eorum delectant propter convenientiam ad sensum." *Q.D. de Anima*, a. 21.

terms, are reactions to sensible good and evil which begin in bodily injury or well-being and terminate in the apprehension of the sense of touch. In this sense, pain and pleasure are called bodily passions.¹⁰⁷

iii. *The origin of passions from pleasure and pain*

There is another sense of the words pleasure and pain, however, in which they are taken not as bodily passions but as passions of the soul,¹⁰⁸ and in this sense they are usually, although not always, called sorrow and joy. This sorrow and joy is consequent, not on simple exterior contacts with sensible goods and evils, but on perceptions of the internal senses of something convenient to or contrary to a sense desire, such as the natural desires of self-preservation and generation.¹⁰⁹ They are similar, therefore, to bodily passions in that they begin with external sensibles, but differ in that they arise upon internal sense perceptions of these sensibles, and terminate not in touch but in some higher and inner reaction.¹¹⁰

St. Thomas investigates in more detail the relationships between the bodily passions of pain and pleasure, and the internal reactions of sorrow and joy, saying that "when the sense senses something pleasant or sorrowful, as if affirming and denying that which is perceived by the senses to be pleasant or sorrowful, then it follows through with an appetite, that is, it desires or turns away."¹¹¹ He seems here to be speaking of

¹⁰⁷ "Sed dolor est secundum passionem corporalem. Unde Augustinus dicit . . . quod dolor usutatus in corporibus dicitur; et ideo incipit a laesione corporis, et terminatur in apprehensione sensus tactus, propter quod dolor sensus est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente." *De Verit.*, q. 26, a. 3, ad 9.

¹⁰⁸ Here passion of the soul means not simply of the rational part but also, and more properly, of the internal sensitive part.

¹⁰⁹ "Sed secunda passio non infert poenam secundum dolorem sensibilem, sed secundum tristitiam quae oritur in homine vel in animali ex hoc quod aliquid interiori aliqua vi apprehenditur ut repugnans voluntati, vel cuicumque appetitui. Unde ea quae sunt contraria voluntati et appetitui affligunt, et magis interdum quam ea quae sunt dolorosa secundum sensum. . . ." *Q. D. de Anima*, a. 21.

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 35, a. 2.

¹¹¹ *III de Anima*, lect. 12, § 767.

sense in a global fashion, not distinguishing the external from the internal senses. For instance, in using the words "*delectari et tristari*," he indicates that he is speaking of the passions of the soul, which follow on the perceptions of the internal senses, for, while "*dolor*" and "*delectatio*" are words used for either internal or external affections, "*tristitia*" is not used for the external or bodily passion.¹¹² However, he immediately adds, by way of explanation, that this joy and sorrow is consequent on the act of the common sense, that is, that the perception of the common sense is involved in the generation of this sorrow and joy. But since the common sense knows only the acts and operations of the external senses, this whole process under discussion must be one which has its origin externally.¹¹³

The total complex of operations, therefore, which begins with the apprehension of the external senses and ends with the movement of the internal sense appetite, seems to proceed thus: the object is apprehended in its sensible qualities, and the sense of touch, which apprehends the qualities most useful to the animal, apprehends also the senses of pain and pleasure allied to contact with the suitable or injurious. The common sense perceives all of these operations of the external senses, whether cognitive or appetitive. Then (and whether or not there are mediating acts on the part of the other internal senses he does not state here) arise the movements of joy and sorrow in the animal part of the soul and from these follow desire or aversion. "It is apparent therefore that the sensible movement in the sense proceeds on a threefold level. For first it appre-

¹¹² Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 35, a. 2; also 3 and ad 3. Cf. *II de Anima*, lect. 5, § 289.

¹¹³ "Et ut sciatur quid sit delectari et tristari, subiungit quod delectari et tristari, est agere sensitiva medietate, idest actio quaedam sensitivae virtutis, quae dicitur medietas, inquantum sensus communis comparatur ad sensus proprios ut quoddam medium. . . . Non autem omnis actio sensitivae partis est delectari et tristari, sed quae est respectu boni et mali inquantum huiusmodi. Nam bonum sensus, scilicet, quod est ei conveniens, causat delectationem; malum autem quod est repugnans et nocivum, causat tristitiam. Et ex hoc quod est tristari vel delectari, sequuntur fuga et appetitus, id est, desiderium, quae sunt secundum actum." *III de Anima*, lect. 12, § 768.

hends the sensible itself as suitable or harmful.”¹¹⁴ In saying that it apprehends the “sensible itself as suitable or harmful,” and not simply “the sensible good or evil,” he indicates that this apprehension is already both cognitive and affective, that is, of the qualities themselves and of their effect on the sensing body. He then concludes: “Secondly, delight and sorrow follow from this. Thirdly, however, follow desire or aversion.”¹¹⁵

The same fact, namely, that the interior passions arise from pain and pleasure apprehended by the sense of touch is also stated by St. Thomas, by way of example, when he says that the “object . . . of the sensible appetites is ‘this thing’ insofar as it is suitable or pleasant: as water insofar as it is suitable to taste.”¹¹⁶ And so whenever a desire is aroused internally by contact with a sensible good, it would seem that this order of genesis is to be observed: external apprehension, exterior pleasure or pain, internal perception by the common sense, internal delight and then desire.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, § 769.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ “Unde datur intelligi quod obiectum . . . appetitus sensibilis est haec res in quantum est conveniens vel delectabilis: sicut aqua, in quantum est conveniens gustui.” *De Verit.*, q. 25, a. 1. Nor should it be judged that St. Thomas is bringing in another sense power, namely, taste, to account for the primary affective movement in the external senses, for he holds that touch and taste are so close in nature and function as to overlap in certain acts. Cf. *II de Anima*, lect. 5, §§ 290-91; lect. 21, § 502. Evidently, in this case, where he uses water as an example, he is thinking of taste as touch, for water has no taste strictly speaking, and the desire for water involves its wetness and coolness, which aspects pertain precisely to touch.

¹¹⁷ It was stated in the section preceding this one that there are no appetites aroused without the intervention of the cognitive: it seems, however, that in these texts and in others (cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4; *II de Anima*, lect. 5, § 289), St. Thomas describes a basic structure of appetite generation, constituting in itself a complete psychological dynamism, without that intervention. The apparent contradiction is not too difficult to solve. St. Thomas posits in lower animals, in which the psychological processes develop in their most primitive forms, an indeterminate imagination, which does not operate to reproduce images in the absence of the external sensible, and in that sense is not an imagination at all, and yet mediates between external sensations and actions, being an interior principle receiving apprehensions and arousing the appetites which cause action. Its presence is manifested, if we may be permitted to speak backwards, by the

iv. *The originative distinction in appetites: the concupiscible and irascible*

There are therefore two orders of generation for internal appetites in man: the one originates in the external senses on the foundation of bodily pain and pleasure and reverberates at higher, internal levels, not, however, without the intervention of the cogitative, at least in conscious reactions, while the other arises precisely from the perceptions of the internal senses, that is, of the cogitative, as from its proper cognitive principle. For "as sense in act moves the appetite at the presence of the sensible thing, so the imagination in the absence of the sensible thing. And on account of this . . . animals perform many acts by imaginations."¹¹⁸

These two originatively distinct processes of apprehension provide the distinction in the cognitive order which founds the distinction of concupiscible and irascible in the appetitive order. In the activity of self-preservation which is the focal point and end of all animal operations, and hence of all sense appetites since sense appetite is nothing more than a principle of operation, there are two complementary aspects, namely, to seek what is good and to destroy what is harmful.¹¹⁹ On the one

absence or primitive development of a nervous system. Hence, in lower animals there both is and is not a cogitative power operating in the generation of appetites.

If we can apply the general psychological principle that the higher forms of life contain all that the lower forms have, we can say that man, in reflexive and quasi reflexive actions, which psychologically seem to operate without higher sense perceptions and physiologically seem to operate without the higher parts of the central nervous system, has responses which operate by an indeterminate imagination which supplies the effect of the cogitative without involving it formally.

¹¹⁸ *III de Anima*, lect. 6, § 669. The question always arises in citing texts concerning the "*phantasia*" and "*phantasma*" as to whether St. Thomas is referring to the faculty of imagination precisely as such or to the three higher interval faculties taken together. In this case, however, it makes no difference, since our purpose is satisfied by showing that the external senses are not the only sources from which appetitive movements originate.

¹¹⁹ St. Thomas sees this distinction even on the level of natural appetites, for even inanimate things have a natural motion towards that which conserves them in being and a natural activity against destructive agents. Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 25, a. 2.

hand, there is that which the animal immediately senses as good or bad on the basis of sensible pleasure and pain. Concerning such things the estimative power makes a simple "judgment," concluding that this pleasing thing is good, and precisely because it is pleasing, and on the basis of this perception, which is of a more simple nature (and in fact no more than an internal reiteration of the "judgment" of the external senses), the simple and direct appetites are aroused, that is, love, desire, joy, hate, aversion and sorrow, which all belong to the concupiscible power. On the other hand, there are objects which the animal perceives as good or bad for itself according to its nature, and regardless of the pleasant or painful effects they have on the senses. This involves a more complex "judgment," for the animal must discern the good in the painful and the harm in the pleasurable, as when an animal abandons food to flee or fight an enemy even if it suffer injury. So the appetites which follow this more complex "judgment" are more complex, such as boldness which drives an animal towards a dangerous enemy for the sake of overcoming it, or despair, which makes an animal shrink away from what is desirable because it is difficult. And so with the rest of the irascible appetites.¹²⁰ St. Thomas, then, sees something more simple and

¹²⁰ "Similiter etiam ex parte appetitus, quod animal appetat ea quae sunt convenientia sensui, delectationem facientia, secundum naturam sensitivae est et pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem; sed quod tendat in aliquod bonum quod non facit delectationem in sensu, sed magis natum est facere tristitiam ratione suae difficultatis, sicut quod animal appetat pugnam cum alio animali, vel aggredi quamcumque aliam difficultatem, hoc est in appetitu sensitivae secundum quod natura sensitiva attingit intellectivam; et hoc pertinet ad irascibilem.

Et ideo sicut aestimatio est alia vis quam imaginatio, ita irascibilis est alia vis quam concupiscibilis. Objectum enim concupiscibilis est bonum quod natum est facere delectationem in sensu; irascibilis autem bonum quod difficultatem habet. Et quia quod est difficile, non est appetibile inquantum huiusmodi, sed vel in ordine ad aliud delectabile, vel ratione bonitatis quae difficultati admiscetur—conferre autem unum ad aliud et discernere intentionem difficultatis et bonitatis in uno et eodem, est rationis;—ideo proprie istud bonum appetere est rationalis appetitus, sed convenit sensitivae, secundum quod attingit per quamdam imperfectam participationem ad rationalem, non quidem conferendo vel discernendo, sed naturali instinctu movetur in illud, sicut dictum est de aestimatione." *III Sent.*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4; I, q. 81, a. 2, ad 2.

direct, and more in the order of passivity and receptivity in the concupiscible order, and something more complex and active in the irascible order, and these diverse characteristics he finds detectable in the differences of both the cognitive and appetitive aspects involved in the total consideration of sensitivity.

v. *The role of imagination*

So much, then, for the two kinds of appetite, the concupiscible which originates in the external senses and is activated by the estimative or cogitative, and the irascible, which originates immediately upon the proper act of the estimative alone. A question still remains, namely, what kind of role does the imagination have in the generation of appetites.

The imagination, taken in the strict sense of the word, does not move the sense appetite to a passion.¹²¹ The reason given for this is that an image in the imagination is like a picture which, even if it portray something terrible or wonderful, does not move us to fright or awe, because it is not clothed in the sense of reality—it is known as nothing more than a representation.¹²² That is to say, we are not moved by simply apprehending a thing, but by apprehending it under the aspect of good or evil, or suitable or harmful, and such an apprehension requires a judgment or quasi-judgment, which the imagination cannot produce. For the imagination is limited to the mode of simple apprehension.¹²³

On the other hand, St. Thomas will also say that animals

¹²¹ This does not contradict St. Thomas' dictum that an appetite follows upon every form. When we say that no appetite follows upon imagination, we wish to exclude elicited appetites, but not the natural appetite which belongs to the imagination as it has a nature.

¹²² "Sed ad phantasiam non sequitur passio in appetitu; quia dum aliquid apparet nobis secundum phantasiam, similiter nos habemus, ac si consideremus in pictura aliqua terribilia vel sperabilia." *III de Anima*, lect. 4, § 634.

¹²³ "Huius autem differentiae rationis est quia appetitus non patitur nec movetur ad simplicem apprehensionem rei, qualem proponit phantasia. Sed oportet quod apprehendatur sub ratione boni vel mali, convenientis vel nocivi. Et hoc facit opinio in hominibus, componendo vel dividendo. . . . Phantasia autem non componit neque dividit." *Ibid.*, § 635.

perform many operations according to imaginations, and if they act, they first desire or fear or love or are moved by some one of the passions, for the passions are the principles of movements. Brute animals always act under imagination because they lack an intellect, and man acts by imagination whenever his mind is impeded by passion, insanity, sleep, or the like.¹²⁴ Again, he says: "the sensitive appetite by its nature is moved not only by "the estimative in other animals, and by the cogitative in man, which universal reason directs, but also by the imaginative and by sense."¹²⁵

However, it is not necessary to see opposition between these texts. The imagination indeed moves the appetites, but not by itself. It is not a sufficient cause of the movement, just as the external senses, taken by themselves are not sufficient causes of appetitive movements. As the external senses move man to passion only when a quasi-judgment has been proffered by the cogitative power, so also the imagination. Hence St. Thomas says: "The imagination of a form does not move the sensitive appetite without the estimation of suitability or harmfulness."¹²⁶ Thus the images of the imagination like the sensibles apprehended by the external senses, can be considered as matter by which the appetites can be moved, but as not actually capable of moving until they have been informed by the estimative effect of the cogitative.

Perhaps an analogy can be drawn between the way an image becomes apt matter for an appetite, and the way it becomes

¹²⁴ "Unde sicut sensus secundum actum movet appetitum ad praesentiam sensibilis, ita et phantasia in absentia sensibilis. Et propter hoc dicit quod animalia multa operantur secundum phantasias. Sed hoc contingit propter defectum intellectus . . . quia omnino non habent intellectum, sicut bestiae, (vel) quia habet intellectum velatum, sicut homines." *Ibid.*, lect. 6, §§ 669-670. Here again the question arises as to whether St. Thomas is speaking of the imagination in the strict sense, or of the three higher internal senses faculties which all use a phantasm. It would seem that he means the imagination strictly speaking, for in this lesson he is working on its definition, as "*motus factus a sensu secundum actum*" and mentions its "creative" function. Cf. § 665.

¹²⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 8, a. 3, ad 2.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2.

apt matter for the memory. An image can be taken in two ways: in itself as it is a sensible form, or in its reference to something else as it represents a reality. In itself it is something which man imaginatively inspects in the absence of the sensible reality, something upon which he can work creatively if he wishes, and in no way a cause of passion, for it is like the picture of a thing and known as such. In reference to something else, however, an image becomes a principle of appetite or of memory, insofar as it takes the place of something real, or as if real, in the case of an appetite, for appetites tend to things as they are in themselves, or, in the case of memory, insofar as it is referred to something as sensed before. It is a question of intentions, for the soul regards an image this way or that depending on its intention.¹²⁷

b. *Sensible consciousness of the appetites*

So much, then, for the generation of appetites and the cognitive principles thereof. With this material as basis, the proper question under consideration can be opened to investigation, namely, how is man sensibly conscious of the appetitive movements.

To begin with, as has already been noted, bodily pleasure and pain, which are responses of the affective order, are directly apprehended by the sense of touch, and consequently by the common sense and other internal senses. But the internal sense appetites do not seem directly apprehended by any sense power. The common sense would not apprehend them because its perception is focused on the operations of the external senses, while these passions arise from an apprehension of the internal cogitative power. The three higher internal sense powers—imaginative, memorative and cogitative—act upon images or phantasms or intentions of images. But no one is conscious of an image within himself of a passion, for the passions are not sensible qualities but conditions or states of the sentient being.

¹²⁷ Cf. *de Memoria*, lect. 3, §§ 340-343. Also *III de Anima*, lect. 12, § 778.

It would seem, therefore, that the appetitive movements or emotions are not apprehended directly by any sense.

Yet man is manifestly conscious of his affective states. The question, then, comes to this: what are the objects in the content of consciousness which indirectly provide man with his knowledge of appetitive movement.

If a thing cannot be known in itself, it can often be known with greater or lesser clarity in its causes or in its effects, as a man, seeing smoke in the distance, knows that there is a fire, and if a fire, also heat. What is sought here, then, are the sensible causes or effects of passion, so connected and known to be connected with passion that they manifest its presence and nature. Now the effect of all passions, and an essential constituent of sense passion, is bodily change,¹²⁸ and bodily changes are perceptible particularly to the sense of touch. It would seem, then, that the search for the clues which reveal the nature and presence of the passions would be a search into the nature of the physical changes involved in the passions. The bodily changes with which we are concerned are changes in the state or condition of internal organs. In this regard, a certain distinction must be made between the internal organic changes which are essentially involved in an appetite, such as the more rapid beating of the heart in anger, and the internal organic changes which are not so much a part of appetite as a cause of appetite, such as dryness of throat giving rise to thirst. The distinction between organs which are physically internal and those which are physiologically internal seems to be useful here, for the latter are those which are more closely connected with appetite in its essence, while the former, in their changes of state, rather give rise to appetites.¹²⁹ The sense of touch in the physically internal organs is similar to that

¹²⁸ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 22, aa. 1 and 3.

¹²⁹ A physiologically internal organ is an organ which cannot be reached from without except by passing through the cutaneous or mucous membranes. A physically internal organ, although it normally has no surface exposed, can be reached by passing through a natural bodily orifice; so, for example, the lungs, stomach, intestines, etc., are physically but not physiologically internal.

in the external parts of the body, in that it operates with regard to external objects, or their lack; it differs from the external sense in its mode of operation insofar as it serves to register not so much the objects themselves as the organic changes which take place on account of the presence or absence of these objects.¹³⁰ So, there is a sense of hunger which arises in the stomach when it is deprived of food for a while, caused by the contractions of stomach muscles, but no analogous sensation arises in a finger deprived of contact for a while. Perhaps we can speak of a threefold function involved in the operation of the sense of touch: a purely objective function belonging to touch as it is located in the exterior surfaces of the body, and apprehends exterior objects in contact with the body, a subjective-objective function belonging to touch in the interior surfaces of the body apprehending the conditions of physically internal organs in relation to the objects dealt with or produced, and finally, a purely subjective function belonging to the sense of touch in the physiologically internal organs apprehending their changes of condition insofar as they are affected by emotion. Since we will find St. Thomas speaking of all of these kinds of bodily contact and change, and of the appetites connected with them, it will be necessary to bear in mind these distinctions, for in this investigation of the structure of consciousness we presently seek only those bodily changes caused by passion and the manner in which they are known.

St. Thomas recognized the extent of the sense of touch, functioning in all parts of the body, surface and interior,¹³¹ but concentrated more in some parts than in others.¹³² He held also that the heart is the principle of the sense of touch, that is, the source of its energies and the main beneficent of its functions, since the heart is the principle of all animal life and movement, and animal life is formally sentient life, and

¹³⁰ See *II de Anima*, lect. 5, § 291.

¹³¹ Cf. *III de Anima*, lect. 3, § 611.

¹³² Around the heart, in the tips of the fingers and generative organs, etc. Cf. *den Sensu*, lect. 5, § 75; *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 32, a. 6; II-II, q. 141, a. 4.

sentient life is basically touch.¹³³ Hence the heart is the organ first and principally affected by the incidents of sentient life, by apprehensions and affections, and through the heart the effects of sensing are derived to other organs of the body.¹³⁴ Thus there are various organic changes involved essentially in emotional changes, since the appetites are not activities of the soul alone, but of the soul as it informs the body.¹³⁵ Whence the fact of an emotion can be perceived if the bodily change can be perceived. Moreover, something of the nature of the emotion can be known from the bodily change, since in all cases of material information, the matter informed is proportioned to the form informing, so that a different disposition is effected by a different form. Insofar then as the differences in bodily changes can be apprehended, the differences in the appetites can be known.¹³⁶ Since, then, the sense of touch is diffused through the whole body, a tangible bodily change can be apprehended anywhere. But many of the effects of the emotions on the body are tangible, being in the order of heat or cold, pressure, contraction, relaxation, tensions, etc. So from the sense of touch, the facts and natures of appetites can be known. Moreover, since the effects of appetites which are aroused by good and pleasing objects are effects which cause, for the most

¹³³ Cf. *de Motu Cordis*, § 460; *II de Anima*, lect. 3, § 259; I, lect. 3, § 32.

¹³⁴ *De Motu Cordis*, § 462; *de Sensu*, lect. 5, § 75-76. We will not digress here or hereafter to discuss the physiological questions involved. St. Thomas largely accepted and depended on the cruder physiology of his times. Since however physiology is so intimately connected with psychology, an imperfect physiology will lead to imperfect conclusions in psychology. This is not necessarily embarrassing to anyone developing a psychological theme on the basis of St. Thomas' work, since the imperfections are generally in the order of detail and remote conclusion while the principles and major lines of argument remain firm and illuminating. In the physiological field, therefore, we shall feel free to omit what has been superseded, adapt what is adaptable and accept what still stands as acceptable, without detailed analyses in the particular cases, confident that this is in the spirit of St. Thomas, who frequently observed that knowledge of the soul could never be perfect until the man knew perfectly the corporeal conditions of the body informed by the soul, and that this latter knowledge was subject to practically endless investigations and improvement.

¹³⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 22, a. 3; *de Verit.*, q. 26, a. 3.

¹³⁶ *De Verit.*, q. 25, a. 2; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 44, a. 1.

part, pleasant reactions, while the effects of appetites aroused by evil objects cause unpleasant reactions, the sense of pain and pleasure aroused by the bodily change gives an immediate impression of the nature of the appetite causing it. Thus delight causes a relaxation and expansiveness in the organs which is itself delightful, while fear causes a contraction and coldness which is itself unpleasant.

In more detail, reviewing more or less briefly the bodily changes effected by, or more exactly, concomitant with, an appetitive movement, we find St. Thomas enumerating four effects of love: a feeling called melting and a feeling of delight which are perceived when the one loved is present; a feeling of languor or pain and a feeling of tension or fervor, which can even lead to sickness, when the one loved is absent.¹³⁷ Moreover, an excessive love can cause injury, and hence pain, after the manner in which any sense power is injured by a too excessive act.¹³⁸ Delight causes a feeling of dilation or expansiveness,¹³⁹ sorrow causes a feeling of heaviness,¹⁴⁰ fear has a certain bodily contraction connected with it, or an effect of tightening,¹⁴¹ and also a coldness and a sinking feeling,¹⁴² while anger gives a feeling of heat and of pressure rising from within.¹⁴³ According to the physiology of the day, it was the flux and flow of bodily humors—blood, bile, phlegm, choler, etc.—which give rise to the sensations accompanying the movement of passion;¹⁴⁴ according to modern physiology it is the muscular, nervous, and glandular response which excites the sensations. The fact, however, which is unchanged from that day to this is that the

¹³⁷ Although the principal interpretations of these four effects of love involve the passion with respect to its object, that is to say, in its formal aspect, he is explicit about assigning these feelings to the organ too, insofar as it is changed by the passion. "Et isti quidem sunt effectus amoris formaliter accepti secundum habitudinem appetitivae virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris consequuntur aliqui effectus his proportionati secundum immutationem organi." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 28, a. 5, in cont.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* in corp.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 33, a. 1.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 37, a. 2.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 37, a. 4; q. 40, a. 6; q. 44, a. 1, ad 1.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, q. 44, a. 1

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, ad 1.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, q. 48, a. 1.

passions are accompanied by bodily changes which can be apprehended, and when apprehended, give notice of the passion itself.

For the sake of completeness, certain secondary effects of the bodily change should be noted, since they also give some indication of emotional states. So, for example, there is flushing and blushing with the consequent sense of heat, paling and coldness, sweating and dryness of mouth, trembling, rapid breathing, and the like, which can all be felt by the one who is moved by passion, and can give him an inkling of the nature of the passion moving him. These sensations, although they contribute to man's knowledge of his own appetites, do not contribute as directly as the sensations arising internally in the organs directly affected by the appetites.

Another source of sensitive knowledge of the sense appetites seems to lie in the knowledge of bodily activity, and its principles and modes. The line of the argument would run thus: man is sensibly conscious of his appetites, as has been said above. He is also sensibly conscious of his physical activity, from touch and from the other senses, from the kinesthetic sense, from his experience of past actions successfully completed, and so on. In fact, the appetites are principles of physical activity, although the abstract notion of causal dependence cannot be sensed. Nevertheless, the sequences of action and appetite can be sensed and associated: that desire is followed by an urge to grasp or obtain, that obtaining is followed by pleasure, that anger is followed by an urge to destroy and that destruction is followed by a sensible satisfaction. Now, if these impulses to action and their cessation when action is consummated can also be sensed, a sensible knowledge is indirectly obtained of the appetite itself. And it seems that the impulses can be sensed, as tensions of muscles and tendons, and consequent relaxations, as feelings of impatience and restlessness when action is delayed, and so on. Hence it seems possible to conclude that man is sensibly although indirectly aware of appetitive movement in actions

poised or in actions consummated or in actions impeded. All of these effects of passion St. Thomas cites in considerable detail, and, although he does not expressly relate them to the question of consciousness, it does not seem invalid to draw the conclusion as given.¹⁴⁵

c. *Conclusion*

The conclusion, therefore, by way of summary, would take into account first of all the crucial role of the sense of touch in man's sensible consciousness of his appetites. It is touch, in its quasi-reflective function, whereby it apprehends the affective consequences of contact with various objects, which gives man the awareness of primary affective factors in his psychological activity, that is, awareness of pleasure and pain. It is touch also, operating in the internal organs affected by emotional change which gives him, although indirectly, whatever consciousness he has of the existence and nature of his internal appetites. It is also touch which gives him his principal awareness of bodily activity in relation to appetitive movement.

And this also gives us some inkling of why man's consciousness is more obscure and confused in regard to emotional content than it is in regard to cognitive content, both because the knowledge of the emotions is attained, for the most part, by indirection, and because it is principally attained by touch, whose perceptions, even when they are vivid, are not clear-cut or well defined. For the perceptions of touch do not attain as simply and completely as the sense of sight, for instance, to such factors as motion, shape, size, and number, and do not attain at all to color or sound. When we consider, then, that intellect and reason work principally on just these sensible data, and that, even in the sense order, these data are often of greater significance in grasping the characters and uses of things, we begin to see that, on account of being confined within the scope of touch, the perceptions of appetites tend to be undefined and

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 37, aa. 1, 2, and 3; q. 40, a. 8; q. 45, a. 4; q. 48, aa. 3 and 4; q. 33, a. 3.

vague. And this will be a matter of considerable importance when the investigation of unconsciousness must be made.

C. *Sense consciousness of the sensing subject*

Another problem in the order of sensitive consciousness is the problem of consciousness of the sensing subject by the sensing subject—whether strict self-consciousness is possible in the sense order, and, if so, to what extent and through what powers, acts and objects. It has been shown above that it is possible to have a complex and varied consciousness in the sense order, but the content of this consciousness as it has been examined so far, has been limited to the objects of the senses, and, to the degree that the objects implicate the actions and powers, these also have been subject to conscious awareness. However, the question at issue now is the question of strict self-consciousness (if consciousness of psychological content and activity can be distinguished as self-consciousness in a wide sense on the grounds that it bears on what man has and not on what he is, or, more precisely, that he is). The question now is whether or not there is any awareness in the sense order of the fact that the sensing subject exists, and perhaps, of what it is.

In passing, it may be noted that, in the intellectual order, there can be perfect self-consciousness, both of the intellectual principles of action and the intellectual subject, and of the sensitive subject which serves it, and of their unity in one whole living being, sentient and intellectual. Indeed, it is only in this order that self-consciousness becomes or can become fully evolved. But this consciousness of the sensing subject is functionally intellectual. Therefore, setting the intellectual order aside for the moment, the problem narrows down to an investigation of whatever perfection of consciousness can be assigned to the sense order in its own right.

It should be noted that the consciousness of the sensing subject which is considered here is consciousness of the subject taken in the strict sense, that is, as the possessor of activity

and known expressly as such. For it is evident that animals know their own bodies by touch, sight, etc., and that they know their physical conditions such as pain, pleasure, well-being, etc., and so, in a way, the sensing subject knows itself. But this is a kind of extrinsic knowledge which does not lead to the apprehension of the subject precisely as such, in contradistinction to its activities or operations. The question at issue now is the possibility of sense consciousness of the subject in that precise sense.

Perhaps it would be best to establish first the obstacles or limits in the sense order which seem to bar it off from strict self-consciousness, and afterward to expose the factors which seem to argue to some perfection of self-consciousness, and then to estimate how much these secondary factors modify the limits previously uncovered.

The arguments against strict self-consciousness in the sense order flow from two orders of causality—the order of finality and the order of formality.

In the order of finality, it would seem that the purposes of sense knowledge are accomplished adequately without strict self-consciousness, that is, without consciousness of the sensing subject as such. Since, therefore, nature does not act in vain, providing means which have no use in relation to ends, it follows that there is no strict self-consciousness in the sense order. For self-consciousness is required in beings which have the obligation of orienting themselves towards their final ends as such. Now in order to orient the self towards an end, a knower must know himself as an individual related to an end, and related precisely by the actions over which he has dominion. Thus man, who alone has free choice in his actions, has the need to know himself, so as to order his actions to the ends which are conformed to his nature. Only man has to consider himself as an agent to whom are imputed, for praise or blame, the actions he performs, and therefore he alone has to make the distinction between himself and his acts. A brute animal is ordered to its end, of self-preservation and reproduction, by

the mind of the Creator, and its actions proceed necessarily towards these ends; it has no need to reflect on its actions, in relation to itself and its end, as to whether they are good or bad; by their nature they are determined to being good. An animal cannot and need not decide for itself whether to act or not, or to act this way or that way. Hence it need not reflect on the nature of its acts, nor discern them precisely as acts distinct from and referable to a subject which is responsible for them, and eventually reaches or does not reach its true destiny on the strength of them. An animal naturally and unwaveringly moves towards its "destiny."

Moreover, within the psychological structure of man, there is no need for self-awareness precisely in the sense order, for the acts by which he measures himself and by which he is ultimately judged by his Creator, are not the acts of the sensible order as such, but the acts of the intellectual order, and of the sense order only insofar as they are subject to the rational order. For the sense life of man is ordered to the service of the rational life. Hence there is no need for a "reference to a subject" precisely in the sense order—the reference required and sufficing is made in the intellectual order.

The same conclusion is reached in the order of formality—self-consciousness is impossible in the sense order. Self-consciousness is possible only to an abstracting power. What is required for self-consciousness is knowledge of the distinction between the acting subject and its action. Now the union between the acting subject and its action is the union between the substance and a proper accident, which union is that of secondary matter and accidental form. Although this union of matter and accidental form is the union of two elements which are really distinct, they are not distinct as substance from substance nor as sensible quality from sensible quality, but as informing principle from principle informed—a union, therefore, which is not an accidental aggregate of two or more into one, but a union *per se*, as of perfectible and perfection. To distinguish the elements which constitute such a union seems impossible

to a sense power, for, whatever the sensible aspects of the composite, neither principle has a sensible aspect by itself—neither indeed exists by itself. An abstracting power can conceive the one separate from the other, for it deals with being as such, and the two elements in the composite can be conceived in the order of being, i. e., as conferring being or as receiving it. Neither, however, can be grasped as in the order of sensible being, for the sensibility of the quality follows upon the information of the matter by the quality. Hence no sense power can grasp the presence of the sensing subject of sensible acts.

Whatever, then, are the arguments which can be brought forth to show that in the sensible order there is sufficient evidence for making the distinction between the subject and the activities of the subject, it must always be answered that, although the evidence is present, the power capable of interpreting it is not and cannot be a power of the sense order. The best the senses can do, and this much indeed they do accomplish, is to provide the data which points inescapably to the distinction between subject and act, and leads in the direction of knowledge of the sensing subject.

This evidence in the sense order that there is one single sensing subject distinct from its manifold operations is abundant and convincing. There is the operation of the common sense, which, by gathering and associating the diverse representations apprehended in the first instance by the external senses, indicates that these several senses are ordered not to several diverse ends but to one end, and hence are of the one subject, which possesses that common sense and that one end. So deep is this indication that St. Thomas says that we know we live by the perception of the common sense.¹⁴⁶ There is also the action of the cogitative, which orients man towards objects precisely as objects, and is followed naturally and immediately by appetites, which tend towards objects precisely as objects, for an appetite tends to things as they are in them-

¹⁴⁶ Cf. p. 421 above.

selves, and in this insistence on objectivity, necessarily indicates the object-subject distinction, and so leads to the knowledge of the subject.¹⁴⁷ There is also the work of the memory, which contains a life-long record of apprehensions of the senses, gradually built up upon many objects, and contains them as the repeated apprehensions of what can only be one single sensing subject, for if there were no one subject perduring under the accumulating flux and flow of psychological activity, and possessing it all, there would be nothing in which the record would be gathered and contained. Either there is a subject, or there could be no series of retained apprehensions. Again there is the effect of attention, and of the limitation in the quantities of psychic energy available at any one time to a sentient being, which point to a single subject of all psychological activity from which the energy available is apportioned among the different activities, and is especially apparent in the sense order. For if there were not one subject supplying energy, there would be no interference of one power's activity when attention is directed to that of another.

These are strong evidences pointing to the existence of the sensing subject, but, as has been said, the power capable of reading the meaning in them is not a sense power. To accomplish the necessary abstraction, an intellectual power is needed, reflecting upon the sense order and grasping what is there at the same time made manifest and ignored. A brute animal, therefore, is actually a sensing subject distinct from its sense activity, and knows objects which are distinct from itself, and acts in regard to these distinct objects in ways in which it would never act if it did not know the distinct objects, but it never knows these distinctions as such. Just as an animal acts for ends which it knows without knowing them under the formality of ends, so it acts for objects without knowing them

¹⁴⁷ "Ostendit quae ratio sit movens. . . . Ratio autem particularis dicit quod hoc quidem est tale, et ego talis, puta quod ego filius, et hunc honorem debeo nunc exhibere parenti." *III de Anima*, lect. 16, § 845.

formally as objects, and without knowing the object-subject distinction as such.¹⁴⁸

Therefore there is no perfect self-consciousness in the sense order. It is only in the intellectual order that powers are found capable of making a complete return upon themselves and upon the subject possessing them, and of so attaining to strict self-consciousness.¹⁴⁹

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¹⁴⁸ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

¹⁴⁹ "Cuiuslibet potentiae animae virtus est determinata ad obiectum suum; unde et eius actio primo et principaliter in obiectum tendit. In ea vero quibus in obiectum tendit, non potest nisi per quamdam reditionem. . . . Sed ista reditio incomplete quidem est in sensu, complete autem in intellectu, qui reditione completa redit ad cognoscendum essentiam suam." *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 9. "Illa quae sunt perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales, redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa. . . . Sed reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt essentias proprias: unde dicitur in libro de Causis, quod omnis sciens essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa. Sensus autem, qui inter ceteros est propinquior intellectuali substantiae, redire quidem incipit ad essentiam suam, quia non solum cognoscit sensibile, sed etiam cognoscit se sentire; non tamen completur eius reditio, quia sensus non cognoscit essentiam suam." *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 9.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND HISTORICAL LEARNING

IN a previous article in this Journal I treated problems of the stability, decline and fall of civilizations in the light of the philosophy of history. Following Toynbee's morphology of civilizations I showed the characteristic way in which these higher societies have declined (in the form of cycles). Higher cultures have broken down and begun to decline because the goodness of the supra-national civilization has been lost sight of by its member states. The typical course of civilizations' histories shows a serial of goods and ideals which have been pursued, and suggests that a philosophy of culture should take into account all the *true* goods and ideals. The philosophy of history, therefore, in some way ought to posit the simultaneous presence of all the perfections that are *proper* to civilizations and which have occurred in the course of their histories. At the same time, virtues and vices have a cultural significance which ought to be elaborated in the philosophy of history. Hence the philosophy is a cultural ethics and, in my view, a Christian philosophy.¹

¹ "The Philosophy of History and the Stability of Civilizations" (THE THOMIST, XX, April 1957, 158-190). The philosophy of history, I think, is the fourth part of a quadrumvirate of ethical disciplines: *Monastica* (or personal ethics), *Oeconomica* (or domestic ethics), *Politica* (or political ethics) and *Historica* (or cultural ethics). I use *civilization* and *culture* as synonymous, meaning not only *culture* in the ordinary sense of the word but especially a supra-national society and its values; viz., a higher civilization such as the Egyptian or Western Civilization. As to ethics, let me give an example of a cultural vice. The eighteenth century Western Civilization was notably an age of irony, an era of literary levity, dissatisfaction and satire. Involved here is the vice called *éipōvela*, irony, or self-depreciation, by Aristotle. The eighteenth century irony not only depreciated the nobler feelings of Western Culture but also attacked the nobler ideals. To the extent that the attitude was a sophistry opposed to the true values of the Western

In the present article I should like to consider the other side of the science; namely, the way in which it illuminates our *historical* knowledge. That is to say, how does the philosophy of history underlie the historical learning of historians? Such a procedure will enable us to understand better the philosophy. Oblivion, so to speak, is the child of time. History is the child of eternity.

I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

A. *The Subject Matter of Historical Learning.*

The philosophy of history nowadays is understood to have much to do with the *historian's* study of the past. Philosophers who write on the subject are particularly concerned to know just what the subject-matter of historical science is and how that material is to be approached, assimilated and presented by the historian.² Yet the primary concern of the philosophy of history, it seems to me, is ethical and cultural. To be sure, I cannot very well take the name of "philosophy of history" for my view about historical learning, unless I do justice to all that the name signifies above. For I, too, take the philosophy of history to be the philosophy by which the historian is best able to distinguish his own genre of knowing from all others. That is, the philosophy of history encompasses certain pre-suppositions and philosophical attitudes of the historian in the same way that the philosophy of nature includes the philosophical assumptions of the biologist or chemist. I shall attempt

Culture, we may call it cultural irony. This is not to deny that the eighteenth century witnessed good satire and irony. Neither is it to deny the emergence of great and fine public intentions in that century.

²I mention a few of the articles: "What is Philosophy of History?," (a symposium, Dec. 1951). Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. *Journal of Philosophy*, XLX (1952), 317-362. C. Brinton, "The 'new history' and 'past everything'," *American Scholar* VIII (1939), 144-157. A. C. Danto, "On Historical Questioning," *Journal of Philosophy*, LI (1954), 89-99. A. O. Lovejoy, "Present Standpoints and Past History," *Journal of Philosophy* XXXVI (1939), 477-89. B. J. Muller-Thym, "Of History as a Calculus Whose Term is Science," *The Modern Schoolman*, XIX, # 4, 41-47, # 5, 73-76.

to show that this aspect of the philosophy of history is perfectly consistent with the ethical; indeed, that each aspect presupposes the other.

For example, the subject-matter of the historian, I think, is immediately or ultimately determined both by ethical values, as well as by the course of history as it really happened. (Thus, the historian selects his material *partly* for moral reasons, and we shall see why presently.) And what I call cultural *ethics*—philosophy of history—in turn, is determined by the subject-matter of the historian. (Thus, a cultural ethics presupposes the interest of some historian in social facts.) But all human knowledge originates in historical experience. Consequently, in the last analysis, “historical” knowledge, even if it be any individual’s awareness of what happened a moment ago, occurs first, and ethical knowledge occurs second. If we are not talking about historians, this may be true. For the *historian* as such, an ethics or a moral attitude is first absolutely speaking, and determines in part the subject-matter of historical science. This is so because his specialty is not merely knowing historically (for we all do that) but knowing, by a principle of selection, what may be termed “historical facts.”^a Far from recording everything that happens, he does not even record every authentic word out of the newspapers. Historical facts are distinguished by a powerful principle of selection at work in historical writing. The outlook or moral philosophy that

^a Cf. W. Fales, “Historical Facts,” *Journal of Philosophy* XLVIII (1951), 84-94. Let me bring to bear on the subject a clear light from a mediaeval mind, encountered subsequent to my formulation. According to Ibn Khaldun (*vivebat* A.D. 1332-1406), philosophy of history (the science of culture) and historical learning are related in three ways. “(1st) In the sequence through which the mind achieves knowledge, the science of culture comes *after* history: it reflects on, and explains the external events ascertained by history. (2nd) The historian cannot, however, ascertain external events without a minimal acquaintance with their nature and causes. In the art of the historian, history and the science of culture should be combined. (3rd) Finally, in the order of being, the object of the science of culture comes before the object of history. Historical events are the product of the nature and causes underlying them.” M. Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History*, a study in the philosophic foundation of the science of culture (London, 1957), p. 171.

guides the selection of the historian is not often explicit or clearly understood or even understood at all; for the true historian has a full time job of his own, without taking on the task of being a philosopher too. He knows what good historical writing is, he has a subject in the historical past that interests him, and he writes the history. Nevertheless, his reasons for *doing* it, and for writing it in the *way* that he does it, are not historical; ultimately they are philosophical. This is why I believe that the subject-matter of historians, generally speaking, is distinctively what it is for philosophical reasons. And since it is history that I am talking about, then I say that the *philosophy of history*—remote as it may be from conscious interest of the historian—determines the distinctive nature of his subject-matter. And this is so, whether he is translating archaeological findings into the history of an ancient Sumerian city or is distilling from documents the history of American banking. If we want to understand clearly the distinctive subject-matter of history we should consider it philosophically. It follows from this that we can find the philosophy of history implicit in historical learning.

B. *The Subject-Matter of the Philosophy of History*

1. *In General*

The *Historian* says that the subject-matter of *his* work may be summed up in the term, "historical facts." These, however, are not ordinary facts, but facts which have been noted for cultural reasons; they are cultural facts. And this is so when the historian or even an amateur writes the biography of some significant person. For example, Boswell's *Life of Johnson* evokes the interest of generations of readers in the cultures of James Boswell and Samuel Johnson and the societies in which they lived. And I think the interest in the story, by virtue of the special circumstances of all the participants including Edmund Burke and George III, those in England, those in Scotland, and those in Europe, is also an interest in human nature insofar as it is cultural. That is to say the story's fascination

has, finally, a philosophical cause. It is interesting, not merely because one likes to consider the private and personal ethical behavior of individuals, nor because one likes to find out the political conduct of man, but also because one wants to observe the cultural activity of human beings. There is then, unconscious though it undoubtedly is, in the reader of Boswell's work, a philosophy of history which, in the reader, gives him a poignant interest in the account. And I say this philosophy of history is ultimately the reason why Boswell wrote the biography. In technical terms it is a philosophy of history whose subject-matter is: man acting voluntarily for a cultural end with the cooperation of Providence. I mention the latter, for in the less serious writing as in the most recondite Providential occurrences share with human initiative in the making of history; and this may be seen in that light but sincere chronicle of Boswell in which much of the conversation of Johnson is recorded.⁴

The philosophy of history lies implicit in historical learning and is accultly its *raison d'être*. A philosophy governs the historian, I think, in the general subject-matter of his own account. To be sure, the historian never defines the subject of his work the "historical facts" *philosophically*. He thinks of them in an *historical* way. He wants to consider certain human beings, certain causes and effects, miracles, other Providential events, parts, structures and processes of societies, customs, ideals and laws. But the ultimate principle of his selection of historical material, in fact of his very decision to be an historian is philosophical as I have described above. He (or the reader for whom he writes), if we analyze far enough, is interested in a moral problem: the establishment or destruction of cultures or civilizations, and this helps him to hit upon with accuracy the subject-matter of his work. True enough, his obvious subject is the history of man; that is, the particular history that he has decided to study. But remotely, his subject is the

⁴ The impact of Samuel Johnson's conservation on his own age is a matter of history. There is no question of the historical significance of Boswell's subject.

same as is that of the *philosophy* of history. Since the historian wants to understand the history of mankind in some way or other, it is a cultural problem that interests him, that of the cultural nature of man and of the way in which man historically expresses it. In philosophical terms we may say that the historian, insofar as he is philosophical, studies the true nature of man insofar as man is cultural. And the historian is philosophical finally, in spite of himself, at least obscurely and unconsciously.

The culture or the civilization, subject-matter of the philosophy of history,⁵ is a complex society, formed of more or less autonomous political societies, and present through its various traditions and institutions to its political and regional parts. The culture is a nobler and less tangible society than a political commonwealth; for it includes orders and hierarchies of: religion, philosophy, the arts, customs, economics, as well as politics. For example, we may speak of the Hellenic Civilization or Culture (referring to both the Greeks and the Romans as Professor Toynbee does) as constituting a single general society with its distinctive outlook. The difference between the culture and the political state is borne out in the history of the Roman Empire after the Principate of Augustus. The success of the Romans in subordinating not only the political states of the world, but also the Hellenic *Civilization*, to Roman *Politics* is more than balanced by the weakening of the Civilization once it and even its religiousness had been wrenched into a totalitarian devotion to the Roman political state.

I say the subject of the philosophy of history is man or men

⁵ The *subject-matter* also refers to the *purpose* of the philosophy of history; cf. below. This is clear if we consider the *subject-matter* of the philosophy of history and morals in general: "man acting for the true good." In the philosophy of history, thus understood, and consequently in historical science, we cannot comprehend the *subject-matter* without referring to the *goal*. It follows that the more surely an historian has a philosophy of history (goal-oriented), other conditions being equal, the more unerringly will he perceive the subject-matter of his history. I do not say the philosophy of history substitutes for the historian's subject-matter, but that it sharpens the insight about the subject-matter.

achieving or perfecting a distinctive society, which may be called a culture or a civilization. Part of this subject are the dispositions or habits that incline or disincline men to live amicably in such a society. These are the cultural virtues or vices which are included under the theological virtues and the cardinal virtues of temperance, fortitude, justice, prudence and charity. For example, St. Augustine opens his work, *De Civitate Dei*, by referring to a species of *intemperance* in the citizens of the Roman Empire, vainglory or pride—what I call a cultural pride: “ ‘ God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble.’ (Prov. 3:34) This prerogative belongs to God but the soul which is puffed up with pride also claims it as his own and loves to hear among his praises that ‘ he spares the conquered and breaks the proud in war ’ ” (Vergil).⁶ Thus, just as a man might have an arrogance, an inordinate love of his own perfection as opposed to his own good (*monastica*), or opposed to the good of his family (*oeconomica*), or opposed to the good of his national state (*politica*), in a like manner he might love excessively his own glory and that of his nation (particularly the military glory) as opposed to the good of the other *πάτριος*, the civilization to which he belongs (*historica*).

2. *An Historical Possibility Exemplifying the Nature of Civilization.*

There is no question that a higher civilization is a distinct type of society; thus we can speak of the Western Civilization or the Hellenic or the Andean or the Hindu and so on, each of them an entity greater and nobler than the participating parochial states. The type of civilization I mention above, as a type, is the highest natural society of which human beings are capable. But it is a possibility that some day several higher civilizations might exist at the same time, as in the Middle Ages, when there existed the Mexic, the Andean, the

⁶ Vergil, *Aeneid*, VI, 853, quoted in *De Civitate Dei*, translated by R. H. Barrow in his work, *Introduction to St. Augustine, The City of God* (London, 1950), p. 28.

Far Eastern, the Hindu, the (Magian) Arabian, the (Magian) Orthodox Christian and the (Western-Faustian) Medieval Christian Civilizations. What is more, if several civilizations should exist in the same era, they all might be competitively aware of the existence of each other. For example, the Hellenic and Persian (Syriac) civilizations existed competitively side by side for several centuries preceding the conquest of Alexander the Great. If such an historical situation were to occur, what would be the natural attitude of the historian or philosopher? For him, the historical facts of the day would take on an extra dimension. The cultural meaning of historical facts would modify the ordinary idea of civilization or culture, because the philosopher or historian would look, whether deliberately or not, for a cultural *rapprochement* in which several integral civilizations might exist peaceably together. Such an historical state of affairs is, I think, a hypothesis, not a reality at the present day; for, of all the higher civilizations that have existed in the past, only the Western Civilization retains its identity as a still vigorous higher civilization, distinguished especially by its industrial know-how.⁷

3. *A Second Historical Possibility.*

Suppose, however, that *all* the nations and societies of the earth should find themselves belonging to a single civilization, a civilization differing in physical extent, but not in essence, from the type realized in the higher civilizations of the past. The historian or philosopher of such an unified world—and an all-encompassing culture—would be face to face with the *geographical* achievement of the ultimate ideal of the philosophy of history. For him, would the historical facts of the day derive their cultural significance from the single society,

⁷ Cf. A. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Abridgement of Vol. I-VI by D. C. Somervell (Oxford, 1947), Table V, p. 565; *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1953, vol. vii-x) Vol. VII, Table I, p. 769. However, I follow Spengler in distinguishing the Magian Culture, common to the Orthodox Christians and to the Muslims so far as Religion allowed. Cf. *The Decline of West*, trans. C. F. Atkinson (N.Y., 1939, 2 vol.), Vol. II, pp. 231 ff.

embracing the entire world in its culture? Not necessarily, I think; for a civilization, enveloping all the earth's peoples, might be worthy or unworthy, capable or incapable, of continuing in existence. An historian of the future might behold an era comparable to that of St. Augustine, in which a universal civilization, in the last stage of its decline was about to disintegrate under pressure. In this desperate circumstance—and certainly not an impossible one—the historical facts of the day would take on an extra dimension. The historian or philosopher (if he did not seek to bring to life a former vigorous era of the same civilization) would look, at least instinctively, for a fresh cultural ideal around which the materials of the old civilization might be gathered and reinvigorated. However, at the present time, an historical situation in which one culture might include the entire world is manifestly an hypothesis, not an actuality. For, though the Western Civilization is the only higher civilization of the past which remains intact today, many primitive societies and numerous great remains from fallen higher civilizations exist independently.

4. *A Third Historical Possibility.*

I mention these historical hypotheses because they are alternatives, and the philosophy of history has to cope with them. Nevertheless, to consider the civilization of which one's own country is only a part is the simplest and most important view of the philosophy of history. Here, I say, one needs cultural virtues in respect to the higher society of which he is a member. But the historical possibilities I outlined above are situations where a civilization might best be replaced by another, as when a disintegrating culture is hopelessly dying. I would add another hypothesis which is very real: the case where a remaining people, a social or cultural fragment of a fallen and lifeless civilization, might choose either to keep the cultural ideals of the past or, on the contrary, to graft itself upon a living civilization. The Japanese, for example, have taken the second way, have rejected their own Far Eastern Culture, in the degenerate

and partial form that survived, as morally inferior to that of Western Civilization.⁸ In this, as in the other exceptional situations, I think the cultural ethics, the philosophy of history, would guide the individual in his choice between one civilization or another. I speak, here, of "culture" in the sense that I have been using the term—as a special kind of supra-national society and its appurtenances—to indicate the Western, Hindu and the other civilizations. But, of course, in a different sense, any cultural component of any society can be called "culture." In this sense, the beautiful Japanese culture, to be seen in architecture, the arts, in manners, in dress, in landscape and so on, continues to assert itself. Again, the Seventeenth century Old World culture of Quebec continues to assert itself in Canada. Nevertheless, both Quebec and Japan belong to the Western Civilization.

II. THE METHOD OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

A. *Culture and the Method of Historical Learning.*

I said that, though he be unaware of it, the historian has a philosophy of history in the recesses of his mind, even the amateur in history, the biographer who chronicles his contemporaries and their time. And I think the philosophy of history that underlies his historical study is the one that I have been describing. But what of those historians whose writings and whose purpose have gone clean contrary to the cultural ideal of an integral civilization? Or, again, how may I reconcile my views about the philosophy of history with another attitude of certain historians? Some not only assume—as a good historian should—that no subjective interference or moral didacticism⁹

⁸ Cf. an address delivered Feb. 11, 1946, by Shigaru Nambara, President of Tokyo Imperial University, "Creation of New Japanese Civilization" *Ethics* (1945-46), p. 293.

⁹ If an historian should depict the past in order to illustrate moral maxims, then his work would not be an history at all, but a species of morals—probably not a very good moral treatise. Though an historian's motive is *ultimately* moral, he is not a moralist; and a moralist is not an historian. The historian's method

has distorted their histories, but also declare, as Herbert Fisher does, in his *History of Europe*, that they cannot "discern in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from them. They can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave; only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations. . . ." ¹⁰ As for the historians who, like Fisher, deny that they find a pattern in human history and assert "the play of the contingent and the unforeseen," ¹¹ the title of their works belie their words. The term, *Europe*, indicated an intellectual pattern of facts in the mind of the author. Indeed, the word, *history*, manifests a universal concept according to which the historian makes a very limited and definite choice of the phenomena at his disposal to record. The term, *historical facts*, reveals some kind or other social idea or ideal at work in the process of human history.

Many historians write on a subject far more limited than the history of Europe and some suppose, or presuppose, a social ideal or good which contradicts that of a supra-natural civilization. A prejudice against the idea of a civilization or any society that is nobler than its member national polities may affect the writings of historians of any kind of history, great or small, reportative or explanatory, factual or ideational.

My answer is, that, like history, historical learning has an element of freedom; it is contingent, not only on account of Providential or unforeseen occurrences, but also because of the historian's freedom to esteem whatever ideals may please him. The historian, if he is worthy of his title, is not free to invent

is too speculative (though very concrete), his attitude is too disinterested, to permit a didacticism. This follows from the nature of human history. There is too much of the unknown and the Providential in history to allow the historian to make systematic moral judgments on the historical process. Of course this does not prevent an historian from "calling a spade a spade." Those historians who do this frequently are called "moral historians." Nor does it prevent the collecting of both historical and didactic writings into one book, as in *Holy Scriptures*.

¹⁰ H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (London, 3 vols.), I, vii.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

the history, but he is free to record one historical truth instead of another, in lines with his scholarly purpose. If the philosophy of history that I have been describing, or an outlook similar to it, does not suit him, he may adapt a broader or more limited opposed view.¹² Nevertheless, I think there is a logic present in history that follows upon the nature of man, a natural law, in addition to the inscrutable logic of divine Providence. History shows that *by nature* human beings seek to dwell in integrated civilized societies and that besides seeking a political ordering of their affairs, men seek a cultural order. Man-in-history, by his very nature, seeks to live in culture or civilization. Then the historian, who is also a man-in-history, has a connatural tendency to view history culturally because it is of his human nature to bring *cultural* questions to the facts that he records. I say this is his tendency *by nature*; but he is perfectly free to approach history in another way, according to any theory or philosophy that may convince his reason. If an historian is convinced that the political state forming but a part of civilization is the noblest community and society that man may have, then his historical writing will be affected thereby—perhaps to the extent of dividing history into the history of nations but not into the history of civilizations. For example, I heard an eminent historian of *France* attack the foreign policy of thirteenth century King Louis IX (St. Louis) as very inimical to the future well-being of the French, which is true. King Louis gave large territories away to other powers. But the historian might have added, if he had seen fit, that the French King's generosity with his territory occurred within a larger mental framework than the political or national, namely, the framework of the whole medieval *civilization*. Upon this view Louis' foreign policy can be defended, even though the object of his policy, the peace and unity of his own civilization, did not succeed, and has not yet, succeeded.

¹² I am discussing the problem on the philosophical level, but we may look to a greater society than terrestrial civilization, without our high purpose contradicting an historical goal. There is no essential contradiction between the City of God and the city of man.

It is, I think, at the extremes of historiography, at the levels of the most *general* and the most *particular* histories that the naturalness of the philosophy of history is most apparent. At one extreme, for example, lies the *New Science*¹³ of Vico, which is intended as a philosophy of history to support the philosophical generalizations. Vico emphasizes the naturalness of his approach in a profound theory of the natural law.¹⁴ He posits the reality of civilizations or cultures because he finds that the builders of cultures, for the most part unconsciously, have articulated civilizations according to the natural law of man's own humanity.¹⁵ The naturalness of the philosophy of history pervades the thought of Vico; reference to natural, as well as to positive, law occurs frequently.

At the other extreme of historiography lies the history of the individual person, and especially the biography written by the amateur in history. His written record will be particular in its conception or naive, instead of general in outlook or sophisticated. This very naivety and particularity, at the farthest remove from the question of the history's meaning—or whether there is a meaning—frees the biographer to record the subject's life naturally. The biographer's interest, or that of his readers if he is writing with a view to satisfying their curiosity and wonder, is natural in the sense of manifesting human nature and the social outlooks which have been adopted by society. Boswell, in his *Life of Johnson*, anticipates the interest of the reader in so highly cultural a matter as the eighteenth century

¹³ G. Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, translated from the third edition (1744) by T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (Cornell University, 1948).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 352, n. 1096.

¹⁵ Vico, however, did not speak of "cultures" and "civilizations"—the use of these words to stand for general societies did not occur until a hundred years later. He wrote, rather, of "the nations." His term refers approximately to civilizations. Past civilizations are often named by the *nation* that imposed a universal state on them. Sometimes Vico discusses "Europe," which was Western Civilization in his day. He did not intend his *New Science* to be a mere political treatise, but a philosophy of history in the full sense of the term, paying full heed to the providential, as well as the human; and the planned, as well as the unplanned, aspects of history. Cf. *op. cit.*

Western Civilization. The fascination of the history, of course, is not merely that of a world-famous man, nor merely the wit and wisdom of Johnson, nor the literary genius of the author. The interest of the narrative also depends on the significance of the civilization in which Johnson lived. This is why I say a rudimentary philosophy of history underlies even so limited a chronicle as a biography. The philosophy of history at the least is a cultural attitude informing the outlook of the amateur historian. One might object that the *Life of Johnson* is a poor illustration of historical writing because it is exceptional. But this is the very reason we can say that Johnson "made history." If a custom or an event or a life is so important as to have historical significance, then the historical record of it (making allowances for amateur historians) is a proper example of historical writing.

B. *The Ethical Method of the Philosophy of History.*

The method of the philosophy of history, as I understand it, is experiential insofar as the philosopher depends on the study of history as it really happened. Before considering the cultural needs of man in this world, the philosopher ought to study the cultural goals that men in history have set themselves. Before analyzing the cultural virtues and vices, the moralist should observe them at work in the fabric of history. This method also is reflective, in the sense that the moral philosopher needs to reflect on the philosophical aspect of the realities and actions he has empirically studied.

Besides being experiential, the method of the philosophy of history is rational; that is, it is logical. The ethicist looks for significant consistencies and also significant inconsistencies, in the virtues, vices, actions and goals of man. If we consider, for example, the ultimate goal of the philosophy of history, to guide the building and maintenance of a civilization, it is necessary to consider inconsistencies that might appear in an historical culture. For example, there is a difficulty of the twentieth century which indeed is a universal problem of culture. The

trouble is that the demand for security, social justice and a higher standard of living will necessitate increased regimentation by the state. Such a difficulty raises the question of what an ideal culture is, or whether one is historically possible. It also brings forward the problem of reconciling the virtue of (social) justice with regimentation; for regimentation and bureaucratic processes may conflict with such forms of justice as piety (patriotism) and observance (due honor to high-ranked persons). On the general level, as in these examples, the philosophy of history is analytic and scientific. As general ethics, some parts of it are absolutely certain (i.e., the cardinal virtues); and the moralist, using the rational method of logic, can organize the subject-matter in terms of the more and the less universal, or the general and the concrete. He may follow out in reason the implications of the cultural virtues, vices and the cultural goals and difficulties.

Like the other branches of morality, the philosophy of history is not only a general ethics but also is concerned with human actions in the concrete. And perfect precision is therefore lacking in this science because of the changeability and novelty of human actions; for there is no science of the unforeseeable until after the event. The dependence of the philosopher of history upon experiential study, as a matter of fact, indicates the limitation of human reason and logic; unlike the angels, man cannot visualize all the possible natural situations that may occur in history; he cannot even know in advance one possible individual who may someday come into the world. And yet a moral philosophy exists for the purpose of dealing with nothing other than the changing historical situation of human beings. Mere ethical generalities are of no immediate use. This is why the philosophy of history, when it is concerned directly with human actions in the concrete, becomes imprecise and makes use of probabilities. Then it is no longer philosophy, but casuistry. This ethics is speculative in its method and scientifically certain—as when it considers the nature of the virtues and vices and, to some degree, when it

analyzes the general requirements of culture and civilization. For example, mankind accepts as the *natural* law the right (*jus*) of people to the common use of earthly goods, and this can be accepted with absolute certainty by the philosopher of history. The institution, the right (*jus*), of private property is accepted as a *positive* law, although it seems to oppose the right of man to the common use.¹⁶ When the philosophy of history refers to the right of private property, an element of probability, or at least of contingency, is thereby added to the philosophy; for, like all positive law, the right of private property is not understood absolutely universally but in respect to the civil societies that man-in-history thus far has developed and will develop in the foreseeable future.¹⁷

Again, in actual historical fact, virtues often resemble the vices. If one attempts to distinguish a certain difference say, in a written report upon some unresolved current event, or if some person should have the power of decision, and has to distinguish the difference when he makes his prudential judgment; in these cases some imprecision or uncertainty might exist. Suppose, for example, a theologian or a philosopher or a casuist wanted to discern the difference between the vice of cultural irony (self-depreciation) and the virtue of cultural humility. At the general, speculative, level there is no difficulty; irony is opposed to truthfulness, humility is opposed to pride. But the irony or humility of some unique person, or of a certain contemplated action, might be difficult to distinguish. This example could lead us afield. To conclude, the method of the philosophy of history is scientific; it has understandable conclusions with universality of scope.

¹⁶ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

¹⁷ That is, men are not capable of dwelling in *civil societies* without the institution of private property, and the positive law stabilizes by positing the institution.

III. THE PURPOSE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

To be sure, it is a purpose of the philosophy of history to illuminate the learning of historians, to clarify the certitude of historical knowledge, to distinguish historical learning from learning that is not called "history," to analyze the subject-matter of the historian. These are philosophical problems, and the philosopher of history is the best fitted to discuss them. From the point of view of the *historian*, all these tasks might sum up the philosophy of history. But to be at the service of the historian is only one of the purposes of the philosophy of history. Its main purpose is that of the philosopher as well as the historian; its unity derives from a philosophical aim. This aim is not completely covered by the fact that historians have a *dossier* of philosophical problems which pertain to their science. To define the philosophy of history only as the group of philosophical problems and answers which the historian encounters in his work obscures the complete nature of the philosophy. This notion would not serve the historian as excellently as might a philosophy of history defined with respect to moral action as well as with regard to historical learning. I mean that by a moral philosophy of history we can learn the most deeply about the nature of historical learning.

But I do not want to minimize the theoretical purpose of the philosophy or over-emphasize its practical purpose. It is quite true that the philosophy of history has two purposes, even though the theoretical purpose is ultimately practical. Therefore, the philosophy of history does not have a perfect unity. *Ultimately*, the end to which it owes its unity as a science is a single practical good. But I am referring now to immediate purposes. This philosophy (and, in less degree, the other branches of moral philosophy) is Janus-like. Like the month of January, named from Janus, this science is between the past and the future. One face of it, so to speak, eyes the past, and the other face makes resolutions for the future.

The answer is that we are dealing with a *mixed science*; and

this is true of all the practical disciplines; for the final end of every practical science is not science, but practical action or production. For example, the end of medical science is not knowledge, but healing. The end of political science is not to know, but to act. In the science of culture there is a mixture of three elements: the theoretical, the artistic or productive, and the moral. But practical action is the end that unifies the philosophy.¹⁸

It is an immediate purpose of the philosophy of history—illuminating historical learning—to know and to understand human nature culturally. But, strictly speaking, we must add: “in order to guide man in his cultural life.” Since the philosophy of history is an ethics—a moral philosophy—then its primary purpose is to increase human virtues according to a cultural outlook. Or to sum up, its whole purpose is to know the true nature of man insofar as he is cultural, in order to bring about the realization of that nature through the cultural virtues.

Before going on to consider a more ultimate goal of the philosophy of history, let us note that, since a moral outlook is concrete instead of perfectly abstract, its purpose will be that of a concrete judgment. I say morals is concrete, because it does not count, it does not fulfill its purpose, until an individual makes use of it in a prudential judgment about some practical action to be done. And the individual man (more precisely, say, a Christian) in the moral life he should follow, is not like philosophy which can be understood in abstraction from theology. No, morally he should be a unique individual incapable of being dissected. A Christian, therefore, is motivated by theology and philosophy at once. His philosophy in fact is at the service of his theology, helping the person to put into service

¹⁸ Ibn Khaldun (M. Mahdi), *op. cit.*, p. 229. My approaches to the philosophy of history have been from the viewpoints: ethics and historiography. Ibn Khaldun, however, restricted “the science of culture” to be only a guiding science for historiography. He did not envisage the full ethical nature of the philosophy. He knew that the ultimate end of historical learning is practical action. Therefore he noted in passing merely that the ultimate end of the philosophy of history is practical action.

the teachings of faith. Moral philosophy, because of this, and for the reason that it does refer concretely to the action of individual living persons, is at the service of theology.

Since the purpose, the end, of a Christian person is religious as well as ethical, then the ultimate purpose of ethics is religious. Natural morality is *distinct*, but it does not exist *separately*, in my view, as a fully true science of conduct. It needs to be completed within a moral theology whose principles are known by divine revelation. I mean a relation of the lower to the higher learning in which the philosophy broadens its basis of certitude and reaches to the firmament under which human beings act, by accepting some conclusions of theology.

I think few philosophers have demonstrated the naturalness of their notions as much as Vico did. He had a legal mind, looking for manifestations of the natural law in the development of customs, letters and positive law. But he was a Christian philosopher also, and he referred to the higher wisdom of Sacred Doctrine when he needed to. *Providence*, for example, appeared to him as a principle of scientific explanation. "In its weakest form, it is an hypothesis, which (as he remarked in one place) is converted into certitude by the normative power of sacred history, and, implicitly, of revelation. In its strongest form, it is a first principle, in a classic sense, that is, as a principle beyond which it is irrational to demand another."¹⁹

CONCLUDING SUMMARY

The subject-matter of the philosophy of history can be learned from that of historical learning, because the philosophy of history lies, more or less secretly and more or less true to itself, in the presentation of the historian. Indeed, the most universal historians, those who have sought by natural means to find the significance of history, have looked beyond the mere state to the culture or higher civilization for a meaning. The "his-

¹⁹ R. Caponigri, *Time and Idea, the Theory of History in Giambattista Vico* (London, 1953), p. 105.

torical facts" of the historian are no ordinary facts, but cultural facts, both Providential and "caused"—deeds, events, things and ideals, which have moral and cultural meanings. The subject-matter of historical learning is historical facts: the past history of man in cooperation with Providence. The historian's subject-matter is determined by the subject-matter of the philosophy of history, which is: man acting voluntarily for a cultural end, with the cooperation of Providence.

Such an ethical description of the philosophy of history presupposes an ethical method whereby it is obtained. For, admitting the freedom (in divers ways often practiced) of historians to take any attitude whatsoever towards history, we find that historians by nature (instinctively at least), have a moral view. This morality (of man seeking civilization with the aid of Providence) distinguishes historical writing from the natural sciences. Sometimes historians are not aware that their study of human nature is at all moral.

The philosophy of history to begin with, is experiential like the rest of ethics. The cultural moralist studies the cultural virtues and vices and the nature of civilization experientially; he reflects philosophically on his findings. As a further step, the method is rational and logical, because the moralist observes the logic of the virtues and vices and of the civilization, notes conclusions and consequences, consistencies and inconsistencies. At the general level, the philosophy of history is a scientific, an exact, and a certain ethics. In addition, inasmuch as it is ethical, it needs to inform the morality that exists at a less abstract and more particular level, dealing with contingent human affairs. When moral guidance (casuistry) becomes particular it makes use of probabilities as well as the certainties.²⁰ It is part of the theoretical purpose of the philosophy of

²⁰ I would add, there is a very weighty fact that powerfully aids the moral philosopher in restricting his analysis to the limits of a speculative science which is only remotely practical. And this limiting factor is simply the pages that the unwieldy moral philosophy requires for expression when it becomes the least bit particular. Pages—these do not merely keep the moral philosopher within his proper boundaries but tend to restrict him too much. St. Thomas is the exception

history to give a philosophical understanding of the learning of historians. Its whole purpose is to know the true nature of man insofar as he is cultural in order to expedite, with the cultural and theological virtues, man's efforts to attain the perfection of his nature.

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from this tendency to contract. In the hundreds of pages of the *Summa* that contain his treatise on the virtues, Thomas Aquinas is neither too particular nor too abstract. But this satisfactory amplitude is exceptional. There seems to be no danger that a modern text on the philosophy of history (understood to be a branch of moral science) could become too particular by filling the ordinary dimensions of a book. The problem, therefore, is to avoid making the expression too abstract.

THE ROLE OF THE RECIPIENT AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION

II

WORSHIP AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION

BY his intention of receiving a sacrament the subject completes the sacramental sign-action or *opus operatum* and in this way makes the final application of the active power of the sacrament to himself. When the sacrament is one of those that impart a character this effect is produced by the very fact that the sacrament is validly received, without any virtuous act on the part of the subject being necessary.¹ The primary effect of the sacrament, however, justification or increase of grace, requires more of the subject than the simple intention of reception. What exactly is required varies according to the particular sacrament and the state of consciousness of the subject. St. Thomas, in general terms, speaks of faith being necessary for justification and quotes St. Augustine as saying that Christ brings the sinner to grace "working in him, but not without him."² What is called for in the subject is discussed very thoroughly by theologians under the rubric of 'dispositions' or "conditions" on the part of the subject for receiving grace. Here again in this formulation of the problem a pre-occupation with the efficient causality of the sacrament to the virtual exclusion of the sacramental mode of that causality reveals itself. The description of the subject's acts as dispositions for grace is accurate; but it does not exhaust their

¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 8. Faith is not required of the subject for the reception of the baptismal character: "Non enim sacramentum perficitur per iustitiam hominis dantis vel suscipientis baptismum, sed per virtutem Dei."

² *Ibid.*, "Hoc modo recta fides ex necessitate requiritur ad baptismum: quia, sicut dicitur Rom. 3, 'iustitia Dei est per fidem Iesu Christi'"; q. 69, a. 6, obj. 2: "Super illud Ioann. 14, 'Maiora horum faciet,' dicit Augustinus quod ut ex impio iustus fiat, 'in illo, sed non sine illo Christus operatur.'"

theological significance. St. Thomas' notion of the sacraments as signs of faith points the way to a more adequate appreciation of their reception as acts of worship, elicited by the subject; and also, no less, of their administration as acts of worship of the minister.

The purpose of the present inquiry is to examine the interior acts of the subject in this light. For this it will not be necessary to determine in detail the dispositions required for the individual sacraments. This would involve specialized and debated problems, particularly concerning penance and Communion, the solutions to which do not materially affect the present discussion since they are concerned with the sacraments purely as causes. What is here proposed is an attempt to determine the relation of the subject's acts of virtue (or dispositions) to the sacrament (*sacramentum tantum*) considered as a sign, or, more accurately, to the *opus operatum*. This involves a study, first, of reception of a sacrament as an act of worship, and second, of the participation of the faithful in the Mass.

Dispositions for reception of a sacrament

St. Thomas devotes no special question to the discussion of the dispositions required in the subject for receiving grace in the sacraments. His whole sacramental tract has to be placed in the context of his moral theology, and in particular, of his teaching on justification and the increase of charity. In the *Tertia Pars* he does no more than make particular applications of the general principles established elsewhere.

Dispositions for justification are distinguished by St. Thomas: remote and proximate, according as they precede, or accompany, the infusion of grace.³ In his treatment of justification his principal interest lies with the proximate disposition in adults which consists in a movement of free will on which the

³ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 2, ad 1: ". . . quaedam est simul cum ipsa infusione gratiae. . . . Est autem alia praeparatio gratiae imperfecta, quae aliquando praecedit donum gratiae gratum facientis, quae tamen est a Deo movente"; *ibid.*, ad 2; q. 113, a. 5, ad 3; a. 7, ad 1; *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 3, ad 10; ad 19; a. 4, ad 3; q. 28, a. 8; *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2 (p. 829, n. 31); a. 2, sol. 1, ad 1 (p. 834 n. 60); a. 3, sol. 3, ad 2 (p. 824, n. 105); a. 4, sol. 2 (p. 846, n. 132).

infusion of grace infallibly follows⁴ and which is so closely bound up with the infusion of grace that it belongs to the substance of justification.⁵ It involves, on the part of the intellect, faith,⁶ on the part of the will, an act of desire for God⁷ which is a true act of charity and contrition.⁸ It is an important element of St. Thomas' teaching, as understood by the majority of Thomists, that this act is dependent, as on an efficient cause, on the grace for which it is the disposition, or material cause.⁹ It is by this act of free will, proceeding wholly under the movement of God, that an adult is formally justified as a person.¹⁰ Such a disposition is not called for in a child or one who is unconscious, because of the very fact that these do not enjoy the use of reason and are justified by God according to their condition.¹¹

Analogous with the movement of free will required for justification is the proximate disposition that is necessary for the

⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 7, ad 1; *IV Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, a. 4, sol. 2 (p. 846, n. 132).

⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 5; a. 6.

⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 4; *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 4, ad 1; III, a. 85, a. 5; *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8.

⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 2, ad 1: "Talis operatio est quidem meritoria; sed non gratiae, quae iam habetur sed gloriae, quae nondum habetur"; q. 113, a. 8, ad 2: "Dispositio subiecti praecedat susceptionem formae ordine naturae, sequitur tamen actionem agentis per quam etiam ipsum subiectum disponitur. Et ideo motus liberi arbitrii naturae ordine praecedat consecutionem gratiae, sequitur autem gratiae infusionem"; *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 8, ad 3 in contrarium. This interpretation is favoured by Cajetan, Dom. Soto, the Salmanticenses, Vasquez, Billot, against Durandus, Scotus, Suarez, De Lugo, John of St. Thomas, etc.; cf. commentaries in I-II, q. 113.

¹⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 5, ad 1; "Per fidem igitur iustificatur homo non quasi credendo mereatur iustificationem, sed quia dum iustificatur, credit, eo quod motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem impii"; *ibid.*, q. 113, a. 3; *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 3: "In adultis requiritur immutatio actus voluntatis ad iustificationem"; *ibid.*, ad 17: "Deus virtutes in nobis operatur sine nobis virtutes causantibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus"; *ibid.*, ad 20. Dr. Schillebeeckx, *De sacramentele heilseconomie*, Antwerp, 1952, pp. 561, f., restates with emphasis and clarity St. Thomas' teaching on the necessity of an act of charity—and therefore of contrition—for justification of an adult. He calls this the "subjectieve toeëigening" of grace, and "immanentie van de verlossingsgenade in de persoon als persoon." (p. 572) His account of the attrition-contrition controversy in relation to penance is especially valuable. (pp. 579 f.)

¹¹ Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 3; ad 5.

increase of charity. Though every act of charity disposes remotely for such an increase, it is only one that attains a higher degree of intensity that actually procures it.¹² The intensity of this act is the human index to the divinely-wrought increase of charity.¹³

It is one of the principal merits of Dr. Schillebeeckx's work, to have shown that the teaching on the relation between grace and free will established by St. Thomas by means of his finely-fashioned notion of proximate disposition applies equally to sacramental and extra-sacramental justification and increase of charity.¹⁴ This is to say that the infusion of sacramental grace produces in an adult subject the proximate dispositions just reviewed. The dispositions, however, that are required for *approaching* a sacrament are distinct from those that are required at the moment of reception of grace and belong to the second member of St. Thomas' distinction, namely, that of remote dispositions.

Whereas proximate dispositions are essential if man's nature is to be respected, remote dispositions are not always required; though it is normal that man should be prepared gradually for closer union with God.¹⁵ St. Thomas compares this process in the sinner with the moving of an object to bring it into the light—or, more suggestively, with the movement of the light to shine on the object—and with the alteration that precedes generation.¹⁶ After faith, the first movement in the sinner on

¹² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 6: "Non quolibet actu caritatis caritas actu augetur; sed quilibet actus caritatis disponit ad caritatis augmentum, inquantum ex uno actu caritatis homo redditur promptior iterum ad agendum secundum caritatem; et, habilitate crescente, homo prorumpit in actum ferventiorum dilectionis, quo conetur in actu"; *ibid.*, ad 2; a. 4, ad 3; I-II, q. 114, a. 8, ad 3.

¹³ Cf. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, p. 623.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 579 f. and 623 f.

¹⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 10: "Est enim ista communis et consuetus cursus iustificationis ut Deo movente interius animam, homo convertatur ad Deum, primo quidem conversione imperfecta, et postmodum ad perfectam deveniat"; *ibid.*, q. 112, a. 2, ad 1; ad 2; *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 3, ad 19; *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 1 (p. 834, n. 60).

¹⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 1; cf. I, q. 53, a. 3.

this path towards justification is fear, provoked by the threat of punishment for sin.¹⁷ This is followed by a movement of hope according to which, so as to win pardon, one forms a resolution of amendment.¹⁸ In "servile" fear and hope is included a movement of repentance, though not as yet inspired by charity.¹⁹ In III, q. 85, a. 5, St. Thomas, without making any explicit reference to the transition, goes on from this to enumerate the proximate dispositions imperated by charity.²⁰ The Council of Trent, however, dealing solely with preparation for baptism and therefore not immediately concerned with the metaphysics of grace, speaks of "beginning to love God as the source of all justice," in other words, of initial, and not true, charity.²¹ This movement towards God may be understood as an act of love "of concupiscence" as distinct from love "of benevolence."²² As such it is included in the movement of

¹⁷ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 4, ad 3; *IV Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 2 (p. 596, n. 108); II-II, q. 19, a. 2; a. 4. Teaching of the Church: Leo X, Bull, *Exsurge Domine*, 15 June 1520, prop. 6 (Denz. 746); Council of Trent, sess. 6, Decret. de iustificatione, cap. 6 (Denz. 798); can. 8 (Denz. 818). Scripture: Prov. 1:7; 8:13, 9:10; 15:33; 19:23; Eccles. 1:16; 1:25; 1:27; 21:7; 32:18.

¹⁸ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 85, a. 5; II-II, q. 19, a. 1, ad 2. Teaching of Church: Council of Trent, *loc. cit.* (Denz. 798); can. 3 (Denz. 813). Scripture: Ps. 32:18; 36:40; 90:14; Prov. 28:25; Eccles. 2:9; Matt. 9:2; Rom. 8:24; I Jn. 3:3.

¹⁹ *IV Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2 (p. 596, n. 106).

²⁰ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 85, a. 5: "... motum fidei . . . motus timoris servilis . . . motus spei . . . motus caritatis, quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum seipsum, et non iam propter supplicia. . . . motus timoris filialis. . . ."

²¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, Decret. de iustificatione, cap. 6 (Denz. 798): "(Deum) tamquam omnis iustitiae fontem diligere incipiunt." That this refers, not to perfect, but to initial, charity is clear from the history of the Council; cf. *Acta* (Ed. Goerresiana, t. 5); 1st redaction of Decree, p. 384, n. 160 (not "sine dilectione aliqua") (cf. p. 387, l. 42; p. 388, l. 9); 2nd redaction, p. 422, l. 43, p. 423, l. 1 ("diligere incipimus"); discussion, p. 489, l. 16, p. 491, l. 16; 3rd redaction, p. 636 ("dilectio" omitted); discussion, p. 645, l. 43 (calling for insertion of "per aliquam dilectionem"), p. 655, ll. 39 f. (calling for insertion of "actus dilectionis"), p. 661, ll. 35 f., p. 681; 4th redaction, p. 695, l. 31 ("Deum omnis iustitiae fontem diligere incipiunt") (cf. p. 698, l. 34). It is to be noted also that ch. 7 of the Decree begins: "Hanc dispositionem seu praeparationem iustificatio ipsa consequitur." (Denz. 799) It follows that ch. 6 is concerned with remote dispositions.

²² The interpretation of the Council is a matter of dispute. The description of God as "source of justice" appears to imply love "of concupiscence"; and so the majority of theologians understand it.

hope noted by St. Thomas in III, q. 85, a. 5 since the person from whom one hopes for help is the object of love.²³

These remote dispositions for justification represent what is required of the subject if he is to approach the sacraments of the dead as a responsible person and worthily. Such too is the state of one who is restored to grace by a sacrament of the living, received in good faith. Concerning one of the dispositions for baptism, namely, faith, the Church has issued certain specific directions which require explicit belief in the principal mysteries of religion.²⁴ It is clear, therefore, that when applied to conscious adults a positive interpretation is to be placed on texts in which St. Thomas says that the part of the subject's interior dispositions in relation to the efficacy of baptism is that of removing obstacles, *removens prohibens*.²⁵ These apparently negative texts are balanced by others in which the enumeration of acts demanded of the subject for worthy reception corresponds to the remote dispositions for justification.²⁶

Worthy reception of a sacrament of the living involves, on

²³ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 40, a. 7; II-II, q. 62, a. 4; q. 17, a. 8; *de Spe*, a. 3.

²⁴ Cf. replies of the Holy Office, 25 Jan. 1703 (Denz. 1349a), 10 May 1703 (Denz. 1349b), 30 March 1898 (Denz. 1966a).

²⁵ Cf., e.g., *IV Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 4, sol. un. (p. 101, n. 128); d. 4, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 2 (p. 184, n. 215); d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1 (p. 187, n. 225); *ibid.*, ad 3 (p. 187, n. 229); d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2 (p. 238, n. 68); *ibid.*, sol. 3 (p. 238, n. 71); *De forma absolutionis* (679); *De articulis fidei* (614).

²⁶ Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 2 (p. 188, n. 230): ". . . oportet quod se habet in debita dispositione ad causam agentem et ad effectum percipiendum." The acts required are specified: faith, devotion, contrition, observance of the Church's ritual, absence of contempt (*ibid.*, n. 230 f.); d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3 (p. 238, n. 72): "contritio sive devotio"; *ibid.*, a. 3, sol. 1, ad 1 (p. 241, n. 90): faith; d. 4, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 1 (p. 184, n. 214): movement of free will. Cf. also the texts referring to *fictio*: *ibid.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 1 (p. 188, n. 234); d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1 (p. 241, n. 88). Charity is not required; therefore attrition, not necessarily contrition, is sufficient for receiving baptism; *ibid.*, ad 5 (p. 242, n. 94); *ad Rom.*, c. 11, lect. 4 (927). The necessity for devotion in receiving the sacraments and the effectiveness of the ceremonies for arousing it are constantly recurring themes in the *Tertia Pars*: III, q. 61, a. 1; a. 2; q. 63, a. 4; q. 64, a. 2, ad 1; q. 66, a. 10; q. 68, a. 3; a. 4; a. 8; a. 12; q. 69, a. 6; a. 8; ad 2; q. 69, a. 9; q. 71, a. 2; a. 3; etc. Confirmation and the Eucharist can justify a sinner who has not contrition but who, while he has neither knowledge of, nor affection for, his sin, receives the sacrament devoutly and reverently: III, q. 72, a. 7, ad 2; q. 79, a. 3.

the part of an adult, at least a remiss movement of charity which is either actual or virtual. Since, however, there can be no increase of grace without a more fervent act of charity the sacrament itself must produce this disposition in the subject.²⁷ In the *Sentences*, St. Thomas says that "actual devotion" is required for receiving extreme unction.²⁸ He says the same there of Holy Communion;²⁹ though in the *Summa* he teaches that even if the subject is distracted by venial sin, and thus momentarily incapable of an *act* of charity,³⁰ he does not forfeit an increase of habitual grace or charity.³¹ Cajetan reconciles these two texts, saying that St. Thomas does not teach in the *Summa*

that the communicant wins an increase of grace even if he has no actual devotion; but that he does so even if he does not actually enjoy spiritual delectation, through the fault of his venial sin (for it cannot be through the fault of the sacrament). Such a communicant, distracted in this way, if he approaches the sacrament devoutly as regards his other acts, places no impediment in the way of habitual increase of grace.³²

There is clearly room here for certain clarifications to be sought in the field of religious psychology so as to determine in particular the influence of the "state of grace" on reception of the sacrament in various deficient states of recollection and advertence. These problems are, however, marginal so far as the theology of the sacraments goes. What is normal and therefore to be urged on the faithful is that the sacraments should be received with recollection and devotion; and when

²⁷ Cf. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, pp. 623 f., who stresses the necessity for an *act* of charity in approaching the sacraments of the living. He writes: "Door het sacrament wordt dan een onfeilbaar verband gelegd tussen deze caritasdaad, 'actus remissus caritatis,' en de vermeerdering van de heiligmakende genade met de daarmee gepaard gaande 'actus ferventior caritatis,' die tot het wezen zelf can de genadevermeerdering behoort bij bewuste adulten." (p. 624) He makes the necessary modifications in the case of unconscious subjects.

²⁸ *IV Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, d. 12, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3 (p. 526, n. 177).

³⁰ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 89, a. 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*, III, q. 79, a. 8.

³² Cajetan in III, q. 79, a. 1 (n. 5).

this is done the subject of the sacraments of the living makes an act of charity, however remiss.

Worship in reception of the sacraments

When a sacrament is worthily received by a conscious subject his act of practical intellect together with the bodily actions which put into effect his intention constitute an external act of religion. For the sacraments of the living this act is imperated by charity, elicited by the virtue of religion; for the sacraments of the dead it is imperated by faith and hope.³³ Thus the subject is involved according to his whole supernatural psychology in receiving a sacrament and his act of submission to the minister is a true act of worship, differing in this respect in no way from other external acts of worship. Though his baptismal character gives this act sacramental validity, it does not affect its moral features. The subject completes (in the sense already explained) the sacramental sign-action, the *opus operatum*, in virtue of his intention operating according to his character; and as a consequence his interior dispositions which elicited or imperated his intention are expressed outwardly by the *opus operatum* in so far as this is dependent on him. The *opus operatum* is the common symbolic action of minister and subject, one giving, the other receiving the material elements of the sacrament. In so far as it signifies the active power of God and of Christ infusing grace into the soul it does not express the subject's devotion in the manner of an external act of religion. It is the *act* of reception which makes the sacrament to be *signified as received* that is the subject's act of worship. This is all acted out on the level of signification, before (*prioritate naturae*) the sacrament is formally causing grace efficiently. Combining this new aspect of the sacraments with what has already been said about the function of the faith of the Church in relating the sacramental sign to the salvific decree of God a complete notion may be formed of the sacraments as signs of faith. A worthily received sacrament is a sign of faith, first of all of the Church, secondly, of the subject (and likewise

³³ Cf. Cajetan, in II-II, q. 81, a. 4, ad 2.

of the minister if he administers the sacrament worthily). Every valid sacrament is a common act of worship of the whole Church, performed through an official minister. A sacrament cannot be fruitful unless it be in some degree a personal act of worship of the subject.

This is the fuller sense of St. Thomas' saying that the sacraments belong to divine worship.³⁴ He indicates the vital union between the external action and the interior dispositions in several places. Grace is needed if the cultual actions to which the characters are ordained are to be performed as they should.³⁵ The baptized gain a new, external extension to their primary incorporation into Christ which is by faith.³⁶ Baptism is the sacrament or external profession of faith.³⁷ The whole concept of *fictio* is that of a false profession, of performing an action which is ordained to worship without having the proper dispositions.³⁸

Special cases

Children and those who, being unconscious or mentally unbalanced, receive such sacraments as they are capable of in the fashion of children, are unable to perform an act of worship. The sacrament is applied to them by the faith of the Church which the minister's intention serves. Children can contribute

³⁴ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 61, a. 4; q. 63, a. 2; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 57; etc. III, q. 63, a. 6 refers to the *effect* of the sacraments, not to the sacramental action itself (i. e., to the sign-action preceding essentially causality), when it says: "Non omnia sacramenta ordinantur ad divinum cultum"; cf. q. 63, *Introd.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, III, q. 63, a. 4, ad 1: "Character directe quidem et propinque disponit animam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus exequenda: et quia haec idonee non fiunt sine auxilio gratiae . . . ex consequenti divina largitas recipientibus characterem gratiam largitur, per quam digne impleant ea ad quae deputantur"; q. 63, a. 4: "Ex hoc autem quod aliquis lavandum se praebet per baptismum, significatur quod se disponat ad interiorem ablutionem"; q. 80, a. 4: "Quicumque (Eucharistiam) sumit ex hoc ipso significat se esse Christo unitum et membris eius incorporatum."

³⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 63, a. 2: Those who have not baptism even in desire "nec sacramentaliter nec mentaliter Christo incorporantur"; q. 69, a. 5, ad 1: "... mentaliter . . . corporaliter. . ."

³⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 78, a. 3, ad 6: "Baptismus dicitur sacramentum fidei quia est quaedam fidei protestatio"; q. 70, a. 1; a. 2; q. 71, a. 1; *Quodl. VI*, q. 3, a. 1; ad 1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, III, q. 69, a. 9; texts from *Sentences*, see above, n. 26.

nothing to this official act of community worship; hence the sacraments of which they are subjects produce their effect solely by reason of the faith of the Church and through the operation of the Holy Spirit who prompts those responsible for the child to offer it to the Church to be baptized (or confirmed) and who in baptism communicates the merit of Christ to one who through no personal fault is in a state of sin.³⁹

In the case of an unconscious adult who previously had the use of reason, however, the sacramental sign-action of the Church will not be completely "true" if the subject is in any way lacking in dispositions. The part of the intention required for validity has already been discussed. In relation to moral dispositions the sacramental action signifies that the subject is a member of the Church who has at least habitual attrition, or, in the case of the Eucharist, who previously showed signs of devotion for the sacrament.⁴⁰ If the state of the subject is not in conformity with this, the Church's community action, the *opus operatum*, by which she offers worship for a helpless member, is in part false and the full effect of the sacrament cannot follow, at least until the subject is properly disposed.⁴¹

³⁹ *Ibid.*, III, q. 68, a. 9, ad 2: "Fides autem unius, immo totius Ecclesiae, parvulo prodest per operationem Spiritus sancti qui unit Ecclesiam et bona unius alteri communicat" (Cf. III, q. 86, a. 2, ad 1); q. 34, a. 3; q. 68, a. 10, ad 3; q. 69, a. 6, ad 3. Cajetan in III, q. 68, a. 9: "In resp. ad 2 non sic intelligas Ecclesiae fidem prodesse infanti qui baptizatur, quasi meritum fidei existens in Ecclesia, salvat infantem, quoniam infans non per fidem, sed per fidei sacramentum, regulariter salvatur; sed intellige Ecclesiae merita prodesse infanti et iuxta articulum communionis sanctorum, et particulariter, tum orando pro infante, tum applicando eundem sacramento, ex corde puro et caritate plena." The faith of the Church involved is that required for the existence of any sacrament. Dr. Schillebeeckx's explanation of infant baptism according to which the habit of faith given to the child is "actuated" by the sacramental ceremony is unnecessarily complicated. (*Op. cit.*, 614: 'Het geloof van het kind dat wordt gedoopt, is dus *geactueerd* in de doopseldaad zelf, als geloofsdaad van de Kerk'; S.'s italics). St. Thomas speaks only of the Church professing faith in the person of the child to whom grace is given by the sacrament; cf. III, q. 71, a. 1, ad 3; q. 68, a. 9, ad 3; *de Verit.*, q. 28, a. 3, ad 14. S.'s teaching is, besides, dependent on his general ideas on worship in the sacraments; see below.

⁴⁰ Cf. III, q. 68, a. 12, ad 1; q. 80, a. 9; ad 1.

⁴¹ In contrast to the child there is a certain sense in which it may be said of the unconscious adult that his habitual faith, attrition or contrition are "actuated"

The principle of this worship (opus operans)

A question remains to be discussed concerning the worship offered by the subject, which has been raised by Dr. Schillebeeckx. Does the sacramental action, the *opus operatum*, express the remote or the proximate dispositions of the subject? Dr. Schillebeeckx answers: the proximate dispositions. This conclusion he advances as a corollary of his teaching that the proximate disposition is the subjective "assimilation" (*toeëigening*) of the gift of grace, that is to say, the act of free will by which grace is accepted by the subject as a person. He expresses this notion in his own version of the *opus-operatum* terminology. He takes *opus operatum* to mean primarily the action of the Christ-mystery in the Church's ceremonial.⁴² He then formulates his conclusion: the *opus operatum* of a fruitful sacrament is not only the expression of the love of Christ and his Church, but also the external act of the subject, expressing the charity by which he makes his own the grace given him in the sacrament.⁴³ Using *opus operantis* of these *proximate* dispositions of the subject, he goes on to formulate the same conclusion in an intentionally startling fashion: in a fruitful sacrament "the *opus operatum* is the *opus operantis*"; that is to say, the sacramental sign of the Church's faith is, when fruitful, the personal external act of the subject's devotion, just as the response of the subject to grace is identified with the action of Christ on the soul.⁴⁴

by the sacramental action of the Church since he receives as a member of the Church who at some time has made acts of these virtues; and such acts will have been directed either explicitly or implicitly towards Extreme Unction and Viaticum, at least.

⁴² Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, pp. 645, 646.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 656: "Door deze voltooide liefdeinzet wordt de sacramentele genade toegeëigend en wordt het sacrament meteen de uiterlijke vertekening van deze liefdebeleving, die door het sacrament zelf in leven werd geroepen. . . . De vruchtbare sacramenten zijn aldus niet alleen de uitdrukking van het liefdeleven van Christus en Zijn Kerk, maar tevens 'sacramenta-signa caritatis' van het ontvangend subject."

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 659: The subject must enter the sacramental action through faith, hope and love: "Gebeurt dit wel, dan is het *opus operatum* het *opus operantis*: d.w.z. het sacrament als symbooldaad van het kerkelijk geloof is, bij vruchtbaarheid, meteen de persoonlijke tekenactiviteit van de innerlijke Godsbeleving."

Two observations seem called for. Neither of them disputes Dr. Schillebeeckx's teaching on the nature of the proximate dispositions for receiving sacramental grace.

First, the *opus operatum* as such—whether the term be understood to signify formally a “visible mystery-act of Christ” or merely the ceremony performed (which is used by Christ)—is not the expression of the subject's dispositions. It is the act of reception that serves in this capacity; and this action is no more than an integral *part* of the sacramental sign-action which is the *opus operatum*.

Second, the essential participation of the subject in the sacramental action is procured by means of his intention and his character. In a fruitful sacrament his participation is an external act of religion in so far as this intention is elicited by the virtue of religion and imperated by the theological virtues. This participation is required for the very existence of the sacrament as applied to the subject and thus enjoys a priority of nature over the causality of the sacrament, in such a way that the character may be said to make of the subject a material instrumental cause of grace. The proximate dispositions for grace in the subject are in their turn produced efficiently by the causality of the sacrament. It is evident, therefore, that these proximate dispositions cannot elicit the intention which is essential to his reception of the sacrament, for this would imply that they were the effect of the sacrament and at the same time a presupposition to its efficient causality; and this is impossible.

It is to be observed that the sacrament produces its effect instantaneously.⁴⁵ Thus it is in the same instant that the subject's intention, elicited by the remote dispositions, is given sacramental validity, and that the sacrament produces its effect together with the proximate dispositions for it in the subject. Though the preparatory and supplementary ceremonies are all intended to be acts of religion, the formal sacramental worship is confined to this instant in which the character functions as a passive power. Therefore the act in which, according to Dr.

⁴⁵ *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 9: “Utrum justificatio impii fiat in instanti.”

Schillebeeckx, the proximate dispositions consist, cannot elicit the act of reception as its external act. At the moment of sacramental reception both grace and the proximate dispositions for it are signified precisely as the *effect* of the sacrament. The act of reception is elicited only by the remote dispositions which remain, at least virtually, at the critical instant.

It seems necessary, therefore, to disagree with Dr. Schillebeeckx on two points. Firstly: it is only that part of the *opus operatum* for which the subject is directly responsible, namely, reception of the sacrament, that is the subject's act of worship. Secondly: it is his remote, and not his proximate, dispositions that form, together with his intention, the *opus operans* that is expressed by the sacramental sign-action in so far as it depends on the subject. It is because the sacraments of the Church are *causes* as well as acts of worship that they signify the proximate dispositions of the subject. There can be no question of an elicited external act so far as these dispositions are concerned. The worshipful use of the sacraments is confined to their pre-causal reality as signs.

Taken literally—though obviously Dr. Schillebeeckx's whole teaching excludes this interpretation of his words—to say that the *opus operatum* is the *opus operans* (or the *opus operantis*) is to deny any efficacy to the sacraments other than that due to the merit of the subject, since the effect of the sacrament is produced *ex opere operato*. Such a phrase appears to concede the Protestant concept of the sacraments.

According to St. Thomas' theology the sacraments are wholly integrated into the moral life of the faithful. Reception of the sacraments is an act of worship to be carried out with all the attention and devotion that should be given to any act of piety. By reason of the baptismal character this act of worship enters the new dimension of the sacramental order where it serves to bring the saving merits and power of Christ into contact with the subject so that he gains far richer graces than his own activity could merit. By participating in the worship of Christ, the Priest, through the sacraments the faithful are filled with the fruits of his worship. In one of the sacraments they par-

ticipate in his worship in a special way. This must now be considered.

* * * * *

Before attempting to define the manner in which the faithful participate in the Mass some general ideas on the Eucharistic sacrifice itself must be noted.

The sacrifice of the Mass

St. Thomas, for all his emphasis on the Eucharist as Communion, points out in a number of places that "this sacrament is also a sacrifice."⁴⁶ In contrast to this he echoes the Epistle to the Hebrews in saying that Christ "was offered once" and that "by one oblation he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified," a fact which excludes the necessity, and even the possibility, of repetition of the sacrifice.⁴⁷ The notion that he uses to reconcile these apparently contradictory assertions, namely, that of the Mass as a "memorial" of the Passion, is one that is apt to appear insufficient to modern theologians. Yet it is repeated so often in the *Tertia Pars* of the Eucharist either as sacrifice or as sacrament that it must be accepted as a key-notion for St. Thomas. Its psychological, humanistic overtones at once place the Mass in the context of signs of faith.⁴⁸ In one place St. Thomas goes so far as to say that Christ can be said to have been immolated in the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law in the same way as he is in the Mass considered simply as a memorial of the Passion.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 6; q. 73, a. 4; q. 79, a. 5; q. 79, a. 7; q. 82, a. 4; a. 10; q. 83, a. 1, ad 1.

⁴⁷ Heb. 9:28; 10:14; cf. St. Thomas, *ad Heb.*, c. 10, lect. 1 (499).

⁴⁸ Cf. III, q. 66, a. 9, ad 5: repraesentativum Dominicae mortis et passionis; q. 73, a. 4: commemorativum Dominicae passionis; q. 73, a. 5: aliquod repraesentativum Dominicae passionis; q. 74, a. 1: memoriale Dominicae passionis; q. 79, a. 7: "Inquantum enim in hoc sacramento repraesentatur passio Christi, qua Christus 'obtulit se hostiam Deo,' ut dicitur Ephes., 5, habet rationem sacrificii"; q. 80, a. 10, ad 2: memoriale passionis Christi; q. 80, a. 12, ad 3: repraesentatio Dominicae passionis; q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; ad 2; q. 77, a. 7: sacramentum Dominicae passionis; q. 78, a. 3, ad 2; q. 79, a. 1; a. 2; q. 83, a. 1, ad 1: exemplum (from Ambrose); *IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2 (p. 548, n. 29); etc.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, III, q. 83, a. 1: "Celebratio huius sacramenti . . . imago est quaedam

That the Mass is something more than the sacrifice of the Temple St. Thomas attributes to the Real Presence;⁵⁰ and this at once leads him beyond the realm of sacrifice on which recent liturgists have concentrated their attention into that of Communion. This significant ambivalence that the Eucharist has for St. Thomas, taking into account, as it does, what is contained in the sacrament both by concomitance and *vi sacramenti*,⁵¹ and envisaging the Mass not merely as a sacrifice but as a sacrifice of which the victim is a sacrament of grace, is expressed by him proleptically:

In this sacrament memory is made of the Passion of Christ, as bringing its effect to the faithful.⁵²

There is a similarity between phrases like this and those used later by the Council of Trent.⁵³

repraesentativa passionis Christi, quae est vera immolatio. . . . Quantum ad (istum) modum poterat Christus dici immolari etiam in figuris veteris Testamenti."

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 73, a. 5, ad 2: "Eucharistia est sacramentum perfectum Dominicae passionis, tamquam continens ipsum Christum passum."

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, q. 76, a. 1.

⁵² *Ibid.*, q. 83, a. 2, ad 1; q. 79, a. 1: "Effectus huius sacramenti debet considerari primo quidem et principaliter ex eo quod in hoc sacramento continetur, quod est Christus. . . . Secundo consideratur ex eo quod per hoc sacramentum repraesentatur, quod est passio Christi"; *IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3, ad 1 (p. 555, n. 75): "Passio Christi prout in capite contingit, semel tantum in anno repraesentatur in Ecclesia; sed prout in nos ejus effectus provenit quotidie debet repraesentari." The most important formulation of this idea is to be found in those texts where the Mass is said to be a sacrifice *under the form of a meal*; e.g., III, q. 66, a. 9, ad 5: "In sacramento Eucharistiae commemoratur mors Christi inquantum ipse Christus passus nobis exhibetur quasi paschale convivium; secundum illud I Cor. 5: 'Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus; itaque epulemur'; see below. St. Thomas' insistence on the Real Presence and relegation of the sacrifice to a secondary place agrees with Pius XII in his address to those taking part in the International Congress of Pastoral Liturgy (Assisi), 22 September 1956 (cf. *L'Osservatore Romano*, 23 Sept. 1956), correcting a tendency of modern liturgists: "On se contente du sacrifice de l'autel, et l'on diminue l'importance de Celui qui l'accomplit. Or, la personne du Seigneur doit occuper le centre du culte, car c'est elle qui unifie les relations de l'autel et du tabernacle et leur donne leur sens."

⁵³ Council of Trent, sess. 22, cap. 1 (Denz. 938): "Deus et Dominus noster . . . in coena novissima, qua nocte tradebatur, ut dilectae sponsae suae Ecclesiae visibili (sicut hominum natura exigit) relinqueret sacrificium, quo cruentum illud semel in cruce peragendum repraesentaretur eiusque memoria in finem usque saeculi permaneret, atque illius salutaris virtus in remissionem eorum, quae a nobis quotidie

Because of his emphasis on the fruits of the Mass and on Communion, St. Thomas offers no ready-made "theory" of the sacrifice; but Abbot Vonier's sacrament-sacrifice theory, according to which the double consecration symbolizes and effects *sacramentally* the Passion of Christ, appears to interpret faithfully his theology.⁵⁴ Of themselves, however, the separately consecrated species constitute formally only a very perfect *sign* of Calvary. They represent the historical, natural sacrifice; but this is insufficient to make the Mass a true and proper sacrifice. For that is required an active offering of the victim; and, according to Thomists, it is Christ himself who actually, not merely virtually, makes this offering. Theologians, even Thomists, differ as to whether the cross and the Mass are numerically identical or not.⁵⁵ The question remains unresolved; but it is

committuntur, peccatorum applicaretur, etc. . . ." Pius XII, in the Encyclical Letter, *Mediator Dei*, possibly to exclude a Caselian interpretation of "repraesentaretur," speaks of "memoralis demonstratio." (cf. AAS 39 (1947) p. 548)

⁵⁴ A. Vonier, O.S.B., *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, 2nd imp., London, 1931. A more recent and clear account of this theory is to be found in B. Durst, O.S.B., *Das Wesen der Eucharistiefeier und des christlichen Priestertums*, Studia Anselmiana, no. 32, Rome, 1953. Concerning the relation between the sacrifice of the cross and the Mass, the Council of Trent confines itself to saying (sess. 22, cap. 2. Denz. 940): "Una enim eademque est hostia, idem nunc offerens sacerdotum ministerio, qui se ipsum tunc in cruce obtulit, sola offerendi ratione diversa." Pius XII, in *Mediator Dei*, more clearly, speaks of the double consecration as the symbol of the Passion. (Cf. AAS 39 (1947) p. 548) Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 74, a. 1; q. 80, a. 12, ad 3: "Repraesentatio Dominicae passionis agitur in ipsa consecratione huius sacramenti, in qua non debet corpus sine sanguine consecrari"; *In Matt.*, c. 26, n. 4 (2191): ". . . rememorativum Dominicae passionis. Et non potuit melius significare quam sic, ut significetur sanguis ut effusus et separatus a corpore."

⁵⁵ Among recent writers, Durst, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 60, asserts that Christ elicits a new act of offering for each Mass; cf. *ibid.*, p. 76, n. 13. This appears to be the opinion of the Salmanticenses, tr. 23, disp. 13, dub. 3 nn. 49, 50. Cajetan, on the contrary, says, *De sacrificio Missae adversus Lutheranos* (*Opusc. omnia*, Lyons, 1567, tome 3, tr. 10, pp. 285 f.), 6: "Non posse affirmari proprie loquendo duas sacrificia, aut duas hostias, aut duas oblationes in Novo Testamento." Identity, in some form or other, is taught in recent years by A. Vonier, *op. cit.*, *passim*; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *An Christus non solum virtualiter sed actualiter offerat Missas*, Ang. 19 (1942) pp. 105-118; Ch. Heris, O.P., *The Mystery of Christ* (*Le mystère du Christ*, tr. by D. Fahey, C.S.Sp.), Cork, 1950, pp. 204-206; E. Masure, *The Christian Sacrifice* (*Le sacrifice du Chef*, Eng. tr.), London, 1944, Bk. 3, *passim*; P. Ruppel, O.S.B., *Sacrificium Mediatoris. Die Opferanschauungen des*

hard to see how the unique character of Christ's sacrifice on Calvary is to be preserved if the Mass differs from it in any way except in the mode of offering.⁵⁶

It is the office of the celebrant to perform this sacramental representation of Calvary. This he does by his power of transubstantiation, a power held by none but the priest.⁵⁷ In this sense the priest offers the sacrifice of Christ instrumentally, taking the place of Christ sacramentally.⁵⁸

The Mass therefore gives a temporal, sacramental extension to Calvary so that the charity of Christ that was expressed outwardly in sacrificial form by the crucifixion is now actually signified by the species of bread and wine that contain the Body and Blood of Christ. It is this relation of signification, proper to an external act of religion, that gives value to the Mass, just as it gave it to the crucifixion.⁵⁹ What is to be noted is that, though the Mass as the sacrifice of Christ gives infinite

Aquinaten (6 parts), *Divus Th.*, Frib., 11 (1933) p. 338. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 83, a. 1, ad 1: "Sicut Ambrosius dicit . . . hoc autem sacrificium exemplum est illius. Sicut enim quod ubique offertur unum est corpus et non multa corpora, ita et unum sacrificium."

⁵⁶ Various proposals have been made to explain how there can be identity between cross and Mass. W. Barden, O.P., *What happens at Mass* (Dublin, 1950), pp. 83-96, distinguishes between the external act of oblation in Christ's practical intellect and his primary, interior, acts of devotion and prayer, and suggests that the former is maintained unchanged by one, aeviternal act, governed by Christ's angelic knowledge. It is by this act that Christ offers each and every Christian sacrifice, either naturally (on Calvary) or sacramentally (at the Last Supper and at Mass). M. Matthijs, O.P., "Mysteriengegenwart' secundum sanctum Thomam," *Angelicum* 34 (1947), pp. 393-399, proposes that Christ, at the Last Supper, offered a sacramental sacrifice, at the same time commanding his Apostles to offer in memory of him. This act of institution of the Eucharist and the priesthood reaches all places and times by Christ's divine power, producing its effect instrumentally through priests. The latter theory is the simpler and ensures greater unity between Mass, Supper and Calvary; but it depends on the proposition that God can apply instrumentally *now* an action that took place in the past. M. solves this difficulty by quoting III, q. 56, a. 1, ad 3 and *I Cor.*, c. 15, lect. 2 (915). Fr. Barden's theory involves no such questionable principle.

⁵⁷ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 82, a. 10, ad 1, ad 2.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 1: "Hoc sacramentum est tantae dignitatis quod non conficitur nisi in persona Christi"; a. 2, ad 2; a. 3; a. 5; a. 7, ad 3; q. 83, a. 1, ad 3: "Sacerdos gerit imaginem Christi in cuius persona et virtute verba pronuntiat ad consecrandum. . . . Et ita quodammodo idem est sacerdos et hostia"; q. 78, a. 1.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 48, a. 2; a. 3: "Hoc ipsum opus quod voluntarie passionem sustinuit

honor to God and is of infinite value in itself to men, this is precisely the honor and value of *Calvary*.⁶⁰ The sacramental representation adds nothing to this. It might be said, if it is understood properly, that as far as the personal worship of Christ as Head goes, the Mass is an irrelevance. The purpose of the *sacramental* sacrifice is that it should be the sacrifice of *the Church*, and this not simply as an empty ceremonial, however holy in itself, but as a sign of the charity of men.⁶¹ Christ's sacrifice cannot be repeated, but the *personal* sacrifice of the Church can, and must, be repeated continually; and, since there is only one definitive, absolute sacrifice in the New Law, namely, the historic sacrifice of Calvary, the Church must make each of her sacrifices an offering of that sacrifice; and this she does by offering the *sacrament* of the sacrifice. The problem to be solved is: how is the charity of the Church, therefore of the individual faithful, expressed by the sacrifice of the Mass?

The worship of the faithful in the Mass

Although the commentators of St. Thomas devote several pages to their replies to the questions:—who offers the Mass?—and, for whom is the Mass offered?—they place their discussion in a canonical, rather than a liturgical or sacramental, context.⁶² They are concerned with the theological implications

fuit Deo maxime acceptum, utpote ex caritate proveniens"; *ibid.*, ad 3; cf. II-II, q. 85, a. 1.

⁶⁰ Theologians put it that it is of infinite value *in actu primo* and sufficiently, not efficaciously; cf. Salmanticenses, tr. 23, disp. 13, dub. 6.

⁶¹ Cf. III, q. 82, a. 7, ad 1: commenting on texts of (pseudo-) Augustine ("Extra Ecclesiam catholicam non est locus veri sacrificii") and Leo ("Aliter [sc. quam in Ecclesia quae est corpus Christi] nec rata sunt sacerdotia nec vera sacrificia"), St. Thomas says: "Extra Ecclesiam non potest esse spirituale sacrificium quod est verum veritate fructus, licet sit verum veritate sacramenti"; q. 63, a. 6: "... Ecclesiae sacrificium." Cf. Cajetan, *De celebratione Missae* (*Opusc. omnia*, Lyons, 1567, tome 2, tr. 3, pp. 146 f.), 2: "Loquendo de effectu huius sacrificii ex solo opere operato secundum se, patet nullum habere particularem effectum in quocumque homine."

⁶² Cf. Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanticenses, Billuart, in their commentaries on III, q. 82: De ministro Eucharistiae; and q. 83: De sacrificio Missae; and q. 75, a. 5: De effectu sacrificii; Dom. Soto, *In IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2; Cajetan, *De celebratione Missae*, and *De Missae sacrificio*.

of the Church law on stipends, on offering Mass for those not in communion with the Church, and so on. The question of participation in the Mass as stated by modern theologians, namely, the question of how exactly the faithful join in the offering of the Body and the Blood, they pass over with one or other variation on a formula found in its typical form in Dom. Soto: the whole Christian people offer "in a very general fashion and mediately, that is, through the priest . . . through the hands of the priest"; those present at Mass offer "in a more particular, but still general, fashion."⁶³

Any attempt to evaluate the liturgical significance of these token formulas must begin by restoring them to their place in the sacramental theology of St. Thomas. He himself nowhere gives a reasoned statement on lay participation, because for him, no less than for his commentators, the question was not an actual one. It is only in recent years that theologians, with the encouragement and guidance of the Church, have attempted to give explicit and systematic form to a belief that has always been acknowledged by the Christian conscience. Nevertheless, the elements of a solution to the problem are, it appears, to be found in St. Thomas' general teaching on the sacraments and in particular on the Eucharist and the baptismal character. What follows is an attempt to formulate this solution. A brief review of the explicit teaching of St. Thomas, of the more precise ideas put forward in recent papal pronouncements, and finally of the approaches to the problem made by some theologians, introduces this suggested solution.

St. Thomas' explicit teaching

St. Thomas' ideas on priesthood and on the offering of sacrifice are based on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and thus primarily on the concept of the Old Testament priesthood as a figure of Christ.⁶⁴ Consequently, he speaks of the priest as

⁶³ Dom. Soto, *loc. cit.*, a. 1; *cp.* Salmanticenses, tr. 23, d. 13, dub. 3, n. 52; Gonet, *De sacramentis*, disp. 11, a. 3, distinguishing the part taken in the external ritual by the deacons, the acolytes, the choir, and so on.

⁶⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 102; III, q. 22, a. 1, Sed c.; q. 41, a. 1; ad 3; q. 59, a. 2; q. 22, a. 4, ad 1. Heb., 5:1 ("Omnis namque pontifex ex hominibus assumptus pro

"offering" the Mass "for" the people. "For" (*pro*) in this context has two senses for St. Thomas. It can mean "for the benefit of," to indicate the disposal of the fruits of the Mass.⁶⁵ It can also mean "on behalf of" or "in the person of."⁶⁶ The people are said to offer their gifts at the offertory—a reference to the offertory procession.⁶⁷ There are besides a few texts where "offerers" are spoken of; and it is not clear in what sense this is to be understood; possibly of the person who offers a stipend.⁶⁸ It is clearly stated that the offering made by the priest is an external sacrifice, not depending on his interior dispositions, even though these ought to correspond to his actions.⁶⁹ It is also clear that, though the external offering made by the priest has an intrinsic value,⁷⁰ the people are called on to participate by devotion and prayer.⁷¹ Texts of this nature are

hominibus constituitur in iis quae sunt ad Deum, ut offerat dona et sacrificia pro peccatis") is quoted in I-II, q. 101, a. 4, ad 5; q. 105, a. 1, obj. 4; II-II, q. 86, a. 2; III, q. 22, a. 1; a. 2; q. 64, a. 7, Sed c.; q. 83, a. 4, ad 6; *Suppl.*, q. 19, a. 3, Sed c. 2; *IV Cont. Gent.*, cap. 74.

⁶⁵ Cf. III, q. 79, a. 7: ". . . pro omnibus sumentibus offertur . . . Aliis, qui non sumunt, prodest per modum sacrificii inquantum pro salute eorum offertur"; q. 83, a. 4: "Commemorat . . . illos pro quibus hoc sacrificium offertur, scilicet, pro universali Ecclesia"; q. 83, a. 4, ad 6 (quoting Heb., 5:1); possibly q. 83, a. 4, ad 5 (quoted below, n. 71).

⁶⁶ Cf. III, q. 80, a. 12, ad 3: "Sacerdos in persona omnium sanguinem offert et sumit"; q. 82, a. 3: ". . . ad (sacerdotem) pertinet dona populi Deo offerre": I-II, q. 102, a. 4, ad 6 (of the Temple sacrifices): "In atrio extra tabernaculum continebatur altare holocaustorum, in quo offerebantur Deo sacrificia de his quae erant a populo possessa. Et ideo in atrio poterat esse populus, qui huiusmodi Deo offerebat per manus sacerdotum. Sed ad altare interius, in quo ipsa devotio et sanctitas populi Deo offerebatur, non poterat accedere nisi sacerdotes quorum erat Deo offerre populum."

⁶⁷ Cf. III, q. 83, a. 4; *Suppl.*, q. 37, a. 4, ad 3.

⁶⁸ Cf. III, q. 83, a. 4: "Sacerdos secreto commemorat . . . specialiter quosdam 'qui offerunt . . .'"—a quotation from the Canon of the Mass, to the interpretation of which St. Thomas does not commit himself; q. 83, a. 1, ad 1: "'Una est hostia,' quam scilicet Christus obtulit et nos offerimus"; q. 79, a. 5.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 4: "Exterius sacrificium quod offert, signum est interioris sacrificii . . ."; q. 82, a. 5; a. 6; a. 7; a. 8 (all of these concerning Mass offered by sinners, heretics, etc.).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 102, a. 4, ad 3: "Ipsum sacrificium Ecclesiae spirituale est" (see context).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, III, q. 79, a. 5: "Quamvis haec oblatio ex sui quantitate sufficiat ad satisfaciendum pro omni poena, tamen fit satisfactoria illis pro quibus offertur, vel

comparatively rare because of St. Thomas' interest in the fruit of the sacrifice of Christ rather than in the sacrifice of the people. According to one of St. Thomas' most significant texts for this matter—he is speaking explicitly of the priest, but his principle is of general application—participation in the fruits of the Mass by sacramental Communion is a public profession that one has made the interior oblation of oneself that is signified by the exterior sacrifice.⁷³

Papal teaching

The teaching of the Church on the matter, up to the time of Pius XI, offers no more definite ideas than those of St. Thomas.⁷³ The Council of Trent urges that all the faithful should attend Mass with faith, reverence and contrition, but is content to say impersonally of the Mass: *offertur*; and finally it recommends that the faithful should take part "not only by interior desire, but also by sacramental reception of the Eucharist."⁷⁴

Pius XI, in his Encyclical Letter, *Miserentissimus Redemptor*,⁷⁵ introduces a remarkable development in the expression of the doctrine. The spiritual sacrifice of the faithful, he declares, is to be associated with the sacrifice of the Mass in order to fill up what is wanting to the sufferings of Christ. The faithful, he goes on, called a "royal priesthood" by St. Peter,

etiam offerentibus, secundum quantitatem suae devotionis, et non pro tota poena"; q. 83, a. 4; ad 5: "In hoc sacramento requiritur devotio totius populi, pro quo sacrificium offertur . . ."; q. 82, a. 1, ad 2; *IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 1 (p. 548, n. 25): "Omnis bonus homo dicitur sacerdos mystice; quia scilicet mysticum sacrificium [*al.* sacerdotium] Deo offert seipsum."

⁷³ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 82, a. 4: "Exterius sacrificium quod offert, signum est interioris sacrificii quo quis seipsum offert Deo: ut Augustinus dicit, *X de Civ. Dei*, Unde per hoc quod participat sacrificio, ostendit ad se sacrificium interius pertinere."

⁷⁴ Cf. condemnations of anti-clerical heresies, insisting on the prerogatives of the ordained priesthood: Innocent III, Profession of faith prescribed for the Waldenses (Denz. 424); IV Lateran Council, c. 1, against the Albigenses (Denz. 430). A more positive theme: the water added to the wine at Mass signifies the union of the faithful with Christ: Council of Florence, Decr. for the Armenians (Denz. 698); Council of Trent, sess. 22, c. 7 (Denz. 945).

⁷⁵ Council of Trent, sess. 22, c. 2 (Denz. 940); c. 6 (Denz. 944).

⁷⁶ 8 May 1928; cf. AAS 20 (1928) pp. 165 f.

must offer for their own and other's sins, "in a manner hardly differing from that in which every priest offers."⁷⁶

Pius XII's Encyclical Letter, *Mystici corporis*,⁷⁷ in a brief reference to the Mass, says that the faithful, united with the priest by their intentions and prayers, offer to the eternal Father, for the needs of the whole Church, the most pleasing Victim which has been made present by the voice of the priest alone.⁷⁸ In a series of later pronouncements, Pius XII insists again on the incommunicable nature of the priesthood of orders and on the divine source of its liturgical mediation.⁷⁹ The priest acts in the name of the people "precisely and solely because he represents the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, considered as Head of all the members."⁸⁰ Only the priest, by pronouncing the words of consecration, can bring about the unbloody offering by which Christ is rendered present on the altar in the state of victim.⁸¹ Nevertheless, goes on Pius XII, the faithful should play an active part in the sacrifice;⁸² and they possess a certain priesthood related to spiritual sacrifices in the sense of I

⁷⁶ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 171, 172: 'Neque enim arcani huius sacerdotii et satisfaciendi sacrificandique muneris participatione ii soli fruuntur quibus Pontifex noster Christus Iesus administris utitur ad oblationem mundam . . . offerendam, sed etiam christianorum gens universa ab Apostolorum Principe "genus electum, regale sacerdotium" iure appellata, debet cum pro se, tum pro toto humano genere offerre pro peccatis, haud aliter propemodum quam sacerdos omnis ac pontifex 'ex hominibus assumptus. . . .''

⁷⁷ 29 June 1943; cf. *AAS* 35 (1943) pp. 193 f.

⁷⁸ *Loc. cit.*, 232, 233: "Itemque in eo christifideles ipsimet immaculatum Agnum, unius sacerdotis voce in altari praesentem constitutum, communibus votis precibusque consociati, per eiusdem sacerdotis manus Aeterno Patri porrigunt."

⁷⁹ Cf. *Encycl. Letter, Mediator Dei*, 20 Nov. 1947 (cf. *AAS* 39 (1947) pp. 521 f.); Address to Sacred College and Bishops, 3 Nov. 1954 (cf. *AAS* 46 (1954) pp. 666 f.); Address to those taking part in the Internat. Congress of Pastoral Liturgy (Assisi), 22 Sept. 1956 (cf. *L'Osservatore Romano*, 23 Sept. 1956).

⁸⁰ *Mediator Dei* (*AAS vol. cit.*, p. 553).

⁸¹ *Mediator Dei* (*loc. cit.*, p. 555): "Incruenta enim illa oblatio, qua consecrationis verbis prolatis Christus in statu victimae super altare praesens redditur, ab ipso solo sacerdote perficitur, prout Christi personam sustinet, non vero prout Christifidelium personam gerit." Address of 2 Nov. 1954 (*loc. cit.*, p. 667): "Ubi nulla sit proprie vereque dicenda potestas sacrificandi nec inveniatur proprie vereque appellandum sacerdotium."

⁸² Cf. Address of 2 Nov. 1954 (*loc. cit.*, p. 668): "In sacrificio activas quasdam partes habere possint et habeant."

Peter 2:9, though it is essentially different from that of the celebrant.⁸³ He makes it clear by the whole emphasis of *Mediator Dei* that the principal activity of the faithful in the liturgy is that of the moral and theological virtues. Again and again he insists that the chief element in the liturgy is interiorly conceived worship, that there is no opposition between "objective" and "personal" devotion, that the faithful take part in the Eucharistic sacrifice "with such active devotion as to be in the closest union with the High Priest," that the faithful offer themselves as victims.⁸⁴ In all of this he echoes the traditional teaching handed down by the Council of Trent.

Yet there is some even more intimate way in which the faithful are involved. As is clear from statements of popes and theologians, argues Pius XII, the faithful actually offer the Divine Victim, though in a manner different from that in which the priest offers.⁸⁵ They hold this privilege by reason of their baptism which makes them members of Christ the Priest and imprints on them a "character" by which they are appointed to the worship of God and share in the priesthood of Christ.⁸⁶ Given that the priest, acting in the person of Christ, has placed the Divine Victim on the altar and is offering it to the Father, the faithful may in their own way share in this offering and for two reasons; first, because they offer the sacrifice through the priest, and secondly, because they offer it with him.⁸⁷

They offer *through* the priest (*per sacerdotis manus*) because

⁸³ Cf. *ibid.* (*loc. cit.*, p. 369): "Negari vel in dubium vocari non debet fideles quoddam habere *sacerdotium*, neque hoc parvi aestimare vel deprimere licet. . . . At quaecumque est huius honorifici tituli et rei vera plenaque significatio, firmiter tenendum est, commune hoc omnium christifidelium, altum utique et arcanum, *sacerdotium* non gradu tantum sed etiam essentia differre a sacerdotio proprie vereque dicto. . . ."

⁸⁴ Cf. *Mediator Dei* (*loc. cit.*, pp. 530-537, 552, 557).

⁸⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 554: "Christifideles etiam divinam offerre hostiam diversa tamen ratione dicendi sunt"; quoting Innocent III, *De sacro altaris mysterio*, III, 6, and St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Missa*, I, cap. 27.

⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 555: "Baptismatis lavacro generali titulo christiani in Mystico Corpore membra efficiuntur Christi sacerdotis, et 'character' qui eorum in animo quasi insculpitur ad cultum divinum deputantur; atque ideo ipsius Christi sacerdotium pro sua conditione participant."

⁸⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 556.

the priest acts in the name of Christ considered as Head and as offering in the name of all the members. They also offer *with* the priest (*una cum ipso sacerdote*). In explaining this, Pius XII is concerned principally with the content of the offering, or what it signifies on the part of the offerers. The faithful, uniting "their sentiments of praise, entreaty, expiation and thanksgiving with the sentiments or intention of the priest, indeed with those of the High Priest himself," make a spiritual offering of themselves which is caught up into the very oblation of the victim. The self-offering of Christ and that of the faithful are united, says Pius XII, *by the priest's external rite* and so presented to God the Father.⁸⁸ He goes on to develop the function of the external rite in unifying the spiritual offering of Christ and that of the faithful.

The external rite of worship must of its very nature be a sign of interior worship; and what is signified by the sacrifice of the New Law is that supreme homage by which Christ, the principal offerer, and with him and through him all his mystical members, pay due honour and veneration to God.⁸⁹

The broad outlines of a solution are marked out in these papal documents. The most significant elements, in the light of St. Thomas' teaching on sacramental worship, are the attribution of an undefined function to the baptismal character in the offering of the faithful, and the recognition of the central, unifying position of the visible species which signify the sacrifice.

Some recent solutions

Theologians, for the most part, have been content to repeat without very much comment the phrases found by the popes for expressing the faithful's part in the Mass. They have insisted on the priest's mediation and, though they have paid their respects to Pius XII's reference to the baptismal character, the majority of them thinks of it as nothing more than a moral

⁸⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, *loc. cit.*: ". . . ut eadem in ipsa victimae oblatione externo quoque sacerdotis ritu, Deo Patri exhibeantur."

⁸⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

power, a right to take part in the sacrifice of the Church. The faithful "associate" themselves with the offering *by faith*.⁹⁰ This solution denies the problem. To offer the sacrifice of Christ by faith it is not necessary to have the Mass. It is something in itself non-sacramental, implicit in every act of virtue. The offering by the faithful at Mass must be specifically connected with the *sacramental* representation of Calvary.

For theologians who hold that Christ, using the minister as his physical instrument, actually offers the Mass the problem must be to associate the faithful's intention of taking part in the sacrifice with the offering of Christ himself in such wise that the external sign of his worship (that is, the sacramentally immolated Body and Blood) may be also the sign of the faithful's worship. However, almost without exception, contemporary theologians of this school are content to state the matter in these terms and to add that it is in virtue of the baptismal character that such an association is possible.⁹¹ This

⁹⁰ Cf. S. Tromp, S. J., "Quo sensu in sacrificio Missae offert Ecclesia, offerunt fideles," *Periodica* 30 (1941) pp. 265-273 (the priest offers, but "in persona Christi et fidelium"); G. de Broglie, S. J., "Du rôle de l'Eglise dans le sacrifice eucharistique," *Nouv. rev. th.*, 70 (1948) pp. 449-460 (that Christ should worship in the Mass is 'un non-sens'; the priest's offering is the faithful's offering); *id.*, "La Messe, oblation collective de la communauté chrétienne," *Greg.* 30 (1949) pp. 534-561; F. Palmer, S. J., "The Lay Priesthood: real or metaphorical?," *Theol. Studies*, 8 (1947) pp. 579 f.; *id.*, "Lay Priesthood: towards a terminology," *ibid.*, 10 (1949) pp. 235-350 (liturgically, the faithful offer only through the ministry of the priest: a mediate offering); J. Rea, *The Common Priesthood of the Members of the Mystical Body*, Washington, 1947, pp. 212, 222; G. Bauer, "Das heilige Messopfer," *Divus Th.*, Freib., 28 (1950) pp. 25-28; J. McCarthy, "Notes," *Irish Eccl. Rec.*, 83 (1955) p. 203; W. A. Kavanagh, *Lay Participation in Christ's Priesthood*, Washington, 1935 (Cf. *RSPT* 25 (1936) pp. 757, 758). An account of various unorthodox solutions is to be found in J. Brinktrine, "Das Amtspriestertum und das allgemeine Priestertum der Gläubigen," *Div. Th.*, Freib., 22 (1944) p. 308, also in *La teologia e i laici*, *L'Osserv. Romano*, 15 Sept. 1954.

⁹¹ Cf. e.g., A. Kolping, "Der aktive Anteilung der Gläubigen an der Darbringung des eucharistischen Opfers," *Div. Th.*, Freib., 27 (1949) pp. 369-380; Y. Congar, O. P., *Jalons pour une théologie du laicat* (Coll. "Unam sanctam," n. 20), Paris, 1953, pp. 246 f., esp. p. 292 (cf., however, p. 275). B. Durst, *Das Wesen . . .*, pp. 61 f., develops the matter considerably, suggesting that the faithful participate in the Mass in two ways: making the offering of the Body and Blood the sign of their interior self-oblation, and also offering "ministerially," by reason of their baptismal characters, the worship of Christ on the cross. This appears a false

amounts to a restatement in explicitly Thomistic terms of the essential words of *Mediator Dei*.⁹²

A solution

The solution is to be sought in the relation between the Eucharist and the baptismal character. In these terms the problem is to be formulated: how does his baptismal character enable the individual Christian to designate the double consecration as the sacrificial sign of his charity?

It is to be observed first of all that sacramental offering of the Body and Blood by the celebrant already signifies in a certain sense the worship of the faithful in so far as it signifies the *mediatorial* worship of Christ, the *Head* of the Mystical Body, since his worship virtually, as the source of all merit, includes the worship of all Christians. In exactly the same way the worship of all Christians was expressed outwardly on Calvary; and this universality attaches to the Mass in so far as it is identical with Calvary. The Mass adds nothing to the merit of Calvary. What it does add, precisely as the sacrifice of the Church, offered by men, is the *actual* signification of the charity of those who participate, which was signified on Calvary only as included in Christ's charity, and which has now been derived from Head to members in such a way that it is formally theirs.

It is at this point that a certain clarification can be achieved using St. Thomas' principles. The Mass is not a natural sacrifice; it is sacramental, the sacrament of a natural sacrifice. Although, therefore, all those who believe in Christ may "offer" by faith and charity the sacrifice of Calvary, only those who have received the sacrament of baptism may offer the Mass in the sense of designating the double consecration as the sacrificial sign of their charity, since baptism is the "gate-way to the sacraments." The *sacramental* Body and Blood, under the species of bread and wine, can actually signify the charity only of the baptized.

dichotomy (see below). Moreover, the interpretation of the instrumentality to be attributed to the baptismal character does not correspond to the teaching of St. Thomas as set out above.

⁹² Cf. above, n. 88.

This is made clearer when the sacramental form of this sacrifice is considered. In conformity with the circumstances of its institution it takes the form of a *meal*. This is a central idea with St. Thomas, taken from the Scriptures, referred to explicitly a number of times, and implicit in the essential concept of the Eucharist as *food*.⁹³ Participation in the sacrifice is confined to those who may receive food from the table; that is to say, to the baptized;⁹⁴ and it is the character that formally gives the power of receiving.⁹⁵ It is because the sacramental signs of the sacrifice of the Mass take the form of food that they can serve as the sacrificial sign of the charity of the baptized and, formally, only of the baptized. The species of bread and wine contain the Body and Blood of Christ as the Food of the soul and hence they signify the effect of that Food, namely, the unity of the Church in charity. This is an Augustinian theme that St. Thomas never tires of repeating.⁹⁶ It is only a short

⁹³ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 9, ad 5: "In sacramento Eucharistiae commemoratur mors Christi inquantum ipse Christus passus exhibetur nobis quasi paschale convivium, secundum illud I Cor. 5: 'Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus; itaque epulemur'"; q. 80, a. 10, ad 2: "In hoc sacramento traditur nobis memoriale passionis Christi per modum cibi"; q. 73, a. 6: Utrum agnus paschalis fuerit praecipua figura huius sacramenti; q. 80, a. 6: "mensa Dominica"; I Cor., c. 11, lect. 4, 5 *passim*, e.g., lect. 5 (654): "Offertur specialiter hoc sacramentum sub specie panis et vini. Primo quidem, quia pane et vino communis utuntur homines ad suam refectionem. . . ." Eucharist is food: cf. III, q. 73, a. 1; a. 2; a. 3, ad 1; ad 2; q. 75, a. 5; q. 76, a. 1, ad 2; a. 3, ad 1; q. 78, a. 3, ad 1; q. 79, a. 1; a. 4, ad 2; a. 5; q. 80, a. 6; a. 10, ad 1; q. 81, a. 3, ad 1; etc.

⁹⁴ Cf. III, q. 80, a. 6: "Cum enim quilibet Christianus ex hoc ipso quod est baptizatus, sit admissus ad mensam Dominicam. . . ."; q. 65, a. 3: "Sacramentum baptismi ordinatur ad Eucharistiae receptionem"; q. 67, a. 2; *In Matt.*, c. 6, n. 3 (592): "Ex quo quis baptizatus est, ius habet in isto pane"; *ibid.*, c. 26, n. 3 (2178): ". . . Nulli non baptizato debet dari huiusmodi sacramentum. . . . immo infideles non debet admitti ad videndum istud sacramentum; unde in primitiva Ecclesia, quando multi erant catechumeni, recipiebantur in Ecclesia usque ad Evangelium, et tunc expellebantur."

⁹⁵ Cf. III, q. 82, a. 1: "Sicut autem baptizato conceditur a Christo potestas sumendi hoc sacramentum, ita sacerdoti, cum ordinatur, confertur potestas hoc sacramentum consecrandi"; *In Matt.*, c. 26, n. 3 (2178): "Sicut non conficeret sacerdos nisi consecratus, sic non debet alicui illud ministrari nisi baptizato"; III, q. 63.

⁹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 67, a. 2: sacramentum ecclesiasticae unionis; q. 73, a. 2, Sed c.; a. 3, ad 1; ad 3: sacramentum caritatis; q. 73, a. 4; q. 74, a. 1, ad 1; q. 78, a. 3, ad 6: sacramentum caritatis quasi figurativum et affectivum; y. 79, a. 1; a. 2;

step from this idea of signification of charity as an *effect* of the sacrament to that of signification of the charity of the faithful as directed towards, or animating, the sacrament-sacrifice. It is a step which St. Thomas would have had no difficulty in taking, as witness such texts as those in which he says that water is added to the wine at Mass so as to signify the union of the faithful with Christ; though, in fact, he understands this again of the effect of the sacrament.⁹⁷

St. Thomas summarizes his teaching on the sacrament of the Eucharist:

This is the sacrament of the body of Christ; but the body of Christ is the Church, which is raised up into the unity of a body from many faithful; hence this is the sacrament of the unity of the Church.⁹⁸

The application of this concept of the Eucharist to the sacrifice of the Mass is in the full tradition of St. Paul, I Cor. 10:16-21, and of St. Augustine in *De civitate Dei*, Bk. 10, ch. 6:

This is the sacrifice of Christians: "many who are one body in Christ." This the Church clearly and frequently repeats to the faithful in the sacrament of the altar, where it is shown that in that which she offers she is herself offered.⁹⁹

That is to say, what is offered is the Body of Christ which (since it is the Food of the soul) symbolizes the charity that unites all members of the Church. Consequently, the offering that the Church makes symbolizes in the manner proper to an external act of religion the offering of herself, that is, of all the faithful.

q. 80, a. 4; ad 1; a. 5, ad 2; q. 82, a. 2, ad 3; q. 83, a. 4; ad 3; a. 5; *I Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 5 (654); *De art. fidei* (620); *IV Sent.*, d. 45, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 1.

⁹⁷ Cf. III, q. 74, a. 6: "... ad significandum effectum huius sacramenti, qui est unio populi christiani ad Christum"; q. 74, a. 7; a. 8, ad 2; q. 82, a. 3, ad 1: "Sanguini admiscetur aqua, quae significat populum"; *In Matt.*, c. 26, n. 4 (2193, 2194); *I Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 6 (684).

⁹⁸ *In Joann.*, c. 6, n. 6 (960). On the typically Augustinian reasoning of this text, with its direct transition from *sacramentum* to *res*, omitting or referring ambiguously to the *res et sacramentum*, cf. P.-Th. Camelot, "Réalisme et symbolisme dans la doctrine eucharistique de S. Augustin," *Rev. sc. phil. theol.*, 31 (1947) pp. 394-410.

⁹⁹ *De civitate Dei*, lib. 10, c. 6 (CCL 47 279).

Only the baptized may thus participate in the Mass since the Eucharist can cause grace only in those who bear the baptismal character, and consequently can signify formally the charity only of such. The Mass is the sacrifice of those who have the power to receive the Eucharist.

There is evidently a difference between the function of the baptismal character at Mass and the one that it has in reception of the sacraments. In the latter case it is required on the part of the subject for the perfection of the sacramental sign, the *opus operatum*. The Mass, however, is in no sense dependent on the faithful so far as the sacramental rite goes. The sacrament is perfected at the moment of consecration and this is solely the act of the celebrant. The sacramental power of the faithful is posterior to this (*posterioritate naturae*). It enables them to make the sacrament-sacrifice the sign of their own charity. The baptismal character intervenes here in so far as the sacrament is of its nature suitable for signifying the charity only of those who may receive the Eucharist. Hence the character intervenes simply as a physical entity, as something implied on the part of the faithful by the sign. It gives validity to the individual's intention of participating in the Mass, as it does to his intention of receiving the sacraments; but in a different way. In the Mass there is no question of instrumental material causality. It is because the character is a permanent quality incorporating a person into Christ sacramentally—as one qualified to use the sacraments—that it enables its subject to use the Mass as the expression of his own charity.

It is here that is to be noted the prime difference between the powers of the priestly and those of the baptismal characters in the Mass. Whereas the priestly character is effective independently of the moral disposition of the celebrant, the intention of participation that gains validity from the baptismal character is essentially an elicited act of religion. The celebrant offers the Body and Blood as the sign of Christ's redemptive charity. The baptized Christian offers them as the sign of his own worship. In this way the Church literally fills up what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ since the charity of her

members is now explicitly signified by the identical sacrifice, sacramentally renewed, which on Calvary signified the charity of the Church only as included in Christ's.

Though the Mass is in this way the sacrifice of all the baptized, it is in a special way the sacrifice of those who are present at its celebration. Indeed, since it is a *sacrament*, a sign, it is only those who are present who participate in the full sense sacramentally. The congregation, grouped together into one body, acknowledging the sole competence of the celebrant to perform the ritual which is to clothe their devotion, form around the altar a sign of the Mystical Body, subordinated to the priestly mediation of its Head. Personal assistance alone satisfies fully the demands of this sacramentalism. The faithful who are not present assist *sacramentally* by reason of their baptism and, further, by their public adherence to the Catholic Church. There are clearly varying degrees of participation to be distinguished here, and even heretics in good faith can be truly said to offer the Mass. Finally, there is a broad sense in which even the non-baptized, if they believe in Christ, may be said to offer. This, at least, appears to be a conclusion in harmony with St. Thomas' understanding of the influence of the Eucharist as extending as far as that of Christ himself.¹⁰⁰ What St. Thomas says of receiving the Holy Eucharist spiritually and not sacramentally may be applied here.¹⁰¹ All those who believe in Christ may "offer" by faith and charity the sacrifice of Calvary. It follows that, since the Mass is identified with Calvary, those who believe in Christ, yet are not baptized, may also "offer" the Mass by faith and charity; but they can do this precisely in the measure that the Mass is identified with Calvary and is the sacrifice offered *by Christ*; not, therefore, formally as a *sacramental* sacrifice offered by the Church, since the sacramental signs do not belong to them. The sacrifice

¹⁰⁰ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 73, a. 3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3: "Aliqui manducant spiritualiter hoc sacramentum antequam sacramentaliter sumant. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, propter desiderium sumendi ipsum sacramentum; et hoc modo dicuntur baptizari et manducare spiritualiter et non sacramentaliter illi qui desiderant sumere haec sacramenta iam instituta. Alio modo propter figuram. . . ."

that they immediately "offer" by faith is the natural sacrifice of Calvary; only indirectly, therefore, can they "offer" the Mass. Such an "offering," by definition, can have no effect *ex opere operato*.

Because the baptized faithful can offer sacramentally the sacrifice of Christ himself their worship takes on new and wonderful qualities. It procures the proper effects of sacrifice: in particular, it makes satisfaction for sin,¹⁰² and it placates God;¹⁰³ it honours him and procures the salvation of the living and the dead.¹⁰⁴ The effect or fruit of this offering can be measured only by God. What is certain is that it corresponds to the charity of Christ in proportion to the degree of charity of the individual members of the faithful.¹⁰⁵ This second element is determined by many factors: actual presence at Mass, offering of a stipend, the quality of the intention of participating (actual, virtual, habitual), the fervour of the act of charity. Insofar as the fruit exceeds the strict merits of the individual it is *ex opere operato*, produced, that is, through the due performance of the prescribed ritual by the priest.

To celebrate Mass, to procure the sacramental sacrifice of Christ, an ordained priest is sufficient. Much more is required—and is always supplied—if the Mass is to be truly the sacrifice of the Church. For that there is demanded of the faithful—priests as well as laity—moral effort, a life of virtue, spiritual sacrifices—all that the Fathers insisted on when they spoke of the "royal priesthood" of the faithful. This immolation, writes Pius XII,

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, q. 48, a. 2; ad 1.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, a. 3; a. 6, ad 3; q. 49, a. 4.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1 (p. 554, n. 66).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3, ad 3 (p. 556, n. 78): "Omnis nostra nostra actio per Christum perfici debet. Et ideo . . . oportet quod . . . Missa in Ecclesia celebretur"; III, q. 79, a. 5: "Quamvis haec oblatio ex sui quantitate [cf. III, q. 48, a. 2] sufficiat ad satisfaciendum pro omni poena, tamen fit satisfactoria illis pro quibus offertur, vel etiam offerentibus, secundum quantitatem suae devotionis, et non pro tota poena"; q. 49, a. 3, ad 2; ". . . multo minor sufficit (poenalitas) quam esset condigna peccato, cooperante satisfactione Christi"; Cf. III, q. 49, a. 1, ad 4; a. 3, ad 1; Cajetan, *De celebratione Missae*, works out in mathematical proportions the fruit for the offerers and for those for whom they offer, taking into account the devotion of each.

is not restricted to the liturgical sacrifice. . . . But, inevitably, it is when the faithful are taking part in the liturgical action with such faith and devotion that it may be truly said that their "faith and devotion are known to Thee," that their faith will more eagerly work by charity and their devotion grow more fervent.¹⁰⁶

The Mass 'means' union with Christ: it presupposes such union, at least in an initial degree; and it promotes union. Today's Mass is consummated in the offering of tomorrow's Mass.¹⁰⁷ The *daily* sacrifice draws the whole life of the Church into the sacrifice of Christ, announcing the death of the Lord until he come.

Conclusions

I. Reception of the sacraments is an act of worship.

The inner dispositions with which the subject approaches a sacrament are expressed outwardly by the *opus operatum*, not in its entirety (as such it is a common action of minister and subject and not, therefore, elicited by the subject alone), but by that part of it which is produced by the subject; in other words, by the reception of the sacrament. It is question here of the sacrament as sign, prior to its causality; and the intervention of the baptismal character, procuring valid reception, is presupposed.

II. It is by reason of the faith of the Church alone that sacraments administered to unconscious subjects are acts of worship. In the case of those who previously had the use of reason habitual dispositions on the part of the subject are implied in this act of worship.

III. The act of reception is elicited by the remote dispositions for sacramental grace, which remain, at least virtually, at the moment when the sacrament acts. Both grace and the proximate dispositions for it are signified at this moment, not as eliciting the act of reception, but as the effect of the sacrament.

¹⁰⁶ *Mediator Dei*, loc. cit., pp. 557, 558.

¹⁰⁷ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 82, a. 7: " . . . fructum sacrificii . . . quod est sacrificium spirituale."

IV. The full *opus operans* of the subject consists in his remote dispositions and in his intention of receiving the sacrament.

V. The sacrifice of Christ is sacramentally represented in the Mass under the form of a meal. Because the Body and Blood of Christ are thus present as food they signify not only the redemptive charity of Christ but also the charity of all those who have the power of eating Christ sacramentally. It is the baptismal character that gives this power; and hence it is it too that makes the faithful's intention of participating in the Mass valid. The offering of the Mass by the faithful consists, therefore, essentially in acts of charity. The character, as a permanent, sacramental incorporation into the Mystical Body of Christ enables its subject to designate the sacramental Body and Blood as the sacrificial sign of his charity. In the Mass the *opus operatum* is produced by the priest alone. It serves as the sign of the *opus operans* of the faithful. At Mass, consequently, the sacrifice of Christ signifies actually charity which on Calvary was signified only as included in Christ's, and which has now been derived to the members of Christ.

VI. Personal assistance alone satisfies fully the sacramentalism of the Mass, but all the baptized can offer sacramentally by reason of their characters. In a broad sense, even the non-baptized may 'offer' the Mass by faith and charity, in so far as it is the sacrifice of Christ, identified with Calvary.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Man's Knowledge of Reality. By FREDERICK WILHELMSSEN. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956. Pp. 215 with indices. \$4.00.

It is probably true as far as textbooks are concerned that even a good one is at best only a mixed blessing. Nevertheless, considering the average size of the contemporary class, we must be alert to the appearance of any worthwhile textbook which may assist us in our teaching. Teachers of scholastic philosophy have for years watched for the appearance of an adequate textbook in epistemology. Their watch has, for the most part, been unrewarded. Because there is little agreement on the exact nature of epistemology and because any investigation into the mystery of knowledge is exceedingly difficult, only few attempts have been made to satisfy the need for a textbook in epistemology. Of these few perhaps the most significant (at least in English) has been Frederick Wilhelmsen's *Man's Knowledge of Reality*, published in 1956 by Prentice-Hall. In the two years since its publication this book has found favor with many, and in that time no other textbook in epistemology written by a scholastic has appeared to challenge it. Because of this it seems highly reasonable to predict not only continued but even increased use of this book in the philosophy curricula of our Catholic colleges. This is the situation which prompts this present critical review of the book.

Man's Knowledge of Reality (subtitled *An Introduction to Thomistic Epistemology*) is proposed by the author not strictly as a textbook but more simply as an essay towards a Thomistic epistemology. Wilhelmsen requests that his work be evaluated first of all by the way it measures up to reality and secondly by the extent of its faithfulness to the philosophy of St. Thomas. There is no question but that he feels that if it measures up to the one it will measure up to the other. As for his brand of Thomism, Wilhelmsen declares himself outside of the school of the classical Commentators. That this is true is clearly seen in his own text and in his choice of the majority of his secondary references. Clearly Wilhelmsen owes most, as far as secondary sources are concerned, to philosophers who have repudiated the Thomistic authenticity of the teaching of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

Wilhelmsen opens his book with the admission that there is no science which is uniquely epistemology. However, he insists that there is a philosophical investigation properly epistemological in nature, though the investi-

gation is not limited to any one philosophical discipline. In fact, an evaluation of the several possible meanings of "epistemology" reveals for Wilhelmsen three valid meanings for the term. Historically, "epistemology" refers to the way men confront the critical problem. This is the first valid meaning. Secondly, "epistemology" can refer to an investigation linking the metaphysics of knowledge (itself not epistemology) with the psychology of knowledge (itself not epistemology). Finally, "epistemology" (and here there are as many distinct epistemologies as there are distinct knowledges) can refer to the investigation of the conditions proper to the many different kinds of human knowledge. Wilhelmsen proceeds to order his book according to these three meanings of "epistemology." In Part I ("Metaphysical Realism") he confronts, and disposes of, the "critical problem." In Part II ("Judgment and Truth") he moves from a general consideration of the metaphysics and psychology of human knowledge to a searching analysis of judgment, and thence to a consideration of truth and certitude. Finally, in Part III ("An Introduction to Epistemology of Speculative Science") he considers generally the nature of speculative science and the classification of the speculative sciences. The result is, for the most part, a well ordered textbook maturely composed and proportioned to upper division students with a solid formation in the philosophy of man and metaphysics.

Since the time of Descartes the "critical problem" has proven to be a stumbling block to philosophers, if not to philosophy itself. The compulsion to attempt philosophically to establish the right to philosophize has invariably driven the critical philosopher into a blind alley, leading him nowhere save further and further into his criticism. The history of philosophy since the seventeenth century yields example after example of the folly invested in asking and attempting to answer the question of how we move from our knowledge of things to the actual existence of things, of how we get out of our knowledge to the *things* we know. The fact is, of course, that there is no solution to the "critical problem." But, fortunately, neither is there a "critical problem" to begin with. Our primary cognitive experiences are not directly of cognition itself, but rather of things. What is directly given in our primary cognitive experience (i. e., the sensory-intellectual grasp of the actually present sensible existent) is not the mind, nor the thing existing in the mind, but the thing existing extramentally and other than the mind. The problem facing the epistemologist is, fortunately, not to prove the things that are known *are* but to show how things that are *are known*. Wilhelmsen is well aware of this and proceeds accordingly. However, while rejecting the "critical problem" as a false start philosophically he takes great pains to give an account of his rejection thereof. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are particularly forceful in exposing the false sophistication and futility of the critical position and in

establishing the fact of the evidence of being on which the non-critical approach to epistemology is based. Wilhelmsen points out that the critical approach which begins with thought itself is based upon the Platonic notion of man which splits man up into two entities, soul and body, each with its own operations essentially divorced from those of the other. The soul, in such an accidental composite can know essences, but not as concretized in concrete sensible existents. The body can know sensible existents, but only as sensible and not as existing. Being, in its true formality as that which exercises the act of existing, simply cannot be directly known by the Platonic man. Such a man could try to establish the fact of being, but he would be compelled to start without it. Such is the plight of any critical philosopher. The Thomistic notion of man, borrowed, of course, from Aristotle, allows for a direct knowledge of being. Man is *one* entity, composed of part-principles, body and soul; his cognitive acts are neither of body alone nor soul alone; they are *his*. By his senses he contacts the actually existing sensible thing and by his intellect in this one sensory-intellectual experience he contacts the existence of the existing thing. In this way he is directly cognizant of the first principle of both knowledge and reality, namely, being itself. Accordingly he begins to philosophize with the evidence of being. He knows, to begin with, that being is; and he need not try the impossible task of establishing this on the basis of something prior to it. This non-critical position, which for Wilhelmsen is the only reasonable position and the position he ascribes to St. Thomas, is called "metaphysical realism." It is a position offering no answer to the "critical problem" precisely because it denies that there is a "critical problem." And this denial is based on the incontrovertible evidence of experience. What I know when I know things are these things existing apart from and other than my knowing of them. The fact that when I know them I know that I know them does not detract from the fact that the primary data directly revealed in my knowledge of existing things are these existing things. One may deny that this is *his* experience and assume a sophisticated position which involves the critical approach. But one need not; as a Thomist one cannot; in fact, as a philosopher destined sometime to penetrate the mysteries of being, one cannot; for originally to cut oneself off from the evidence of being is to preclude the possibility, no matter how ingenious the critique attempted, ever of reaching being in its true formality as that which is. Wilhelmsen completes Part I of the book with two interesting but, as far as their conclusions are concerned, rather ordinary chapters. In the first of these he establishes the fact that "being" signifies either as a verb or a participle and not as a noun; in the second he establishes the point that neither the subject nor the predicate, but rather the verb "to be," expresses the existence attained in judgment.

Since simple apprehension bears only on essence while judgment bears as well on the act of existing, and since reasoning is only for the sake of judgment, Wilhelmssen insists upon the primacy of judgment in an adequate epistemology. Accordingly, in Part II of his book, where he attempts to link the metaphysics of knowledge with the psychology of knowledge, the concentration is heavily upon that instance of knowledge which is the judgment. However, before getting into the question of the judgment there are two chapters devoted to knowledge considered generally, the one to its metaphysics, the other to its psychology. In what he refers to as an introduction to the metaphysics of knowledge Wilhelmssen begins by exposing the "copy theory" of knowledge, which would explain knowledge in terms of some picture in the mind of the knower of the thing known. Pointing out the impossibility ever of knowing being if such a theory concerning knowledge is the fact, he warns against any misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the Thomistic theory as though it were but a variation of the "copy theory." This leads quite naturally into the highly metaphysical consideration of intentional being. In turn Wilhelmssen points out that knowledge is an extension of the knower; that the principle of knowability is immateriality; that the union between knower and known is a non-physical union; that in knowledge the known is re-presented to the knower (but not that knowledge is a representative of the known) in such fashion that it not only is (*esse*) in the first existence it has as a thing independent of knowledge but that it is present to (*esse-ad*) the knower in a second existence as an object of knowledge; and finally that knowledge is a pure sign, a formal sign, signifying the known to the knower without itself enjoying the status of being any thing. Wilhelmssen treats the psychology of knowledge as a review, briefly sketching the moments of ideogenesis through the operations of external and internal senses, agent intellect, and possible intellect. Stress is placed upon the fact that the species which informs the possible intellect after being abstracted from the phantasm through the light of the agent intellect comes ultimately from the thing in the real and is a "formal and existential 'prolongation' of the form and being of the thing." The phantasm, which is to play a highly significant role in Wilhelmssen's explanation of judgment, is described as a "highly refined sensorial image which is the expression of the whole sensorial-perceptive process."

Chapters 10, 11, 12, and 13 are the crucial chapters of the book. Here Wilhelmssen gets to the heart of epistemology, the theory of judgment. In turn he discusses the structure and meaning of judgment, the process of judgment, truth, and finally assent to truth and the *verbum*. Wilhelmssen does not speak of judgment simply as the second operation of the intellect, for he views it rather as a complex act involving both sense and intellect. Existence is found only in concrete singular existents; hence any knowledge

cut off from concrete singular things cannot bear on existence; but judgment bears on existence and so also on concrete singular things. The human intellect cannot by itself contact the concrete singular thing, since the matter which makes it singular also makes it unintelligible; the intellect by itself can know only universal essences or the natures of individual things cut away from the individuation which is the condition for actual existence. A man judges by reflecting to the individual thing as represented in the phantasm produced through the action of thing upon the senses. He judges by thinking a nature (known in simple apprehension) as *be-ing* the nature of a subject presented in a phantasm. Wilhelmsen admits the traditional subject-predicate composition of the proposition. But he denies the classical explanation of this composition which explains subject and predicate as distinct objects of apprehension (i.e., two as meanings) known as identical in subject (i.e., one in existence). He argues both from his own experience in judging and from reason that the only intelligibility the subject can have in the proposition is the meaning which is the predicate. Arguing (with seeming support from the texts of St. Thomas) that the intellect can be informed by but one species at a time and that the predicate is form of the subject, Wilhelmsen concludes to the impossibility of any meaning for the subject beyond the meaning given it by the predicate in any given proposition; and this, he says, is verified by his own experience. The subject is but "the finger of the intellect" pointing to something about which the predicate, "the voice of the intellect," says something. He admits, of course, that the man who judges may know more about the subject than expressed in the predicate. But he denies that this knowledge can be consciously articulated at the moment of judgment. He places it on the level of the Freudian pre-conscious, ascribing to the phantasm the task not only of presenting to the intellect the form which specifies the predicate in a given proposition but the mysterious task of symbolically representing the whole latent field of meanings which have been and might in future propositions be said of the thing which is the subject. In judging, then, one thinks a subject presented in a phantasm, which symbolizes a host of pre-conscious meanings belonging to that subject, to exist as formed by a predicate expressing a determinate mode of being, itself originally grasped by abstraction from this phantasm. But this is not the complete explanation of judgment. When we judge we not only know the existential information of subject by predicate, but we know that we know this. If the proposition which expresses this existential information measures up to reality then it is true. The final step in judging comes in the active commitment of the mind upon sufficient evidence to the truth of the proposition it forms. This is the judgment most strictly considered: the act of assent precisely to the truth of the proposition formed. In the act of assent the mind says the truth, and this interior

and spiritual expression of the truth is the word of the mind or the *verbum*; this is the truth consciously expressed. The complete act of judging, then, involves apprehension of an essence or mode of being abstracted from existing individuals; reflection back to the phantasm and thence to an existing subject; the composition is a proposition of this essence as a form of this existing subject; insight into the conformity of this proposition with reality; finally, commitment to the truth of this proposition in an interior act of assent to it.

These chapters on the epistemology of judgment, which in the opinion of the author are the very heart of this work, take up better than a third of the length of the book. They are followed by a final chapter in Part II of the book. This chapter is an uncommonly clear exposition of what for the most part is the common scholastic doctrine on certitude and its types, as well as opinion and error. The most significant contribution of the chapter is the effort made to explain the causality of error. A judgment is explained as true because it terminates in something which is not only a term of a relation but a subject of existence, while a judgment is explained as false when it terminates in something which is only the term of a relation.

Part III of *Man's Knowledge of Reality* includes but one chapter, "An Introduction to Epistemology of Speculative Science." Although the author excuses himself in the Preface for the brevity of the third part of his book it remains nevertheless a severe disappointment. Agree or disagree with Wilhelmson in the first two parts of his work, nevertheless it is impossible not to admire the intensity with which he goes about his task of disposing of the "critical problem" and of probing the depths of the judgment. But in this final part there is a minimum of philosophical penetration and the obscurity which invariably follows upon excessive brevity. Some information is given, but the value of this is lessened by a questionable ordering of these points of information. The reviewer is tempted to suspect that somehow editorial surgery helped shape this part of the book into the form in which it was published. It bears unmistakable signs of a "cut and paste" operation of rather major proportions when compared with its much more imposing and penetrating predecessors. The points made in the final chapter, in the order in which they are made, are simply these: that knowledges are many; that they are distinguished into the practical and the speculative by way of a distinction in ends; that they can be distinguished according to diverse material objects; that they can be distinguished by way of diverse formal objects; that differences in method can distinguish them one from another; that as habits of the intellect they are distinguished by the mind of man; that "science" has acquired a new meaning in the modern world; that "science" in the traditional sense is knowledge through causes; that sciences differ according as their relations

to matter differ; that on the basis of a distinction in scientific objects in relation to matter there are three distinct types of intellectual acts corresponding to three different types of science, namely the abstraction of a whole which is proper to the sciences of nature, the abstraction of a form proper to mathematics, and separation or negative judgment proper to metaphysics. It is interesting to note that Wilhelmsen takes pains to reject the traditional teaching of the three degrees of formal abstraction as differentiating the speculative sciences after allowing almost anything else as a legitimate principle of scientific differentiation.

Man's Knowledge of Reality represents a serious effort to satisfy the need for an adequate textbook in epistemology for English-speaking students. Its basic plan is sound. While denying that there is a "critical problem" one cannot in the face of the history of modern philosophy simply ignore the question. Recognizing this Wilhelmsen wisely begins his book by explaining the "critical problem" and by substantiating his rejection of it. After having taken care of this Wilhelmsen is prepared to enter into the epistemological investigation of knowledge. Here, as always, the proper order is from the more general to the more particular; and Wilhelmsen observes this order by treating first of knowledge in general and then of the division of knowledge into its types. His explanation and rejection of the "critical problem" is one of the strong points in the book. Granted he owes much to Gilson for the ideas expressed in the first part of the book, nevertheless, the expression of these ideas is his own; and, for the most part, it constitutes an effective exposition well calculated to get the thoughtful student safely past the Cartesian obstacle to fruitful philosophy. Another strong point in the book is Wilhelmsen's treatment of the "copy theory" of knowledge. Not only does he describe the position of the "copyists" well, effectively illustrating its futility and showing how unnecessary it is as an attempt to explain knowledge, but he very cleverly indicates the manner in which an unsuspecting common-sense realist might rather easily be reduced to an idealistic position by a dialectically skilled idealist. It has been the experience of this reviewer that many students are to a greater or lesser extent in fact victims of an intellectual seduction which turns them from a native realism to a sophisticated idealism. Wilhelmsen has done a service in indicating how easily the unwary can be trapped by the tempting thesis of the idealists, for here, as elsewhere, to be forewarned is to be forearmed. The decision to center the epistemology of knowledge in general around the judgment is a happy one. There is no doubt but that judgment has a primacy over both apprehension and reasoning. The stress on the importance of the phantasm in knowledge and especially in judgment is also to be commended. To divorce the operation of the intellect from the phantasm and the operations of the senses producing the phantasm is to introduce a split in man not warranted by the criterion of our experi-

ence. In stressing the intimate connection between the sensory and the intellectual in man Wilhelmsen has carefully avoided the psychological absurdity of speaking of faculties as though they themselves were agents acting. We all know, but unfortunately frequently speak and even teach as though we did not know, that the sense does not sense nor does the intellect understand but *man* knows by way of sense and intellect.

There are a number of difficulties which arise throughout the text, and which, to this reviewer at least, considerably lessen the value of the book. I shall discuss but three. The first of these is found in Part I of the book, and this one, though somewhat disturbing, is hardly sufficient to vitiate an otherwise excellent treatment of the "critical problem." Wilhelmsen proposes that for a Platonist the evidence of being would be lacking. What he means, it seems to me, is that if we were as Plato says we are we would not have the experience of being we do have. It is not because we are Thomists that we have the experience of being which grounds our epistemology, but rather it is because we are as Thomists say we are that this is true. It is the primary experience of being achieved in our sensory-intellectual experience of sensible existents which grounds us epistemologically—not our philosophical explanation for this experience. If this latter were true we would be reduced to a critical position, and one which, as for all critical positions, we could never defend. On what would I ground my philosophy of man if my philosophy of man were necessary as founding the integrity of my knowledge? Wilhelmsen has not intended to make the philosophy of man the starting point, but there is some danger that the student will mistake his point because of the manner in which he introduces the question of Platonic psychology.

The second difficulty is far more serious and cannot be explained away on the basis of any factors simply semantic. Wilhelmsen's theory of the judgment, which is the central thesis of his book, involves as an indispensable part of it the teaching that only the predicate of a proposition is directly a bearer of meaning. The subject, though presented in a phantasm which may symbolically signify a great number of latent meanings hidden in the pre-conscious, has no conscious meaning in a proposition save that of the predicate said to inform it. Wilhelmsen argues to this from his own experience in judging and from the texts of St. Thomas where St. Thomas says that only one species at a time can inform the intellect and where he makes the point that the predicate is related to the subject as form to matter. It might seem that one cannot take issue with Wilhelmsen's own experience. However, Wilhelmsen himself would certainly be willing to admit that if this is not the experience of others as well as himself the argument from experience does not hold. To this reviewer it seems clear through experience and reason that whenever we are involved with a *per se nota* proposition the meaning of both subject and predicate must be con-

sciously articulated. How else can we see that the predicate is within the definition of the subject or the subject within the definition of the predicate than by knowing the intelligibility of both subject and predicate? Granted that this is not an example of the primary instance of judgment for Wilhelmsen, yet it is a legitimate instance of judgment and a legitimate proposition; and there is no indication in Wilhelmsen that his thesis on the strictly symbolic intelligibility of the subject does not apply to all judgments and all propositions. As for the texts of St. Thomas, there is no necessity to interpret them as Wilhelmsen does. Granted that only one species at a time can actually inform the intellect, yet there can be a composition within the unity of the species itself. Things two as objects of thought can be represented as united in subject in but one species. St. Thomas (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3) tells us that *the man is white* means that "*the man is something having whiteness*" or, in other words, "*man is identical in subject with the being having whiteness.*" Neither of these explanations of the meaning of the proposition would be the equivalent of the meaning Wilhelmsen would be forced to give the proposition, namely, that *this thing* (only pre-consciously grasped as *man*) *exists as white*. Granted too that the predicate is form of the subject, there is no need to push the analogy of matter and form too far. Prime matter receives the whole of its determination from substantial form, but second matter is determinate in the order of substance while determinable in the order of accidents. So also the subject can admit of a determination of its own while allowing for further determination from its predicate. If Wilhelmsen's doctrine on the proposition were authentically Thomistic we would be struck with a Thomistic epistemology itself destructive of Thomistic logic. Suppose that no subject of a proposition had a meaning save the meaning of its predicate. What would happen to syllogistic procedure? The first principle of categorical syllogism, namely, the principle of "triple identity," would be meaningless in the face of a syllogism built of propositions whose subjects had no meaning of their own. A third figure syllogism would not only involve only two terms, but the missing term would be the very middle itself. There is no room for a middle term which is but a "finger of the intellect" in the traditional logic to which St. Thomas subscribes unequivocally. If syllogism itself is impossible, *a fortiori* there can be no demonstration. But suppose it were argued that I have not established the impossibility of syllogism in Wilhelmsen's scheme of things. Then surely I could establish the impossibility of demonstration as St. Thomas explains it. According to St. Thomas the major premise of a strict *propter quid* demonstration is in the fourth mode of perseity, the minor in the first, and the conclusion in the second. To demonstrate involves a reflexive appreciation of these modes of perseity, and no one of them can be known save that both subject and predicate be recognized for the meaning each

in its own right is. The evidence seems clear: If Wilhelmsen is right in his theory of judgment, St. Thomas is in error in his theory of syllogism and demonstration.

The third difficulty I would like to point out occurs in the third part of the book. I have already indicated dissatisfaction with this section of the book. Here I would like to indicate one of my reasons for questioning its worth. Having determined to speak only of speculative science Wilhelmsen proceeds to discuss its division into types. His first division by way of material object is highly questionable. This is at best an accidental principle of division, a point not made by Wilhelmsen who leaves open the possibility that this division has as much significance as that by way of formal object. The divisions which follow are presented in hap-hazard order. No attempt is made to indicate that division by way of formal object, by way of relation to matter, and by way of scientific distinction are ultimately reduced to the same thing. In fact these are separated from one another by divisions quite unrelated to them. All in all the treatment is exceedingly confused and calculated to mislead the student. It is clear that this section of the book should either have been omitted entirely or reordered and expanded before publication.

After he has suggested multiple principles of division for speculative science and announced that the "ways in which the cake of intelligibility can be cut are potentially infinite" it is disconcerting to find Wilhelmsen reject the traditional doctrine of three degrees of formal abstraction as inadequate to the task of dividing speculative science. His reasons are four in number: (1) "St. Thomas *never* speaks of three degrees of formal abstraction." (2) "For St. Thomas the abstraction of a *form* is proper to mathematical science." (3) "St. Thomas' *triplex distinctio* . . . is not an adequate principle for distinguishing one specific science from another if these sciences exist on the same level of scientific necessity." (4) "The traditional 'three degrees of abstraction' are utterly unable to place St. Thomas' philosophy of man within the hierarchy of science." None of these reasons is sufficient to demand the rejection of the traditional doctrine of the degrees of formal abstraction. As for the first, St. Thomas does speak of three degrees of abstraction or remotion from matter as constituting the formal objects proper to the three genera of speculative science (*In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 1, c., *In De Sensu et Sensato*, 1, n. 1; *In VI Met.*, 1, nn. 1155-1165; *In I Post. Anal.*, 41, nn. 361-371; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2; *In I Phys.*, 1, nn. 1 & 2; *In Met.*, prooem.). As for the second, it is clear from the explanation of Cajetan's *abstractio formalis* and *abstractio totalis* that these are not the equivalent at all of St. Thomas' *abstractio formae* and *abstractio totius*. Hence there is no reason for scandal because St. Thomas limits his *abstractio formae* to mathematics while Cajetan would refer to physical, mathematical, and metaphysical abstrac-

tion each as instances of *abstractio formalis*. Wilhelmssen points out that the "sciences of nature use the abstraction of a total essence (that is a complete essence: matter and form)" but seems unaware that this complete nature can itself be considered as a form (*In II Phys.*, 5, n. 179: "Natura igitur speciei constituta ex forma et materia communi, se habet ut formalis respectu individui quod participat totam naturam") so that what is an *abstractio totius* from one point of view is itself an *abstractio formae* from another. To say, as Wilhelmssen does at this juncture, that *separatio* is an abstraction only metaphorically is gratuitous and cannot be established. St. Thomas speaks of it as an abstraction in the very article Wilhelmssen would suggest in defense of his point (*In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 3, c.; cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2). The difference between *abstractio* (as said even of *separatio*) and *abstractio proprie* (which is not said of *separatio*) is the difference between the general and the particular, not the metaphorical and the proper. The third criticism, which seems (curiously, for Wilhelmssen) to link Cajetan's "three degrees of abstraction" with St. Thomas' "three intellectual distinctions," is based upon the fact that neither can explain the specific diversity of sciences within a given genus. This may perhaps be so, though this is not as settled an issue as Wilhelmssen seems to indicate, but even so this does not rule out the three degrees of abstraction as a legitimate principle of generic differentiation for the speculative sciences. Wilhelmssen's final reason for rejecting the three degrees of abstraction supposes an essential unity for St. Thomas' philosophy of man. To my knowledge no such unity has yet been established, and hence, the objection stands as questionable. With none of his reasons adequate to the rejection of the doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction one is tempted to suggest that such a rejection is highly questionable.

An evaluation of *Man's Knowledge of Reality* apart from its content, strictly taken, suggests a list of commendations on one side and a list of criticisms on the other. The typography is excellent. There is a detailed table of contents, plus an excellent marginal outline. Each chapter includes suggested readings in St. Thomas and a brief bibliography of secondary sources in addition to a generous scattering of helpful footnotes. The author has added a general bibliography, an index of names, and an index of subjects at the end of the book. The book is extremely well written. The author has literary abilities far beyond those of most philosopher-writers. Even in this difficult region of epistemology Wilhelmssen is, with rare exceptions, uncommonly clear and, with no exceptions, exceedingly interesting. From this point of view, certainly, the book is a welcome treat.

Though the bibliographical suggestions are helpful it seems to this reviewer that those from St. Thomas are frequently insufficient to the task of substantiating the argument of the chapter and that the secondary references are extremely one-sided, representing for the most part what

might loosely be referred to as the "Toronto school." The documentation, though impressive at first glance, is extremely sloppy. There is no set pattern for bibliographical references, and, what is worse, these are not always accurate. For example, Father Gerard Smith, S.J. is sometimes referred to as Gerald Smith, sometimes as Gerald Smith, S.J., sometimes as Gerard Smith, J.S., and sometimes, apparently *per accidens*, as Gerard Smith, S.J. In one bibliography (pp. 203 & 204) an article by Father Geiger is indicated as being in the wrong volume of the wrong year on the wrong pages of a journal not accurately named; an article by Father LeRoy is given an inaccurate title and situated erroneously as far as page numbers are concerned; neither Father Geiger nor Father LeRoy is listed as a Dominican, while Father Henle and Father Klubertanz are listed as Jesuits and Father Regis as a Dominican (Fathers Maurer, Owens, and Robert suffer the same privation as Fathers Geiger and LeRoy as far as religious designation is concerned); for all journals cited save one the volume number is given, with this one designated rather by month; finally for some of the authors full names and middle initials are given, for others no middle initials, for others only initials (while elsewhere in the book several of these same authors are designated differently than in this bibliography). All in all the documentation is disappointingly sloppy, and, while this may not seriously bother the ordinary undergraduate, it is sure to prove a stumbling block to the advanced student who will approach the book as an effort in scholarship.

While there are parts of the book which are commendable and other parts which are questionable I would like to suggest, as a final point, that one might question not only some of what Wilhelmsen has included in the book but also what has been left out. True enough, he has promised in his Preface no more than an essay towards a Thomistic epistemology. Yet the book is presented by the publisher as a textbook for a course in epistemology. As such it seems to lack context-wise much of what ought to go into even a one-semester course in epistemology. No one teacher of epistemology would dare impose his syllabus on another. Yet it seems reasonable to expect that a course in epistemology will cover knowledge in general as well as the division of knowledge into its most significant types, with a reflexive investigation into the nature of these types and the methodologies proper to them and finally into the interrelationships between them. A course so conceived and executed would serve not only the end of epistemology itself as the speculative science of knowledge but would serve the well-being of all the sciences and, for the advanced college student, would serve as a true principle of integration shedding light and meaning upon the totality of his college program. For such a course *Man's Knowledge of Reality* by itself is hardly an adequate textbook.

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Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. By BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, S.J. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. 815. \$10.00.

Leo XIII found scholastic philosophy in a sorry state. He called for a reconstruction in which the best of old scholasticism would be restored and completed by new thought. His motto for reconstruction implies that he recognized philosophy as a dynamic process; Leo did not confuse the love of wisdom with its attainment.

The Leonine reconstruction has not proceeded rapidly and smoothly. Still, scholastic philosophy has neither stood still nor regressed. Historical studies have helped us to understand Aquinas and other scholastic doctors. For the interpretation of the medievals, we now demand textual studies made according to precise methods; we have thrown off the burden of the commentaries and the *ad mentem* summaries.

Moreover, some excellent analytic studies concerned with particular points of doctrine have been made. Many of these studies, it is true, have been ambivalent with respect to philosophic verification, sometimes using authority and slipping unconsciously into a traditionalism on philosophic issues. Still the monographic studies have made us aware of philosophic problems and we have developed some sophistication in thinking about them.

There are some who see no need for any work besides the historical and analytical studies to carry on the Leonine reconstruction. Yet to others it seems we must still advance in two ways. First, we must face the philosophic issues as they are now presented. We must talk about what our non-scholastic colleagues are talking about and we must make ourselves intelligible to them. Second, we must present philosophic syntheses which can stand independently of any allusions to medieval texts or citations of authorities.

This preface leads to my general evaluation of *Insight*. This book is genuinely and competently philosophic. It stands independently of any historical positions. It depends only on the readers' own experience and intelligence to validate its conclusions. Its appeal is not to a parochial audience. It is not written in scholastic jargon. It raises issues which are now interesting to non-scholastic philosophers and deals with these issues in a way which should be illuminating to them.

I realize this judgment of the importance of the book is strong. But Lonergan's book is unusual. *Insight* deserves to be read and studied, discussed and criticized. This book, I believe, is the first perfected philosophic product of the Leonine reconstruction. *Insight* might initiate a new era in scholastic philosophy.

Using the act of the intellect as a point of departure, Fr. Lonergan has built a complete philosophic synthesis. We can indicate the content and

the order of the work by using the old titles for the systematic courses, although these labels are not appropriate to this book. Beginning with epistemology, Fr. Lonergan develops the main positions of a scholastic cosmology, ontology, rational psychology, ethics, and natural theology.

In epistemology, Lonergan treats the types and sources of knowledge and error, certitude and degrees of certitude, and the grounding of first principles. He refutes scepticism, relativism, empiricism, and idealism. In cosmology, he treats change and its types and conditions, time and place, matter and form, causality in nature, contingency, and evolution. In ontology, he treats metaphysical composition, substance and accident, essence and existence, the transcendentals, the causes, analogy, distinctions, relations, and individuation. In rational psychology, he treats the cognitive and appetitive processes with special emphasis on the distinction between sense and intellect, the substantial unity of man, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, and freedom of choice. In ethics, he treats the main principles with respect to the end, the moral act, virtue, and law. He also makes interesting points concerning the common good and society. In natural theology, he treats the existence and attributes of God, divine knowledge and love, and creation. He also shows the possibility of miracles, revelation, a supernatural order, and the church. The scholastic will detect treatment of all these topics and will be comforted by the regularity and ease with which the right answers come. From this point of view, the book constitutes a well-integrated course in scholastic philosophy, including the philosophical portions of apologetics.

Yet *Insight* is not a text-book, and the account I have given of its content according to topics hardly suggests the significance of the book. Indeed, it is difficult to convey briefly what Fr. Lonergan has done, since *Insight* is written in a dialectical pattern similar to that of a Platonic dialogue. Thus, while the ostensible subject of the book is insight, the act of the intellect, he manages to treat all the topics mentioned above by making his treatment of insight relevant to an ever-broadening context. Insight thus serves not as the subject of a monograph but as the reference-point for building a philosophy.

The structure of the book may be indicated as follows. By a long and careful development, the author prepares the reader to understand and affirm a group of absolute principles. The implications of these principles are then drawn leading to the range of conclusions mentioned above. The process of drawing implications, however, is not logical but dialectical. "What must be granted if the principles are granted in order to maintain the principles solidly, consistently, and unambiguously?" is the question which guides the construction.

The book has two parts. In chapters I-X, the reader is brought to understand understanding as distinct from experience. In chapters XI-XX, the

reader is brought first to affirm his own existence as an intelligent knower and then to accept the developed position as an implication of his self-affirmation.

The first part can be divided into four parts. In chapters I-V, the author works from illustrative instances of understanding in mathematics and natural science to develop an understanding of the nature of understanding, different modes of understanding, and the conditions which are required for the occurrence of understanding. In chapters VI-VII, he analyzes the non-explanatory function of intelligence in common-sense knowledge, clarifying the limitations and imperfections of such knowledge. In chapter VIII, he considers substance and substantial unity, basing his treatise on the character of explanatory as distinct from common-sense knowledge. Finally, in chapters IX-X, he clarifies the notion of judgment as distinct from and added to mere apprehension.

The second part of the book also can be divided into four parts. In chapters XI-XIII the author elicits from the reader an act of self-affirmation as an intelligent knower, and then explicates this act as a knowledge of being objectively real. In chapters XIV-XVII, using the notions of being and objectivity and the structure discovered in the knowledge process, the author builds an ontology of the structure of beings and of the concrete universe. He also presents a defense against any alternative metaphysics by showing how his position can interpret and place any other position. In chapter XVIII he develops the principles of ethics by extending the metaphysical structure to cover the reality of moral obligation as well as of actual existence. Finally, in chapters XIX-XX, working from the ideas of being and cause and any affirmation of existence, he proves the existence of God and treats the problem of evil.

This summary indicates the general structure and content of the work. I will now indicate the method of *Insight* by pointing out Fr. Lonergan's functioning principles. The principles he uses in developing the argument, not the ones he talks about, are three: the desire to know, the isomorphism of the structure of knowledge with the structure of what is known, and reflexivity.

Man's desire to know is taken to be unconditioned and unrestricted. The satisfaction of this desire is considered to be an absolute value. Thus the desire to know serves as a term to which all knowledge is related and thereby unified. This desire also serves as a norm for judging acts of knowledge motivated by other desires. The desire to know is the means of transcending experience. Further, using this principle the author can blend speculative and practical considerations throughout the book. This blending is not confusing the two but uniting them by their joint origin in intellectual appetite. Beginning in chapters six and seven on common-sense knowledge, the author leads the reader to view rationality as a practical norm. Fr.

Lonergan can then treat error as malicious interference with the dominion of reason and cultural decline as the result of such viciousness. The starting point of apologetics is then the need for something to counteract the kingdom of darkness. The desire to know is the ultimate value-source of the adverse judgments which the author makes concerning other positions.

The second principle, the isomorphism of the structure of knowledge with the structure of what is known, permits him to infer a metaphysics from one's self-affirmation, once that act has been explained so that it involves the acceptance of his theory of knowledge and objectivity. For example, the distinctions between experience, understanding, and affirmation ground the distinctions between matter, form, and existence. Using this principle, Fr. Lonergan begins from instances of insight, proceeds to an articulation of the process of knowledge, and then infers the general structure of whatever can be known, that is, of being. The content of the instances becomes insignificant in this procedure, and the metaphysical structure which is inferred can be posited independently of any special scientific theories. For metaphysics works from the structure immanent in knowledge as a process, using the processes of direct knowledge as data. Special sciences base themselves on empirical data and so must operate within metaphysical structure, although they are not determined by that structure within their own domains. The result is that all sciences are incorporated into a single systematic world-view, the multiplicity of ways of knowing with all their richness being maintained within the general framework.

Reflexivity, the third principle used by the author, is difficult to explain. An example of the use of this principle in a classical text is Aristotle's defense of the principle of contradiction. That defense depends on the impossibility of communicating and therefore the impossibility of denying the principle if it is not accepted. Fr. Lonergan proceeds in a similar way, not with respect to the principle of contradiction but with respect to the structure of cognitive process as he has elucidated it. He maintains that his account is not subject to revision since any attempt to revise it would have to proceed according to the same process. Just as in Aristotle dynamic contrariety lies behind the principle of contradiction, so in Lonergan dynamic cognitive process lies behind the known structure of cognitive process.

Reflexivity not only functions negatively, as a means of pointing out that the adversary is refuting himself out of his own mouth, but it also functions positively as a norm for construction. What one says in building his own position must be in accord with what one holds it possible to say on that position. On the other hand, to beg the question is a fallacy. Fr. Lonergan tries to be careful to meet the demands of reflexivity himself. He maintains that his conclusions are independent from the instances he uses, but not

from all instances. He also maintains that his conclusions can be reached without following his method, but not as clearly, completely, and effectively.

Criticisms of *Insight* can be made from the point of view of rhetoric. The book would benefit from less explicitness and repetition and from many more self-references. Some of the sentences could be broken down. Occasionally the terminology is unnecessarily obscure, a glossary might be helpful. The index seems accurate but I did not find it helpful. Of course, the usefulness of an index varies with different readers. All in all, as philosophical writing goes, *Insight* is a well-written book. Had Kant written as well, he would be more popular and better understood than he is.

In *Insight* interpretations of many other philosophical writings are offered: The book is not intended to be a history. Historical allusions are used to clarify the position presented and to furnish grist for the dialectical mill, not to bolster the argument itself. Fr. Lonergan's use of history is like Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors. Many questions might be raised concerning the historical accuracy and adequacy of the author's statements concerning other philosophical positions. We restrict our questions here to the single problem of whether the philosophy presented in *Insight* is in agreement with the philosophy of Aquinas.

Lonergan thinks his philosophy agrees with that of Aquinas. He recognizes that he has augmented the old with something new, developing a novel method, but he does not admit that he diverges substantially. In raising questions about this problem I do not presume that I solve it. To decide whether *Insight* conflicts with Aquinas' philosophy is a task for a very careful historical investigation.

Two things should be kept in mind. First, Fr. Lonergan may not agree with Aquinas. Second, if he doesn't he could be philosophically adequate anyway.

The author has published two series of articles in *Theological Studies*, the last of which appeared in 1949. These articles were professed interpretations of Aquinas' writings. Fr. Lonergan wished to keep his history and his philosophy distinct. A fair method of attacking him on historical grounds, then, would be to attack the interpretation presented in the articles, using the development in *Insight* to clarify the intended interpretation.

In this type of criticism, the following questions might fairly be asked of him. Is it not the case that a philosophy is constituted of method and arguments, not merely of conclusions? Do not conclusions have their meaning from the philosophic means used reach them? Is not the use of insight as a reference-point for unifying what is understood and the use of the desire to know as a universal reference-point a method diverse from that which Aquinas employed? Can isomorphism be reconciled with Aquinas' principle that the mode of understanding is not the mode of

being? Aquinas constantly used this principle against Plato. Does the relationship which Fr. Lonergan posits between possibility, probability, and actuality accord with Aquinas' doctrine of being? Does Fr. Lonergan's doctrine of abstraction as an addition to the data accord with Aquinas' distinction between the potentially and the actually intelligible? If not, the doctrine of conception, definition, categories, form, and essence is also diverse. Does Fr. Lonergan's doctrine of judgment as the reflective grasp of the fulfillment of the conditions sufficient for fact accord with Aquinas' distinction between categorical and hypothetical propositions? If not, the doctrine of reflection, verification, modes of predication and analogy, and existence and action is also diverse. Does Fr. Lonergan's doctrine of science as the understanding and affirmation of correlations of data accord with Aquinas' distinction between understanding and reason? If not, the doctrine of inquiry and proof, the nature and division of sciences, intellectual principles and methods, and causal determination and order is also diverse. Do not the priority of intelligence to existence, the priority of self-affirmation to knowledge of the other, and the priority of dialectic to demonstration which Fr. Lonergan posits constitute a complete reversal of Aquinas' philosophy?

Apart from the historical accuracy of the author's identification of his philosophy with Aquinas', one can examine and criticize *Insight* as an expressed philosophy. I think Fr. Lonergan should face the following questions and I believe he would have serious difficulties with some of them.

How can necessary conclusions follow from contingent principles? Or, are cognitive facts necessary or metaphysical conclusions contingent? If the desire to know is somehow unconditioned, is not desiring to know a mere fact? Does the use of the desire to know as a principle require an equivocation on "unconditioned," i. e., on "necessary?"

How can the principle of the isomorphism of the structure of knowledge with the structure of being be defended from a starting-point within knowledge as distinct from being? If every assertion requires that the fulfillment of the conditions of the fact be grasped, does not the assertion of the principle of isomorphism suppose the grasp of the fulfillment of conditions which is given only outside knowledge, i. e., which is unknowable? To put the question in another way, if it is necessary to go from the structure of knowledge to the structure of being, how can one justify the transit without begging the question? If one accepts the evaluative theory of judgment and the isomorphic principle, is it possible either to distinguish knowledge and being without opening an unbridgeable gap between them or to relate them without identifying them?

How can knowledge be known as to its necessary characteristics independently of knowing the necessity of something which is not knowledge? Fr. Lonergan distinguishes between direct and introspective modes of cogni-

tive process. Does this distinction presuppose that cognitive process is knowable independently of anything being known? If so, there must be a third mode based on the first two, and so on indefinitely. When levels are distinguished in this way they are not of themselves related but must be referred by an extrinsic act. But if there is no infinite regress, must there not be only one mode of cognitive process to which self-awareness is immanent but which is primarily intentional of the non-cognitive? If there is only one mode of cognitional process, is it not impossible without question-begging or paradoxes based on reflexivity to ground a metaphysics on the structure of knowledge?

If things are what they are by being referred to insight, and if the whole philosophy is definite by being referred to the precognitive desire to know, how are relations what they are? If relations are not any "what" in themselves, what is their status? Relations are not things absolutely and they are not insights. If one distinguishes levels of the real to place relations, what about the relations between those levels? If *relata* determine relations and relations determine *relata*, what does it mean to say that insight determines both when insight too can be related? If insight is not related, then are we talking about human knowledge or about God? If we can't keep these distinct, can we keep anything distinct?

This series of philosophic questions might be extended indefinitely, and it would be easy to find many small points to argue, but all the questions I have raised are really concerned with one issue. What that issue is may be suggested by the questions or it may be suggested by a historical allusion. It seems to me that the philosophy which Fr. Lonergan has constructed is closely akin to the position of Plato. Aristotle criticized Plato for separating the forms, and I mean to suggest by my questions the possibility of criticizing Fr. Lonergan in an analogous way. My questions are merely a reformulation of the old criticisms to meet the new formulation of dialectical philosophy.

If *Insight* arouses counter-formulations as ingenious and competent as it is itself, Fr. Lonergan will have done us a considerable service. I believe that happy result may occur. And consequently I attribute that importance to the work which I stressed in the beginning of this review.

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BRIEF NOTICES

The Doctrine of the Trinity. By CYRIL C. RICHARDSON. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. Pp. 159. \$3.00.

The intention of the author of this Protestant study of the doctrine of the Trinity, stated in his Preface, is to give "the leading doctrines of the Trinity as they have developed in the Church's thought, and to raise some basic questions about their validity." The book is an effort to demonstrate that although we must make distinctions in the Godhead, they do not fall into a neat three-fold pattern, and that the traditional symbols of Father, Son and Spirit are ambiguous and even troublesome. The author's contention, which is stated explicitly in the Preface, is that Trinitarian doctrines have confused the real issues by admitting arbitrary distinctions in God, while at the same time attempting to reconcile the necessary contradictions by concealed ones.

In the initial chapter, which explicitly gives the "point of view" of the author, the value of the "threeness" of the Trinity is questioned on the basis that there is an artificiality about it which breeds confusion. That the author's position is Unitarian is expressly denied, however; for it is not the paradoxical character of the traditional doctrine to which he objects, but rather the threefoldness. He regards it as undeniable, moreover, that God revealed Himself in terms of a "human person" i.e. Jesus of Nazareth. The doctrine is not found specifically in the New Testament; rather, it is a creation of the fourth century Church. If the reader should be inclined to defend the existence of the teaching in the New Testament, it would matter little, for it is claimed that the background of thought from which the New Testament symbols were derived left something to be desired, and that we should seek more satisfactory ways of expressing the "message."

In the second chapter the author claims that it is generally assumed that the major problem is "the way in which God can be one person and yet three." He does not clarify by whom this is generally assumed. In Mr. Richardson's view, however, the fundamental issue is the difference between the Father and the Son, the essence of which distinction is between God's beyondness (Father) and relatedness (Son). The nature of the symbolism clouds this distinction, however. Whereas "Father" gradually came to denote God in His absolute, transcendent glory, yet the title never could be emptied of its original content; the heavenly Father must be related to his children. The name "Father" poses an additional difficulty,

in that it implies begetting, or derivation of one mode of being (God as related) from another mode of being (God as absolute). Why assume any priority? the author asks. Many other problems are said to evolve from this symbolism; e.g., the Father is thought of as Creator, but this seems more fittingly applicable to the Son, who is God in His activity.

That the New Testament presents us with the dominant symbols of Father, Son, and Spirit is asserted in the third chapter. From what has been said it is obvious that this does not mean that there is a Trinitarian doctrine in Scripture, although the existence of these symbols gave rise to the creation of the doctrine which came later. The blending of Jewish and Greek thinking in the New Testament is seen as a source of difficulty, for, the writer claims, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the Hebrew notion of the Father and the idea of an abstract God who operates by His reason or Logos. Another troublesome idea traceable to Greek thinking is "the fecundity of the absolute" which leads, in Richardson's opinion, to the idea of priority in the Godhead. After the treatment of the New Testament doctrine of the Father, the idea of the Son is considered. Briefly, the thesis offered is that there is an evolution of the notion of the sonship of Jesus in the New Testament. Whereas, Richardson claims, in the Synoptics it means dependence of the man upon his heavenly Father, in St. John's Gospel a truly divine status is given to Jesus Christ. Since the word "Son" was retained, however, it came to refer to a distinction in the Godhead itself, and the term has remained "to plague Trinitarian thinking." The symbolism of the Spirit is said to pose special difficulties, for although the distinction between the Logos and Spirit is admittedly retained throughout the New Testament, they are, Richardson maintains, logically identical.

The "Trinity of mediation," which makes the basic distinction between the Father and the Son one of mediation, is discussed in the fourth chapter. Attributed to Tertullian, this doctrine views the Father as the God of the philosophers, the Son as the One Who is encountered. The trouble with this doctrine, as Richardson sees it, is that the first term of the Trinity seems to be more really God than the second. It assumes that the Absolute can beget the mediator, but this, the author thinks, seems to imply inferiority in the One begotten. The assumption that there is derivation in the Trinity is seen as an unwarranted and vain attempt to compose an essential paradox. As for the Spirit: the role of the "third term" seems ambiguous and irrelevant in the "Trinity of mediation."

More oriented to the Scriptures in the author's opinion is the doctrine of the "Trinity of love," which is discussed in chapter five. Almost identified as the Roman Catholic Trinitarian doctrine, this is expressed somewhat as follows: Because God is love, He must have an object of love, and because He is self-sufficient He must have an object of love

different from creatures. Hence the distinction between Father and Son. But, Richardson argues, the "modes of being in the Godhead" (his term for the distinctions in God) are such that they cannot love each other.

The place of the Spirit in the Trinity is taken up in the sixth chapter. By such early writers as Athenagoras, the Spirit was often considered as a uniting bond between Father and Son, and this Richardson views as an attempt to compose the original paradox. St. Augustine is said to have developed this notion of Spirit as bond of union, and the modern Protestant student of Augustinianism, Karl Barth, quite decisively distinguishes the Son and the Spirit. The contrast Barth makes between these seems to be rooted in a distinction between God's revelation as objectively presented to us and as apprehended by us. Richardson argues, however, that the object-subject distinction stressed by Barth does not necessitate another distinction in the Godhead. His conclusion, anticipated in his earlier treatment of the Father and the Son, is that the Logos and the Spirit are really identical.

That the practical man of faith has always tended to think of God as one Person manifesting Himself in a diversity of ways is contended in the next chapter, which deals with the "Trinity of revelation." Indeed, the Apostle's Creed was so formulated that one could view the matter in this uncomplicated way and still recite it sincerely. But whether such popular piety opened the way to Sabellianism or not, Richardson maintains that Sabellius failed to make an adequate distinction in the Godhead, and to understand the necessity for paradox in God. Even the recent attempts of the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher to "rehabilitate" Sabellius seem to the author to miss the essential problem, which is not concerned with the manner in which God is revealed, but with the paradoxical fact that along with God's revealed (related) nature, there is His beyondness. The recent attempt of Claude Welch in the survey, *In His Name*, to reconstruct a Trinity on the basis of revelation is also rejected here, for the same reason.

The last pattern of trinitarian theology discussed, which is treated of in chapter eight, is the "Trinity of God's activity." This is based, not upon the different modes of revelation, but upon the different elements in each of God's activities. This notion is attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, and is claimed to have been recently revived by Dorothy Sayers, in *The Mind of the Maker*. Besides his not unexpected objection that this treatment leaves out of account the absoluteness and beyondness of the Godhead, Richardson's argument is that such a Trinity is arbitrary, since we could, if we wished, detect innumerable aspects of God's activity. Why stop at three?

The final chapter of the book deals with the meaning of the symbols Father, Son, and Spirit. By this time it is abundantly, perhaps redundantly, clear that the author does not find the major Trinitarian patterns satis-

factory. Posing the question of whether any satisfactory Trinitarian doctrine can be reconstructed, he answers in the negative. What then is the value of the Biblical symbols Father, Son, and Spirit? It is replied that although they each express something which it is important for us to affirm, they overlap. They point beyond themselves to antinomies which demand other modes of expression. "Father," it is maintained, points to the transcendence of God, whereas "Son" indicates a relation between the heavenly Father and Jesus of Nazareth, within the terms of the Incarnation, and should not be forced back into the Godhead itself. Spirit refers to God's dynamic action. The three terms, which according to Richardson do not denote precise persons in the Trinity, are "ways of thinking about God from different points of view." They point to the necessity of making distinctions, the most basic of which is that between the absolute and the related character of God. Others follow: He is joy and suffering, rest and motion, solitary and yet in some sense of society, our ground of being and yet a person to be confronted. One thing definitely emerges: there is no necessary threeness in God.

It would be absurdly redundant to belabor the point that the central theses of this book are opposed to the teaching of the Church. It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss this book as having no value for the Catholic reader. It has, of course, the value of exemplifying modern Protestant theological procedure. It gives, moreover, an interesting analysis of the Trinitarian views of such thinkers as Barth, Schleiermacher, Hodgson, and Sayers. Its greatest interest, perhaps, is its attempt to equate the inevitable paradox in the theologian's—or the philosopher's—statements about God with the mystery of the Trinity, which is not of man's making.

That the author confuses the objective data of revelation with the subjective difficulties involved in contemplating the infinite is evidenced in the closing chapter in which it is claimed that the three "terms" are ways of thinking about God from different points of view. Revelation does not seem to be thought of as something given by God to man. Rather, one gets the impression that the doctrine is the result of a sort of reciprocal action, which "reveals" also—perhaps primarily—the mind's frustration in its groping for God.

Certain difficulties present themselves to the reader. In the first chapter, for example, the author speaks of the "orthodox" view of Jesus of Nazareth, who is described as a "human person." One wonders what is meant by "orthodox." Again, in the second chapter, he states that the major Trinitarian problem is "generally assumed" to be how God can be one Person, yet three. By whom is this generally assumed?

One of the most puzzling aspects of the book is the position of its author in regard to Biblical inspiration. In the fourth chapter he complains that the Church inherited the symbols, Father, Son, and Spirit, from

Scripture, and that because of its "rigid view" of Biblical inspiration it was forced to work out its doctrine within their context. That the author's view is decidedly less rigid is indicated in the first chapter, where he claims that the measure of the New Testament writers' inspiration was greater than that of later theologians. It seems that there is only a difference of degree. The Biblical writers, moreover, have only a dubious advantage, for it is claimed that we profit by an advantage denied them, i. e. two thousand years of Christian reflection and experience. Therefore, we are told, we should indeed read them with humility, but we should try to express in more satisfactory ways the message they recorded. In other words, it would seem that although our inspiration is dimmer, we must be brighter. Our two thousand years of Christian experience apparently enable us to do great things, for we should "weigh the value of the New Testament symbolism and assess its adequacy."

It is significant that the author does not make much of the scholastic distinction between person and nature. Despite his disavowal of Sabellius, there is a type of Modalism here. The basic problem for Richardson is rooted in the fact that all thought about God involves paradox, which implies duality in the Godhead. The third mode or term seems superfluous—an undercover attempt at establishing a link between the contradictory modes, at resolving the unresolvable.

The reader might with good reason be suspicious that the real issue with which Richardson is primarily concerned is a problem distinct from, although of course related to, the theology of the Trinity. For him, what the Trinity tries—and fails—to express is the paradox in our knowledge of God; it becomes in fact a sort of three-fold hypostasization of this. Reduced to a human attempt to express the apparent mysterious contradiction at the heart of all man's efforts to know God, the doctrine takes on the aspect of a psychological device. The book seems to overlook the possibility that the Trinity could be more than this, that is, a revelation of God Himself.

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Occult Phenomena (In the Light of Theology). By ALOIS WIESINGER, O. C. S. O. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1957. Pp. 294 with index. \$5.00.

This scholarly work which is well written and excellently translated is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the theology and philosophy of the author's theory of occult phenomena and the second part applies

this theory to the phenomena themselves. This reviewer does not consider himself sufficiently skilled in either theology or philosophy to write a critical review of the first part. I shall content myself, therefore, with a description of the theory in terms as nearly those of the author as possible. It is the author's contention that occult phenomena, such as telepathy, second sight, the production of sounds (raps), and the movement of bodies otherwise than through muscular action, are due to the activity of a part or element of the human soul which he calls spirit-soul, and that insofar as this element is active, the soul is simply behaving after the manner of a pure spirit and showing a pure spirit's characteristics. It is the author's ultimate contention that this mode of action is a vestigial remnant of the preternatural powers with which our first parents were endowed before the Fall. There are, however, according to the author, abnormal states in which the life of the senses has been diminished, or cut out altogether, in which the life of the spiritual part of the soul is greatly intensified. In these it acts increasingly after the manner of a pure spirit, according to the author, and can receive communications from other spirits, such, for instance, as the angels. The fact that, while in this state the soul may still make a limited use of concepts built up on sense perceptions does not alter the fact, again according to the author, that its mode of behavior is radically different from that which it practices in its normal state, and that in this abnormal state it acts wholly after the manner of a pure spirit.

All this makes it desirable, according to the author, that he should examine how actually the human soul is organized, and what is the exact relationship of this purely spiritual element with the other elements within it. Here the author states that he follows Catholic teaching, according to which the soul is a unity with the body and is its form; nevertheless, the soul is not wholly submerged in the body (*non totaliter comprehensa*) but reaches out beyond it. In other words, there is a part of the soul that is, so to speak, not actually wedded to the body. Modern writers, he states, have tended to relegate this part of the soul (if one may thus employ—as of necessity one must—a purely spatial terminology) to the subconscious.

So far we have seen, he then continues, that there are certain powers within the human personality which must be accounted as abnormal, and from time immemorial the duality of our psychic functions has been recognized, so much so that two separate terms, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\piνε\upsilon\mu\alpha$, have been invented to designate these two different aspects of our psychic activity. We are, however, not concerned here, he states, with two separate things but with a single entity, though this entity acts differently according to whether we find ourselves in our normal state or in one of the different kinds of natural and artificial sleep. To some extent the two merge in the subconscious, which both serves to store our sense perceptions and also

records and gives effect to those acts of knowledge and of will which take place otherwise than through the bodily mechanism.

The author then proceeds to prove his theory by stating that, whereas today the spiritual element in the soul can only function fully when the rest of the human personality is put out of action, this was not always so. In our first parents the preternatural endowment was fully present and active without the rest of the personality suffering any impairment. This was true both in regard to (A) the preternatural modes of knowledge and (B) the firmness of the preternatural will.

In the Fall man, the author continues, lost his preternatural gifts (as well as the supernatural) but not his natural powers. Something, however, must obviously remain when these natural powers are destroyed by death or dimmed by sleep, since the spiritual part of the soul still survives, and that something consists of the vestigial remains of the spiritual powers originally enjoyed.

The reviewer feels more competent to evaluate the second part of the book dealing with the practical application of the theory. This second part is a potpourri of naivete, contradictions, outmoded theories especially in psychiatry, interesting case reports, many dating back over 50 years or more, which are so intimately interwoven that any criticism, except that it be sentence by sentence, is almost impossible. This reviewer has no problems in accepting as factual most of the phenomena which are described. Telepathy, clairvoyance, hypnosis and diabolical possession, the phenomena of spiritualism and divination, are recognized as possible by those interested in the field of the occult. This second section makes very interesting reading but is replete with non-sequitur statements and contradictions e. g., on pages 123-124, "Most witches' dreams can be similarly interpreted—those for instance which led the dreamers to declare that they had attended a witches' Sabbath and presumably experienced all the sensual delights that this implied. Such dreams were the remnants and the results of vivid day-time fancies, reinforced by the witches' salve. This last was composed of belladonna and opium and was well calculated to produce hallucinations. Today things are rather different; today our anxious Christendom dreams up visions of the mother of God. Since 1931 no fewer than thirty-one cases involving some three hundred alleged appearances of Mary have been the subject of ecclesiastical examination and the great majority have been completely rejected. From the eastern states there have come since 1945 some two thousand reports of miraculous happenings, prophecies and other forms of solace for displaced persons who have been driven from their homes. People find comfort in these things *as they do in the eidetic phenomena described above.* (Italics mine.) It would therefore appear that Christian morality is today on a somewhat higher level, although the belief in witches is still said to persist in such

places as the Luneburger Heide." Actually I see little resemblance between the witches' sabbath and visions of the Mother of God.

On page 132, speaking of such conditions as kleptomania, pyromania, etc., he states: "The patients are really in a state similar to that of sleep; the actions of the soul are *uncontrolled* and *uncontrollable*." Below on the same page he states: "This last (bodily defects) is admittedly more difficult in the case of such notorious forms of neurosis as neurasthenia, psychasthenia, in which the *actual nerves* are in a diseased condition." These statements in which the italics are mine are not true.

On page 146 he states, with apparent acceptance, the following about fortune tellers: "Let us, however, here note the fact that the cases of which we hear so often where a person is made aware of the death of another, are not to be accounted as telepathy, but as clairvoyance. We may say the same thing of the utterances of fortune-tellers and of persons who predict the future from cards. Such people have much experience in putting themselves into a trance."

On page 235 he states regarding hypnosis: "In this condition (of being hypnotized) it can also establish direct contact with the soul of another, receive that other's thoughts and combine them with the experiences that lie dormant in the subconscious. Proceeding from there, it can excite the actions of the body and influence it to an extraordinary degree. The body then performs involuntary motions, and experiences *irresistible* likes and dislikes, even in its vegetative life, which normally does not stand under the direction of the will. (Italics mine)

"In hypnosis all this is intensified, the sensorium disappears *completely*, the mental connection with the hypnotist becomes *perfect*. Insane persons resist such connection, but nervous and hysterical people enter quite readily into it; in the main *all persons* are capable of being hypnotized, though they generally display some resistance to the first attempt; once they have been hypnotized, however, *they lose this power of resistance*. On this many moralists base their condemnation of hypnotism, insofar as by reason of it men lose their freedom of the will *forever*. This is so great a good that men have no right to part with it, particularly since, once lost, *it can never be wholly recovered*." The italicized statements are exaggerated half-truths which are not held by present-day experts. In fact, on page 240 the author corrects himself to a large extent by stating: "It would appear that even under hypnosis a residue of free will and morality remains, or, to put the matter psychologically, the influence of law and morality, together with the awareness of the will of God, are stronger for the soul, even in its state of extreme suggestibility, than the suggestion of a hypnotist."

On page 241 he speaks of "cures" under hypnosis, a phenomena not recognized by medical specialists. Relief of symptoms is possible, but

this often leads to greater difficulties. On this same page he continues: "Under hypnosis sick people can see inside their own bodies, can declare the position of a foreign body, which can then be removed; also the nature of the necessary medicines can be discerned. One is strongly reminded of those people among the ancients who could diagnose and find the cure for illnesses in dreams. Thus, within certain narrow limits, "medical occultism," if the term is rightly understood, must be recognized as having certain validity. There are indeed great possibilities here for mankind, if the hypnosis can be made deep enough for correct impressions to be obtained under it."

Most of this is too fantastic to comment upon. The above would serve as examples of what I would like to convey. The statements are documented, but it is the uncritical acceptance of the cases of others that this reviewer feels is the great fault of the book. The best section in the second part of the book is that on demoniacal possession.

As interesting reading for the uncritical the book is recommended. For the more critical it is likely to prove quite frustrating and non-informative except, perhaps, in the bibliographical references which are abundant. Only four or five of these are in English publications.

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On the Philosophy of History. By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957. Pp. 180 with index. \$3.50.

There have been few historians who, at one time or another in their study of the record left by man on earth, have not wondered, as did Henri Marrou, "Does the pilgrimage of mankind, triumphant and heart-rending by turns, through the duration of history, have a value, a fecundity, a meaning?" Yet historians, as a class, have almost unanimously rejected a philosophy of history. The closest most of them ever come to a philosophy is the adoption of an hypothesis to explain the trends of history such, for example, as the frontier theory of American history, or the theory that war has been the great factor in human progress.

But an all-embracing philosophy of history, which would answer the question proposed by Henri Marrou, the generality of historians (including Marrou himself) deny. The charges leveled by Marrou against those who have attempted to evolve a philosophy of history would be subscribed to by most historians. And after reading some of the modern efforts to formulate such a philosophy, viz., the efforts of Hegel, Wells and Toynbee, who shall say that the charges are false? Marrou accuses the philosopher

of history of violating four canons of sound historical criticism: an oversimplified, arbitrary and uncritical use of the material; a determination to obtain an *a priori* explanation of the course of history; an ambition to develop an all-inclusive explanation of the meaning of history; a desire to make history conform to laws conceived by the philosopher. In brief, the historian accuses the philosopher of trying to make history; not to study it. And this, of course, is the greatest sin against his art that the historian can commit.

It is not yet a proven fact that there can be such a discipline as a philosophy of history. That is to say, if one uses the term philosophy in the strict sense—"the study of things in their ultimate causes." And the present work does nothing to establish such a proof—if it does anything it strengthens the contrary opinion. The philosopher cannot work on history as he does on the cosmos, the nature of man, the nature and operation of the soul or God as He is known through nature. In the study of all these subjects the philosopher can prescind from Revelation and consider his subject in the light of reason alone. But how is it possible to consider history, which is the record in the world of Divine Providence, by the light of reason alone? Jesus of Nazareth, the central point of all human history, was not simply an historical figure such as Josephus tries to portray him by his passing mention. Had Jesus been but an historical figure He never could have loomed so large in the history of mankind. He would have been of no more importance than Judas the Galilean or Barabbas. But He was not just an historical figure. He was Jesus who is called the Christ, the only Son of the Eternal Father.

No philosophy of history could be true which does not rest upon this revealed truth. And so it would seem that any "philosophy" of history must needs be a branch of theology. Even for the non-Christian a philosophy of history would seem well nigh impossible. For Hegel, the modern reviver of philosophy of history, was (witness his unholy trinity of thesis, antithesis and synthesis) more of mystical theologian than a philosopher, as were his followers Marx and Engels. The greatest philosopher of history of all time was St. Augustine, whose *De Civitate Dei* is the classic work on the subject. And where does philosophy leave off and theology begin in that great work? "In the mind of St. Augustine," says Maritain, "both wisdoms, the philosophical and theological, worked together." Would it not be more to the point to say they were inseparable, since all the philosophizing has a theological basis in the *De Civitate Dei*?

This distinction of philosophy and theology as applied to history Mr. Maritain never quite makes clear. He does spend a great deal of space tilting with windmills, viz., "How can a philosophy of history be possible since History is not a science?" He has a fine critique of the "great irrationalist" Hegel. And once again he establishes the fact that Hegel was a mystical theologian rather than a philosopher—a theologian who

based his philosophy upon private revelation or intuition. But a cogent and convincing argument as to why there can be such a science as a philosophy of history: this is lacking.

As in *De Civitate Dei* it is impossible to separate the philosophy in this book from the theology. To argue that a philosophy of history is possible because the light of reason alone is used to arrive at certain conclusions does not prove the right to independent existence of a philosophy of history as a separate discipline, for even in theology philosophy is used in an ancillary manner. But theology is not philosophy, for its conclusions are based ultimately upon Divine Revelation. And it would seem that no matter to what extent philosophy is used in the evaluation of the history of mankind, its conclusions must ultimately be drawn to theology and revelation.

But if by the term "philosophy of history" one is not using the word philosophy in the strict sense, there certainly can be, indeed there must be, a philosophy of history. If the word philosophy is used (as it definitely is used by the moderns) to express a particular outlook on life, a frame of reference which includes both theology and religious belief, then a philosophy of history is inevitable and can only be avoided by the historian if he be content to be only a keeper of chronicles. This seems to be the sense in which Mr. Maritain uses the term, although he does, as I have stated, avoid, for the most part, a clear-cut definition of his approach. In the only instance where he attempts to distinguish the philosopher of history from the theologian, the distinction, to my mind, is invalid. Speaking of the great heresies, Mr. Maritain points out the difference (he claims) of the approach that would be taken to them as historical facts by the theologian and the philosopher:

"The theologian of history will observe that in the course of time, and despite the permanent impulse of such communities toward separation, a greater and greater number of those who are brought up in the religious communities involved are made, by reason of their good faith exempt from the sin of schism or heresy, so that these religious communities should not be called "heretical" or "schismatic," but simply "dissident."

"The philosopher of history will be mainly concerned with the effects and repercussions of the spiritual events in question on the history of the world and civilization."

It seems to me that this distinction would have a more valid application to the difference of concern between the speculative and practical theologian rather than between the philosopher and theologian.

Mr. Maritain divides his work into four parts under the following titles: I. The Philosophy of History in General; II. Axiomatic Formulas or Functional Laws; III. Typological Formulas or Vectorial Laws; IV. God and the Mystery of the World. Under the heading of Axiomatic Formulas, which deal with the "functional relation between certain intelligible characteristics,

certain universal objects of thought—a functional relation which exists and which can be verified in one way or another at each step of the development of human history,” Maritain lays down six laws: 1) “The law of twofold contrasting progress.” This law has its clearest expression in the Gospel parable of the wheat and the cockle. It concerns the existence of both good and evil in history and, indeed, the contribution made by the Devil under the divine government to human progress.

2) “The ambivalence of history, which is a consequence of the first law,” and by which “at each moment human history offers us two faces. One face gives grounds to the pessimist, who would like to condemn this period of history. And the other gives grounds to the optimist, who would like to see the same period as merely glorious [but] no period of human history can be absolutely condemned or absolutely approved.” According to Maritain, St. Gregory gave clear expression to this law when he wrote, “Men should know that the will of Satan is always unrighteous but his power is never unjust.” However, the same claim cannot be made for the text from Habacuc (which is cited by the wrong chapter and verse), viz., “*et egredietur diabolus ante pedes ejus.*” According to the best modern scholarship St. Jerome mistranslated “devil” for “lightning.” But even in Jerome’s interpretation this text would not confirm Maritain’s law of ambivalence.

3) “The law of historical fructification of good and evil deals with the relation between ethics and politics.” The gist of this law was expressed by the poet who wrote, “The mills of God grind slowly but they grind exceedingly fine.” Or as Maritain expresses it:

“The good in which the justice of human societies bears fruit, and the misfortune in which the injustice of human societies bears fruit have nothing to do with the immediate and visible results; historic duration must be taken into account. . . . The achievements of the great Machiavellianists seem durable to us, because our scale of duration-measurements is an exceedingly small one, with regard to the time proper to nations and human communities. We do not understand the fair play of God, Who gives those who have freely chosen injustice the time to exhaust the benefits of it and the fullness of its energies.”

4) “The law of world significance and history-making events” is still in the process of gestation in the mind of the philosopher. As Mr. Maritain expresses it: “I am still searching for the proper expression of a truth which I think I perceive but which seems to me to be rather difficult to formulate. My main difficulty has to do with the notion of the ‘unity of the world’ or the ‘unity of mankind’ and its true meaning.” Mr. Maritain suddenly decides that he is a philosopher of history and not a theologian and that since “there is in the world nothing akin to the spiritual unity of the Church . . . we must take care not to think of these things in terms of theological concepts like that of the “communion of

saints. " Although it seems entirely too simple a solution to the great problem that occupies Mr. Maritain's mind, I suggest that the expression for which he is searching (and which is not a theological concept) is "the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God."

5) "The law of *prise de conscience*" is the growth in awareness as the sign of human progress and as involving at the same time inherent dangers.

6) "The law of hierarchy of means" which consists of two laws: a) "the superiority of humble temporal means over rich temporal means with respect to spiritual ends"; and b) "the law of superiority of spiritual means of temporal activity and welfare over carnal means of temporal activity and welfare."

Of Vectorial laws there are four: 1) "The law of the passage from the 'magical' to the 'rational' regime or state in the history of human culture." It concerns the passage of mankind from symbol or magical sign, which speaks primarily to the imagination, and logical sign, which speaks primarily to the intellect.

2) "The law of the progress of moral conscience," Maritain considers to be "a most important law in the philosophy of history. In its essence and even in its value the rectitude and purity of moral conscience are independent of the explicit knowledge of all particular moral laws." As stated, this law appears to be identical with *synderesis*, the first principle of morality but such is not the case, for further on the author states, "As a matter of fact, the precise knowledge of these natural moral laws—with the exception of the self-evident primary principle, good is to be done and evil avoided—is acquired slowly and with more or less difficulty. I would say that the equipment necessary to know the particular precepts of the natural law exists within us—it is made up of the essential tendencies and inclinations of our nature. But a very long experience is required to have the corresponding knowledge through connaturality take actual form. In other words our knowledge of moral laws is progressive in nature . . . and certain of these norms, like the law of monogamy, were known rather late in the history of mankind so far as it is accessible to our investigation." This statement is contrary to the teaching of Christ, for in the Gospel of St. Matthew 19:7-8, we read: "They said to him, 'Why then did Moses command to give a written notice of dismissal and to put her away?' He said to them, 'Because Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives; but in the beginning it was not so.'" And what does Mr. Maritain mean by monogamy being known rather late in the history of mankind "so far as it is accessible to our investigation." Whose investigation? The anthropological authorities whom I follow, such as Schmidt and Cooper, do not agree with these findings. What authorities does Mr. Maritain follow? I am certain by that "our investigation" he is not implying that he is to be considered an authority on anthropology also.

Another error Mr. Maritain makes in his exposition of this "law" occurs on page 106 where he states: "We may cite a few of the other examples of this progress in moral conscience. One is the notion of the treatment to be given to prisoners of war. For many centuries, and even Christian centuries, it was considered quite normal to kill prisoners of war." I would ask him to specify the Christian century in which a Christian nation considered it "quite normal" to kill prisoners of war. Of the numerous footnotes he has in his book a great many are unnecessary. Where a footnote is demanded by the nature of the statement it is never to be found. Here, as in the statement above concerning monogamy, footnoting is a necessity.

Another statement that cries for, at least, a footnote is one made on page 107: "The notion that human labor is impossible without the whip of destitution—a notion quite wide-spread in the nineteenth century—seemed at that moment to be in accordance with the natural law. Even religion and a misreading of Adam's punishment in Genesis was made to contribute to this punishment." My question to Mr. Maritain: What religion? Whose interpretation?

3) "The law of the passage from 'sacral' to 'secular' or 'lay' civilization. The distinction between 'sacral' and 'secular' civilization has a universal bearing. Yet—by reason of the very distinction between the things that are Caesar's and the things that are God's—it is with Christianity that this distinction has taken its full historical importance."

4) "The law of the political and social coming of age of the people. This law . . . deals with the progressive passage of the people in the course of modern history, from the state of subjection to a state of self-government in political and social matters."

The last chapter of the book is concerned with God and the problem of evil. And here again Mr. Maritain seems to find it impossible to keep to a strict philosophy of history. For more than half the chapter is devoted to the Church as the Kingdom of God on earth. In this chapter, too, he makes one of those startling statements which no honest reviewer can pass without challenge. In a footnote on page 139 we are told that the novel "Grey Eminence" by Aldous Huxley which concerns the life of Father Joseph, the Franciscan adviser of Richelieu, is a "tragically true picture of a man who was a *real contemplative* in the spiritual order and a *real Machiavellian* in the temporal order." (italics mine) And that combination, I submit, is quite as impossible as a square circle.

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